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ELEVENTH ANNUAL SURVEY OF NORTH
CAROLINA CASE LAW*
The Eleventh Annual Survey of North Carolina Case Law is
designed to review cases decided by the North Carolina Supreme
Court during the period covered and to supplement past and future
Surveys in presenting developments in North Carolina case law over
a period of years.
It is not the purpose of the Survey to discuss all the cases that
were decided during the period of its coverage. It is intended to
discuss only those decisions which are of particular importance-
cases regarded as being of significance and interest to those concerned
with the work of the Court, and decisions which reflect substantial
changes and matters of first impression in North Carolina. Where a
case embraced within the period covered by the Survey has been the
subject of a note in the Review, the holding is briefly stated and the
note is cited.
Most of the research for and writing of this Survey was ac-
complished by selected members of the Student Board of Editors of
the Law Review, working under the supervision of the Faculty of the
School of Law of the University of North Carolina. Some sections,
however, represent the individual work of a faculty member.'
Student members of the Law Review, or candidates for member-
ship and the sections for which they are responsible are: Arch T.
Allen (Civil Procedure (Pleading & Parties)); Robert G. Baynes
(Credit Transactions and Sales) ; George M. Beasley III (Torts) ;
Scott N. Brown, Jr. (Criminal Law & Procedure); John S. John-
ston (Administrative Law, Municipal Corporations and Public
Utilities); DeWitt C. McCotter III (Domestic Relations and Taxa-
tion); Mrs. Ann II. Phillips (Real Property); Walter Rand III
(Agency & Workmen's Compensation); Arch K. Schoch IV (Evi-
dence); William Edward Shinn, Jr. (Equitable Remedies, Labor
Law and Trusts) ; James M. Talley, Jr. (Damages, Eminent Domain
and Wills & Administration); Marvin Edward Taylor, Jr. (Con-
* The period covered embraces the decisions of the North Carolina Su-
preme Court reported in 258 N.C. 211 through 260 N.C. 451.The survey of case law in the field of Trial Practice is reviewed by Pro-
fessor Herbert Baer.
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tracts and Insurance); Charles M. Whedbee (Conflict of Laws and
Constitutional Law).
Throughout this Survey the North Carolina Supreme Court will
be referred to as the "Court" unless it appears by its full title. The
United States Supreme Court will be designated only by its full name.
North Carolina General Statutes will be signified in text and textual
footnotes by "G.S."
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS OF FACT
An established principle relating to the validity of administrative
decisions is that there must be basic findings of fact which support
the conclusions of law.' Several recent cases are indicative of the
difficulties which administrative agencies have in applying this
principle.
In Moore v. Adams Elec. Co.,2 a workmen's compensation case,
the Industrial Commission found that two insurance companies were
not liable due to cancellation of the policies. The Supreme Court
remanded because there was no finding of fact as to whether in one
instance the employer had received any notice of the cancellation and
in the other instance there was no finding as to whether the proper
notice had been given.
Also, in Pardue v. Blackburn Bros. Oil & Tire Co.,8 the Com-
mission made an award, but the case was remanded because the
Commission failed to find any facts relating to whether the plaintiff,
at the time of the injury, was about his normal duties and was
performing such duties in the usual manner. Nor were there any
facts found from which these matters could be inferred.
The same principle was used in State Highway Comm'n v.
Clinchfield R.R.,4 where the Commission found that a grade
crossing was dangerous to the public safety. The Commission, how-
ever, failed to find any facts relating to the actual conditions at the
crossing. Furthermore, it did not appear that any evidence had been
offered concerning these conditions.
'See generally DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 163 (1951).
259 N.C. 735, 131 S.E.2d 356 (1963).
260 N.C. 413, 132 S.E.2d 747 (1963).
'260 N.C. 274, 132 S.E.2d 595 (1963).
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EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
In Sinodis v. Board of Alcoholic Control,5 the Board suspended
petitioners' permit to sell malt beverages on the basis of evidence
taken by a hearing examiner. Petitioners, seeking judicial review,
asserted that they were denied a proper hearing because they had no
opportunity to appear before the Board and because a copy of the
examiner's report was not made available to them. The Supreme
Court, rejecting petitioner's contention, pointed out that the Board
had promulgated rules governing hearings. Under these rules, the
petitioners could have obtained a hearing before the Board, and it
was implicit in these rules that petitioners could have obtained a
copy of the examiner's report if they had made such a request. More-
over, since the petitioners failed to request a hearing by the Board,
their request for judicial review had to be dismissed under the rule
requiring the prior exhaustion of administrative remedies.
JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Jarrell v. Board of Adjustment,' the Board found as a fact
that petitioner's building was not used as a two-family residence
when a zoning ordinance went into effect. Accordingly, under this
ordinance, the Board had no authority to grant petitioner a non-
conforming use of the property as a two-family residence in a one-
family residential area. The Board had based its finding of fact solely
on an affidavit as to what occupants had told affiant and one letter.
On judicial review, the lower court affirmed the Board's decision,
but the Supreme Court reversed. The Court relied on the general
judicial review statute,7 which provides the judicial review of ad-
ministrative decisions "unless adequate procedure for judicial review
is provided by some other statute, in which case the review shall be
had under such other statute."' The Court stated that the particular
review provided for the Board's decision would be adequate only if
the scope were equal to that under the general judicial review statute.
The latter includes in the grounds for reversal of the decision of an
administrative agency, that the decision is "unsupported by com-
petent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire record
'258 N.C. 282, 128 S.E.2d 587 (1962).
6258 N.C. 476, 128 S.E.2d 879 (1963).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-306 to -316 (1958).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307 (1958).
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as submitted.. . ."9 The Board's critical finding of fact based on the
affidavit and letter was unsupported as thus required.
Accordingly it is clear that the Court took the position that the
general judicial review statute provides the minimum scope of
judicial review which will be afforded.
In Ballenger Paving Co. v. Highway Comm'n,'° plaintiff filed a
claim for funds due on a construction contract which provided for
liquidated damages of one hundred dollars per day for any delay not
occasioned by unforeseeable causes. The Board of Review found that
there had been an eleven day delay, but that plaintiff was chargeable
with only nine of those days. The other two days were due to an
unforeseeable cause. Therefore the Board allowed a deduction of
nine hundred dollars from the sum due plaintiff.
Defendant appealed to the superior court, where the presiding
judge held that the findings of fact did not support the conclusion that
part of the delay was due to an unforeseeable cause. The correctness
of this ruling was not questioned on appeal. It would seem that the
plaintiff would therefore be chargeable with eleven days of delay;
however, the lower court went further. Although the Board had not
considered the question of whether the liquidated damage clause had
been properly invoked, the judge nevertheless considered this and
found that the facts indicated that the defendant Highway Com-
mission showed no concern about the delay and that there was no
evidence that the delay inconvenienced it. Therefore the defendant
was entitled to deduct only nominal damages, which the judge
assessed at nine hundred dollars, and accordingly approved the
amount of the Board's award.
The Supreme Court reversed, pointing out that under the ap-
plicable statute," the Court reviews only for errors of law. It may
not find additional facts. Therefore the lower court had no power
to make the additional finding that the Highway Commission had
suffered no damages as a result of the delay. Having held that the
delay was not due to an unforeseeable cause, the lower court should
have allowed the deduction of eleven hundred dollars for the full
'N.C. GEN. STAT. 143-315(5) (1958).
1258 N.C. 691, 129 S.E.2d 245 (1963). This case is discussed in
DAMAGES, Nominal Damages, infra.
1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-29 (1958).
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eleven days. The Court added that nine hundred dollars could not be
considered merely nominal damages.
In Thomas v. Board of Alcoholic Control,12 the Board suspended
permits to sell beer and wine on the ground that the licensee had sold
beer to a person under eighteen years of age. The evidence showed
that beer had been sold to Lawrence Reid. The evidence as to his
age was a birth certificate showing the birth of one Lawrence
Christopher Reid in another county. The superior court vacated the
order of suspension, and the Supreme Court affirmed on the ground
that under the general judicial review statute,'3 decisions of admin-
istrative agencies may be reversed for lack of competent evidence. 4
Here there was no competent evidence that the purchaser of the beer,
Lawrence Reid, was under eighteen years of age, since the birth
certificate was not shown to be the record of the birth of the
Lawrence Reid who bought the beer.
LIABILITY OF WITNESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS
In Robinson v. United States Cas. Co.,' plaintiff's driver's
license had been suspended by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,
and the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for having
given false testimony to the Commissioner, which had resulted in the
suspension. The Court held that such an action could not be main-
tained, mainly due to policy reasons against the intimidation of
witnesses. The plaintiff's only remedy was to contest the suspension
further before the Commissioner as allowed by statute.
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
In Cox v. Pitt County Transp. Co.,'" decedent's widow, after
having recovered under the workmen's compensation laws, demanded
damages for wrongful death from another party. This party paid
50,000 dollars into court for a full release. The insurance company
1' 258 N.C. 513, 128 S.E.2d 884 (1963).
"N3 .C. GEN. STAT. § 143-315(5) (1958).
"' See, e.g., Maley v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 214 N.C. 589, 200 S.E.
438 (1939), for a discussion of the role of otherwise inadmissible evidence
in administrative determinations. In Maley, the Court states that an award
will not stand "which is based on hearsay evidence uncorroborated by facts
and circumstances or other evidence." Id. at 594, 200 S.E. at 441.
12260 N.C. 284, 132 S.E.2d 629 (1963). This case is discussed in IN-
SumANCE, Automobile Liability Insurance, infra.
10259 N.C. 38, 129 S.E.2d 589 (1963).
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which was to pay the workmen's compensation award claimed that
they were subrogated to this 50,000 dollars to the extent of their
liability under the workmen's compensation award. Plaintiff there-
upon brought an action for a declaratory judgment, seeking a ruling
to the effect that the insurance company had no claim to the 50,000
dollars which the tortfeasor had paid into court. The Court dis-
missed the action on the ground that the Industrial Commission had
exclusive original jurisdiction to decide the question.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The general judicial review statute17 allows an appeal by any
person aggrieved by a final administrative decision. G.S. § 105-
241.3,18 concerning the judicial review of Tax Review Board deci-
sions, states that the taxpayer shall have an appeal to the superior
court from this Board under the general judicial review statute; how-
ever, there is no express provision allowing such an appeal by the
Commissioner.
In the case of In re Halifax Paper Co.,'9 the Court considered
whether there was jurisdiction to hear an appeal by the Commis-
sioner, since G.S. § 105-241.3 was enacted after the general judicial
review statute and G.S. § 105-241.3 does not expressly provide for
such an appeal. The Court held that there was jurisdiction, reason-
ing that the legislature was only collaterally dealing with the question
of appeal when the statute was enacted. Moreover, the Court did not
favor an amendment or repeal by implication of the general judicial
review statute.
The Court also considered the question of whether the Com-
missioner was an aggrieved person within the meaning of the general
judicial review statute. The Court pointed out that although an
administrative agency could not be a person aggrieved by its own
order, nevertheless it could still be an aggrieved person to secure
judicial review of a decision of an administrative reviewing agency.
In holding the Commissioner an aggrieved party, the Court stated:
"The Commissioner serves in a representative capacity, is charged
with an important public trust, and is aggrieved by the opinion ad-
verse to what he considers is a fair and correct interpretation of law
'
TN.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-307 (1958).18N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-241.3 (1958).
19259 N.C. 589, 131 S.E.2d 441 (1963).
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affecting his duties and affecting the public interest with which he is
charged."2
AGENCY AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AGENcY
Permissable Inferences from Co-ownership
If husband -and wife are co-owners of an automobile and the
wife's alleged negligence in operating the vehicle results in injury to
an "expense sharing" passenger, can the husband, in whose name
the vehicle is registered, be held liable under either the family pur-
pose doctrine or a partnership theory? Rushing v. Polk' answered
that on these facts alone, liability does not result to the husband by
either theory.
In reaching this conclusion the Court noted that registration of
an automobile in one's name is prima facie evidence of ownership,
2
but actual ownership may be proved by parol evidence.' If co-owner-
ship is established no liability is imposed on the absent co-owner
without proof of agency;4 therefore, the family purpose doctrine
could not apply to co-owners, nothing else appearing, because each
uses the automobile by his own right.5
20 Id. at 596, 131 S.E.2d at 446.
' 258 N.C. 256, 128 S.E.2d 675 (1962).
2 N.C. GEx. STAT. §20-71.1 (Supp. 1963).
' Carolina Discount Corp. v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N.C. 157, 129 S.E.
414 (1925).
'A sole or joint owner is not liable for damage done by his automobile
due to the fact of ownership alone. If such liability exists it is on the prin-
ciple of respondeat superior. See Gibbs v. Russ, 223 N.C. 349, 26 S.E.2d 909
(1943); Parrott v. Kantor, 216 N.C. 584, 6 S.E.2d 40 (1939); Leary v.
Virginia-Carolina Joint Land Bank, 215 N.C. 501, 2 S.E.2d 570 (1939).
The fact that the co-owners are husband and wife does not affect the re-
sult, since one spouse is not the agent of the other as a matter of law. General
Air Conditioning Co. v. Douglass, 241 N.C. 170, 84 S.E.2d 828 (1954) ; Pitt
v. Speight, 222 N.C. 585, 24 S.E.2d 350 (1943); Towles v. Fisher, 77 N.C.
437 (1877).
The family purpose doctrine is inapplicable in the principal case be-
cause the person sought to be held (husband) had no control over the vehicle
as to its use by the alleged negligent party. Control is a necessary element
for fixing liability under the family purpose doctrine. See Tart v. Register,
257 N.C. 161, 125 S.E.2d 754 (1962); Griffin v. Pancoast, 257 N.C. 52,
125 S.E.2d 310 (1962); Matthews v. Cheatham, 210 N.C. 592, 188 S.E. 87
(1936).
The basic function of the family purpose doctrine is to make the owner
of the vehicle liable for the negligence of his "agent." This is merely an
[Vol. 42
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The Court reasoned that the mere application of money received
from an "expense sharing" passenger to the upkeep of the automobile
would not make co-owners liable as partners in the legal sense,
because this is not sufficient to show a joint business undertaking
between the co-owners.0
Proof of Agency-Ratification
In Reverie Lingerie, Inc. v. McCainF process was served upon the
defendant Union's alleged agent. The Union contended that it was
not doing business in North Carolina s and denied the existence of an
authorized agent.
The Court recognized the general rule that declarations and
acts of the alleged agent are not sufficient by themselves to establish
the agency,' thereby implying that evidence tending to show that the
alleged agent had engaged in attempts to organize Reverie's em-
ployees might not be sufficient by itself to show the principal-agent
relationship.10 However, the Court held that when, prior to this
action, the Union filed suit with the National Labor Relations Board
charging Reverie with unfair labor practices, the Union ratified the
acts of the agent and proof of the relationship was complete.'"
extension of respondeat superior. See Grindstaff v. Watts, 254 N.C. 568, 119
S.E.2d 784 (1961); Robertson v. Aldridge, 185 N.C. 292, 116 S.E. 742
(1923).
' The Court distinguished between transporting passengers for hire and
transporting them for "expenses." 258 N.C. at 263, 128 S.E.2d at 681.
r258 N.C. 353, 128 S.E.2d 835 (1963). This case is discussed in LABoR
LAW, Vicarious Liability of Parent for Local's Misconduct, infra; TRI
PRAcTicE, Process-Waiver of Immunity, infra.
' Process was also served upon the Secretary of State under N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1-97 (6) (1953), which provides that unincorporated associations
doing business in the state are to appoint agents upon whom process may be
served, and if no process agent is appointed, the association is bound by
service on the Secretary of State.
'E.g., Sealy v. Albany Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 774, 117 S.E.2d 744 (1961);
D'Armour v. Beeson Hardware Co., 217 N.C. 568, 9 S.E.2d 12 (1940).
" The Court did not state that the alleged agent's actions were insuffi-
cient to prove the relationship in the principal case. On the contrary the
Court stated that if the agent's actions and declarations were such that the
principal had knowledge and acquiesced in them, then the agent's acts and
declarations are admissable as evidence. Accord, Smith v. Kappas, 218 N.C.
758, 12 S.E.2d 693 (1941) (dictum).
"Ratification by a suit attempting to enforce the benefits of the "un-
authorized" agent's action is well accepted in North Carolina. See, e.g.,
Lawson v. Bank of Bladenboro, 203 N.C. 368, 166 S.E. 177 (1932); Alex.
Sprunt & Sons v. May, 156 N.C. 388, 72 S.E. 821 (1911); Beeson v. Smith,
149 N.C. 142, 62 S.E. 888 (1908).
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Accidents Arising Out of Employment
An employee's duties were divided between operating a fork lift
truck and serving as a cook, chauffeur, and valet for company execu-
tives as additional compensation to them. The employee frequently
accompanied a particular executive to a weekend cottage where the
employee served as a general utility man, for which he was paid for
an eight hour day by the company. During one such weekend
excursion the executive consented to his young son's request that the
employee be allowed to accompany him and an older son on a short
hunting trip. Returning to the cottage the employee was killed in an
automobile accident.
Lewis v. W. B. Lea Tobacco Co.Y denied compensation on the
ground that there was no causal relationship between the employ-
ment and the automobile accident, so the injury did not arise out of
the employment. The Court reasoned that the employee was not
performing any of his customary duties while on the trip; the execu-
tive did not order the employee to go on the trip ;13 and the trip was of
no benefit to the business of the employer.' 4 It was further stated
Where the principal brings suit on an unauthorized contract, the suit
automatically ratifies the agent's acts, because the principal would have no
right except for the agent's actions. Reverie appears distinguishable from
this type suit because the Union received no additional rights from the al-
leged agent's acts. The Union could have made the unfair labor practice
charge without having an agent in North Carolina. See TWENTY-EIGHTE
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARm 63 (1963).
Thus it appears that bringing the unfair labor practice charge constituted
conduct which the Court interpreted as ratifying the alleged agent's actions.
12260 N.C. 410, 132 S.E.2d 877 (1963).
"In Kelly v. Hackensack Water Co., 10 N.J. Super. 528 (App. Div.),
77 A.2d 467 (1950), aff'd, 23 N.J. Super. 88 (App. Div.), 92 A.2d 506
(1952), the court recognized that the circumstances surrounding the act
would determine whether the employee was compelled to do it. A direct order
is not necessary. Accord, Miller v. Keystone Appliance, Inc., 133 Pa. Super.
354, 2 A.2d 508 (1938).
" The requirement that the act resulting in the injury be of benefit to
the employer, rather than a third person or the employee himself, is well
accepted. Burnett v. Palmer-Lipe Paint Co., 216 N.C. 204, 4 S.E.2d 507
(1939), denied compensation when an employee, who was employed pri-
marily as a painter's helper but who also did yard work at his employer's
home, was injured while mowing his employer's lawn. The Court said that
the injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, because
the yard work did not benefit the company. Accord, Beavers v. Lily Mill &
Power Co., 205 N.C. 34, 169 S.E. 825 (1933), where a company foreman
instructed another employee to pose for a group picture, the employee's
[Vol. 42
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that the trip was not a risk inherent in the employee's job.'5
Such a decision as Lewis places an employee whose job entails the
performance of personal services for other employees as well as the
performance of "regular" business duties in an impossible position.
By performing the personal services the employee risks the loss of
Workmen's Compensation coverage,' and by refusing he risks dis-
missal from employment. No rules of law need be changed to remedy
this result; all that is necessary is a broader interpretation of such
terms as "arising out of... the employment," as required by
G.S. § 97-2, and "benefit to the employer's business," which has been
made an indispensable requirement by North Carolina case law.17
Borrowed Servants
G.S. § 97-918 is interpreted as preventing an injured employee,
who is covered by Workmen's Compensation, from bringing an
action for the injury against a co-employee.' 9 Weaver v. Bennett2 °
further clarified the statute by holding that the exemption does not
apply to borrowed servants.2
seat collapsed and she was injured. Compensation was not allowed be-
cause the employer had no interest in the proceeds derived from the picture.
Lewis is distinguishable from Burnett and Beavers, because in Lewis
the employee's acts were an indirect benefit to the employer by making the
company a more attractive one to executives. See 1 LARsoN, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 20.00 (1952). A liberal construction of "benefit
to the employer" would seem warranted by Guest v. Brenner Iron & Metal
Co., 241 N.C. 448, 85 S.E.2d 596 (1955), where the Court based the decision
in part on the fact that "plaintiff's response was reasonable and natural.
He had reasonable grounds to believe that what he was doing was incidental
to his employment and beneficial to his employer...." Id. at 453, 85 S.E.2d
at 600.
" This requirement would seem only another method of stating that
the injury must arise out of the employment. See Goodwin v. Bright, 202
N.C. 481, 163 S.E. 576 (1932).
" As the employee loses the right to recover for injury because of its
designation as "work-connected," he gains the right to sue his employer or a
co-employee on the basis of fault. See 1 LAsoN, op. cit. supra note 14, § 2.
2 See note 14 supra.1 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-9 (1958). The statute is to the effect that neither
the employer nor "those conducting his business" can be sued by the injured
employee.
" Warner v. Leder, 234 N.C. 727, 69 S.E.2d 6 (1952) ; Bass v. Ingold,
232 N.C. 295, 60 S.E.2d 114 (1950); Essick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C.
200, 60 S.E.2d 106 (1950).20259 N.C. 16, 129 S.E.2d 610 (1963).
" For a criticism of this decision see 42 N.C.L. REv. 251 (1964).
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Occupational Disease-Silicosis
In order for a death to be compensable it must result from an ac-
cident sustained in the course of and arising out of the deceased's
employment. 2 The Court uncovered an exception to this rule in
Davis v. North Carolina Granite Corp.
2 3
In Davis the employee contracted silicosis as a result of his em-
ployment and began receiving disability payments under Workmen's
Compensation. While receiving disability payments the employee
died from a heart attack, a cause totally unrelated to silicosis.
In reversing the Commission's denial of compensation for death
the Court held that G.S. § 97-61.6, which provides that compensation
is due "should death result from ... silicosis within two years from
the date of last exposure, or should death result within 350 weeks
from the date of last exposure and while the employee is entitled to
compensation for disablement . . . ." does not require a causal rela-
tionship to exist between death and employment when the employee
is receiving compensation at death. The Court's decision was based
upon the "plain meaning" rule24 of statutory interpretation.
It would seem that G.S. § 97-61.6 might also be interpreted from
the viewpoint of legislative intent. It is firmly established that the
basic rationale of Workmen's Compensation requires a "causal con-
nection" between the employment and the injury.2 5 This would lead
to the conclusion that "from silicosis" was inadvertently omitted
from the second clause of the statute, and that the words "should
death result" in the second clause relate back to "from silicosis" in
the first clause.2 ' The Court found, however, that the second clause
2 N.C. GF:-. STAT. §§97-2(6), (10) (1958).23259 N.C. 672, 131 S.E.2d 335 (1963).
2, "[W]hen language is clear and unambiguous it must be held to mean
what it plainly expresses." 2 SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRuCTION § 4702, at 334 (3d ed. 1943).25A "causal connection" between employment and injury is required in
all North Carolina cases. See, e.g., Sandy v. Stackhouse, Inc., 258 N.C.
194, 128 S.E.2d 218 (1962) ; Vause v. Vause Farm Equip. Co., 233 N.C. 88,
63 S.E.2d 173 (1951). Workmen's Compensation is not to provide general
health insurance, but to compensate for industrial injuries. Duncan v. City
of Charlotte, 234 N.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 22 (1951); Conrad v. Cook-Lewis
Foundry Co., 198 N.C. 723, 153 S.E. 266 (1930).
20 "Result" is defined as "to proceed, spring, or arise, as a consequence,
effect or conclusion." WEBSTER'S Nnv INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2126
(2d ed. 1940). The choice of "result" would seem to indicate that it should
relate back to "from silicosis"; if relation back was not intended "ensue,"
"occur," or "follow" might be more descriptive.
[Vol. 42
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was independent of the first and that it expressed an exception to the
scheme of Workmen's Compensation, due to the nature of silicosis.
Therefore, the Court felt bound by the "plain meaning" rule; how-
ever, the antithesis of that rule, that a "plain meaning" should not be
followed when it leads to results clearly not intended by the legisla-
ture27 would seem equally applicable.
Suicide Caused by a Compensable Injury
When an employee who has suffered a compensable injury later
commits suicide because of insanity produced by the prior injury,
may there be a recovery for the death under Workmen's Compensa-
tion? This question was presented in Painter v. Mead Corp.",
G.S. § 97-12 specifies that compensation is denied if death is
caused by "the willful intention of the employee to... kill himself."
Thus the question of primary concern is to what extent the employee
must be deprived of his reasoning to remove the case from the
"willful" category under the statute. There is conflicting authority
here-the "Massachusetts rule" requires the suicide to be the result
of "an uncontrollable and irresistable impulse" and requires that
death occur without "conscious volition" to produce it;2 the English
rule merely requires that the suicide be the result of a compensable
injury which produces insanity.80
27 "One who contends that a section of an act must not be read literally
must show either that some other section expands or restricts its meaning,
that the section itself is repugnant to the general purview of the act, or the
act considered in pariv ateria with other acts, or with the legislative history
of the subject matter, imports a different meaning." 2 SUTHiERLAND, Op. Cit.
supra note 24, § 4702, at 335.2_58 N.C. 741, 129 S.E.2d 482 (1963).
20 This rule originated from Sponatski's Case, 220 Mass. 526, 108 N.E.
466 (1915). However, Massachusetts has since adopted the more liberal
rule by statute. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 152, § 26A (1937). The Sponatski
case is still followed by a majority of the courts. See, e.g., Cubit v. City of
Philadelphia, 138 Pa. Super. 325, 10 A.2d 853 (1940); McFarland v. De-
partment of Labor & Indus., 188 Wash. 357, 62 P.2d 714 (1936); Barber v.
Industrial Comm'n, 241 Wis. 462, 6 N.W.2d 199 (1942).
" Marriott v. Maltby Main Colliery Co., 13 B.W.C.C. 353 (C.A. 1920);
Graham v. Christie, 10 B.W.C.C. 486 (Scot. 1916). This view has been
accepted by California, Florida, Mississippi, New York, and Ohio. See
Burnight v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 181 Cal. App. 2d 816, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 786 (1960); Whitehead v. Keene Roofing Co., 43 So. 2d 464 (Fla.
1949); Prentiss Truck & Tractor Co. v. Spencer, 228 Miss. 66, 87 So. 2d
272 (1956); Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431
(1928); Burnett v. Industrial Comm'n, 87 Ohio App. 441, 93 N.E.2d 41
(1949).
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In affirming the award of compensation as being justified by the
evidence, the Court did not choose between the two rules, even
though the Commission had applied the harsher "Massachusetts
rule" in making a determination of the issue. Since the Court found
that the evidence was sufficient to support compensation under either
rule3 1 it would seem that Painter would have been a good place to
declare future policy. This may indirectly result from the Court's
specific statement that Painter should not be read as approving of the
"Massachusetts rule"; this statement seems to leave the way open
for adoption of the more liberal English rule."
CIVIL PROCEDURE
(PLEADING AND PARTIES)
PLEADING
Alternative Remedies
In Wirth v. Bracey,' plaintiffs were allowed to maintain actions
for negligence against a state employee notwithstanding prior filing
of claims with the Industrial Commission under the Tort Claims
Act.2 While the claims were pending before the Industrial Com-
mission, the trial judge overruled defendant's plea in abatement and
plea in bar, both of which were based on the claims pending before
the Industrial Commission. The Court affirmed. The claims before
the Industrial Commission, being sui generis rather than civil actions
instituted under and subject to the Code of Civil Procedure, were held
not to constitute "another action"' within the meaning of G.S. § 1-
" The Court affirmed the Commission's finding that the deceased became
"insane and mentally deranged to such an extent that he became delirious
and frenzied without rational knowledge of the physical consequence of his
act, without conscious volition to produce death... ." 258 N.C. at 746, 129
S.E.2d at 485. Such a finding would also make the death compensable under
the English rule which only requires that the compensable injury produce
insanity, which in turn, produces death.
"2 See 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rnv. 673 (1961), which criticizes the "Massachusetts
rule" as being based on the "fault" concept of criminal law and tort, and
precluding a liberal construction of the statute.
1258 N.C. 505, 128 S.E.2d 810 (1963).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-291 to -300.1 (Supp. 1963).
'"The defendant may demur to the complaint when it appears upon the
face thereof,... that: ... 3. There is another action pending between the same
parties for the same cause .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-127 (1953).
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127. Nor were the claims "between the same parties"4 as provided
therein, because the claims under the Tort Claims Act were against
the State. Furthermore, the Court rejected defendant's contention
that plaintiffs should be forced to an election of remedies, holding
that plaintiffs' claims were not inconsistent.5 The Court reasoned
that the legislature intended the Tort Claims Act as an enlargement
of the rights and remedies available persons injured by the actionable
negligence of state employees, but added that such persons are not
to recover in excess of the damages sustained.'
Contribution
In Pearsall v. Duke Power Co.,7 P sought recovery from D for
personal injuries allegedly caused by D's negligence. Under G.S. § 1-
240, D alleged the right to contribution from T. The jury found D
negligent, but it exonerated T. Judgment was entered accordingly.
Within time for appeal, D paid the judgment and then accepted its
assignment and transfer. D then appealed the case for contribution
from T. The Court found error and granted a new trial on the issue
of T's negligence. In hearing the appeal, the Court rejected T's con-
tention that by paying and taking an assignment of the judgment D
forfeited the right to have his claim for contribution reviewed. As
stated by the Court: "It would be manifestly unjust to compel ...
[D] to withhold compensation from plaintiff until its rights, if any,
against... [T] had been determined.""
Demurrer-Dismissal or Amendment
A complaint subject to demurrer for failure to "state facts suf-
ficient to constitute a cause of action"9 is generally described as either
a "defective statement of a good cause of action"'" or a "statement
'Ibid.
"The whole doctrine of election is based on the theory that there are
inconsistent rights or remedies of which a party may avail himself, and a
choice of one is held to be an election not to pursue the other. The principle
does not apply to co-existing and consistent remedies." Standard Sewing
Mach. Co. v. Owings, 140 N.C. 503, 505, 53 S.E. 345, 346 (1906). Accord,
Thomas v. Catawba College, 248 N.C. 609, 104 S.E.2d 175 (1958).
0 Under the Tort Claims Act, "in no event shall the amount of damages
awarded exceed the sum of ten thousand dollars ... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-
291 (1958).
258 N.C. 639, 129 S.E.2d 217 (1963).8Id. at 643, 129 S.E.2d at 220.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-127 (1953).
10 "When, however, there is an enforceable cause of action stated but
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of a defective cause of action."' 1 Although the distinction between
the two types of insufficiency determines whether amendment or
dismissal results," it "is not always clearly defined."' Under the
leadership of Bobbitt, J., however, the Court has begun using lan-
guage more suggestive of the nature of the insufficiency. By this
language, dismissal results, "only if the allegations of the complaint
affirmatively disclose... that plaintiff has no cause of action against
the defendant."' 4 Some recent opinions by other justices use similar
language.' 5 Further use of this language is desirable if only as a
matter of semantics, for its apt description of the defect indicates the
result more clearly than the traditional phraseology.
the statement thereof is inartificially expressed, or is in general terms, or
the facts are not clearly and definitely stated, or it is lacking in some material
allegation, it constitutes a defective statement of a good cause." Davis v.
Rhodes, 231 N.C. 71, 73, 56 S.E.2d 43, 45 (1949).
""When the defect goes to the substance of the cause and not to the
form of the statement, it is a defective cause of action which cannot be made
good by adding other allegations not included in the original complaint. It
is in no event, however expertly stated, an enforceable cause of action."
Ibid.
.12 "In each instance, the demurrer should be sustained. Where there is a
defective statement of a good cause of action, the complaint is subject to
amendment; and the action should not be dismissed until the time for ob-
taining leave to amend has expired.... But where there is a statement of a
defective cause of action, final judgment dismissing the action should be
entered." Mills v. Richardson, 240 N.C. 187, 190, 81 S.E.2d 409, 411 (1954).
18 1 MCINTOSHr, NoRT CAROLINA PRACrICE & PROCEDURE § 1189, at
645 (2d ed. 1956).
1, Skipper v. Cheatham, 249 N.C. 706, 711, 107 S.E.2d 625, 629 (1959).
(Emphasis added.) Accord, East Carolina Lumber Co. v. Pamlico County,
250 N.C. 681, 110 S.E.2d 278 (1959); Elliott v. Goss, 250 N.C. 185, 108
S.E.2d 475 (1959).
" In Ingram v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 258 N.C. 632, 129 S.E.2d 222
(1963), the Court affirmed the sustaining of a demurrer to the complaint, but
found error in dismissal because it did not find that "the allegations of the
complaint affirmatively disclose that plaintiff has no cause of action against
the defendant." Id. at 639, 129 S.E.2d at 228. The same result was reached
in Murray v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., 259 N.C. 638, 131 S.E.2d 367 (1963),
where there was no finding that "the facts stated affirmatively showed that
plaintiff did not have a cause of action." Id. at 642, 131 S.E.2d at 371. Less
significant language is found in Johnson v. Johnson, 259 N.C. 430, 130 S.E.2d
876 (1963), where dismissal was affirmed because "a study of plaintiff's...
allegations of fact affirmatively shows that it [the complaint] contains a
statement of a defective cause of action .... ." Id. at 440, 130 S.E.2d at 883-84.
Ingram v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., supra, is discussed in Real Party in
Interest, infra; Murray v. Bensen Aircraft Corp., supra, is discussed in
SALES, Warranty, infra; Johnson v. Johnson, supra, is discussed in TRusTs,
Trustee's Power of Sale-Necessity of Allegations in Action, infra.
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Motion to Make More Definite and Certain
In Clement v. Koch,'6 plaintiff appealed a judgment sustaining
defendant's demurrer and dismissing the action. Upon concluding
that defendant's objections were without merit, the Court reversed.
The Court stated, however, that the complaint met no more than
minimum requirements. To rectify this situation, the Court advised
that the proper procedure was to move that plaintiff be required to
make his complaint more definite and certain.Y1 The distinction be-
tween the proper functions of a demurrer and a motion to make more
definite and certain has not always been observed.'" If a demurrer is
sustained, where instead a motion to make more definite and certain
should be granted, the allowance of amendment usually saves plain-
tiffs from harsh results. Problems arise, however, as in Webb v.
Eggleston,'0 where the demurrer was sustained with express leave to
amend, but the statute of limitations ran before plaintiff filed an
amendment, thereby defeating the action.
The plaintiff in Gaskins v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. 2 0 was faced
with a situation analogous to that presented the plaintiff in Webb v.
Eggleston, but fortunately was spared the same fate. In Gaskins,
plaintiff sought recovery on a fire insurance policy issued by defend-
ant. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained upon stipulation by
counsel for both parties that the complaint failed to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action,' but plaintiff was allowed
259 N.C. 122, 130 S.E.2d 65 (1963).
17 "When the allegations of a pleading are so indefinite or uncertain that
the precise nature of the charge or defense is not apparent, the court may
require the pleading to be made definite and certain by amendment .... "
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-153 (Supp. 1963). "When, however, the complaint al-
leges or attempts to allege a good cause of action but is defective in that it
does not definitely and sufficiently set out all the essential, ultimate facts, or
is inartificially stated, or is in general terms, demurrer will not lie if, when
liberally construed, the allegations are sufficiently intelligible to inform the
defendant as to what he is required to answer. The remedy is by motion to
make the complaint more definite." Davis v. Rhodes, 231 N.C. 71, 74, 56
S.E.2d 43, 45 (1949).
" "When, as is often the case, counsel resort to a demurrer, rather than a
motion to make more definite, to challenge the sufficiency of the statement
of a good cause of action and the defect may be cured by amendment, the
courts will allow the amendment rather than dismiss the action." Id. at 74,
56 S.E.2d at 46.
228 N.C. 574, 46 S.E.2d 700 (1948).
"0260 N.C. 122, 131 S.E.2d 872 (1963).
The complaint was deemed insufficient "for that (1) it appeared the
contract was without consideration and (2) there was no allegation that
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leave to amend. The plaintiff amended within thirty days. While
the action had been instituted within twelve months of the loss as
required by G.S. § 58-176,2 the amendment was filed subsequent
to the twelve month period. The defendant's demurrer on grounds that
the limitation period had expired was overruled by the trial court.
The Court affirmed, ruling that the policy provision requiring com-
mencement of the action within twelve months after loss was con-
tractual and therefore subject to waiver or estoppel. In dictum, how-
ever, the Court took pains to indicate that the original complaint was
not subject to demurrer but only to a motion to make more definite
and certain, and that plaintiff's counsel could not be allowed to stip-
ulate away plaintiff's case as the Webb v. Eggleston precedent might
suggest.
Motion to Strike
While no direct appeal ordinarily lies from an order allowing a
motion to strike,2 3 a direct appeal is allowed when the motion to
strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint and is therefore
a demurrer in substance.24 In Chas. H. Jenkins & Co. v. Lewis,"
direct appeal was allowed from an order striking an affirmative
defense in its entirety, since the motion to strike was a demurrer in
substance.
Releases
In Simpson v. Plyler,2" the Court held that a covenant not to sue
one of two joint tort-feasors, entry of a consent judgment pursuant
thereto, and subsequent satisfaction of the judgment constituted a
plaintiff had an insurable interest in the property which was destroyed." Id.
at 123, 131 S.E.2d at 873. Plaintiff's subsequent amendment merely supplied
these specific averments.
2 N.C. GEx. STAT. § 58-176 (1960), provides for the Standard Fire In-
surance Policy.
2 ""[T]his Court will not entertain an appeal:... (2) From an order
striking or denying a motion to strike allegations contained in pleadings.
When a party conceives that such order will be prejudicial to him on the
final hearing of said cause, he may petition this Court for a writ of certiorari
within thirty days from the date of the entry of the order." N.C. Sup. CT. R.
4(A).
2" See Williams v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 754, 127 S.E2d 546 (1962).
26259 N.C. 85, 130 S.E.2d 49 (1963).
2258 N.C. 390, 128 S.E.2d 843 (1963). This case is discussed in TORTS,
Negligence, infra; TRIAL PRAcTIcE, Judgments-Consent Judgment as
Waiver of Claim Against Joint Tortfeasor, infra.
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release of the other tort-feasor as well, notwithstanding recitals to the
contrary. This case is the subject of a previous note in the Review. 7
Rights of an Insurer after Partial Payment of a Loss
The rights of an insurer paying only a portion of a loss were con-
sidered in Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Spivey.2 The plaintiff insur-
ance company paid all but the deductible amount on an automobile
collision policy and took from its insured a release and assignment of
the insured's claim to the extent of the amount paid. The tort-feasor
responsible for the loss was notified of the assignment. Thereafter,
the tort-feasor settled by consent judgment with the insured for that
portion of his loss not paid by the insurance company.29 When the
insurance company sued for compensation for the amount paid on
the loss, the tort-feasor relied on the settlement and a proposition
stated in Burgess v. TrevathanW0 to defeat the action. The Court dis-
agreed, holding that the insurer had a cause of action for compensa-
tion. As stated by the Court: "[T] he tort-feasor who has knowledge
of insurer's rights cannot, by settling with claimant for the rights
remaining in him, defeat the insurer's rights." 31
Subject of the Action
In Burton v. Dixon,32 plaintiff sought to recover for services
rendered defendant's intestate. Plaintiff alleged that defendant's
intestate lived with plaintiff and her husband, that he had promised
to compensate her for services, care, and support rendered him by
2742 N.C.L. Rnv. 429 (1964).
28259 N.C. 732, 131 S.E.2d 338 (1963).
2o The consent judgment was entered in an action for personal injury as
well as the uncompensated portion of the loss.
2 236 N.C. 157, 72 S.E.2d 231 (1952). "4. Where the insurance paid by
the insurance company covers only a portion of the loss, the insured is a
necessary party plaintiff in any action against the tort-feasor for the loss.
The insured may recover judgment against the tort-feasor in such case
for the full amount of the loss without the joinder of the insurance company.
He holds the proceeds of the judgment, however, as a trustee for the benefit
of the insurance company to the extent of the insurance paid by it." Id. at
160, 72 S.E.2d at 233. The Court in the principal case upheld the validity of
this statement of law, but rejected defendant's contention that it controlled,
relying instead on Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C. 290, 88 S.E. 426
(1916).
21259 N.C. 732, 734, 131 S.E.2d 338, 340. Accord, Phillips vs. Alston,
257 N.C. 255, 125 S.E.2d 580 (1962); Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N.C.
290, 88 S.E. 426 (1916).
2 259 N.C. 473, 131 S.E.2d 27 (1963). Also discussed in Proper Parties,
infra.
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providing for her in his will, and that no such provision was made.
Defendant denied plaintiff's material allegations. In a counterclaim,
defendant alleged in effect that plaintiff and her husband conspired
to gain control of the intestate's assets, that they persuaded the
intestate to sign a legal instrument purporting to be a power of at-
torney over the property of intestate, and that by virtue of the power
of attorney they sold timber and collected rents from the intestate's
property, converting the proceeds to their own use. The Court
allowed the counterclaim, holding that there was no misjoinder of
causes and parties.
If he meets the requirements of G.S. § 1-137, a defendant may
litigate in the one action a counterclaim "connected with the subject
of the action." 38 The Court found defendant's counterclaim connected
with the subject of plaintiff's action, namely, the alleged contract
between plaintiff and defendant's intestate.8 4 The Court reasoned
that the services plaintiff was to render the intestate under the alleged
contract may. have included the sale of timber and the collection of
rent. If such were not the case, the Court reasoned that the alleged
failure of performance by the intestate could have resulted from his
properly considering the conversion of his assets when it came time
for him to perform.
The Court's opinion, per Moore, J., indicates commendable
willingness to find a connection with the subject of the action. Per-
haps the Court will now find satisfaction of that requirement under
both G.S. § 1-137 and G.S. § 1-12335 more easily than in the past.80
" N.C. GuN. STAT. § 1-137 (1953).
""The 'subject of the action' means, in this connection, the thing in re-
spect to which plaintiff's right of action is asserted, whether it be specific
property, a contract, a threatened or violated right, or other thing concerning
which an action may be brought and litigation had." Hancammon v. Carr,
229 N.C. 52, 55, 47 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1948).
" "The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes of action,
of legal or equitable nature, or both, where they all arise out of - 1. The
same transaction, or transaction connected with the same subject of action."
-N.C. Gm, . STAT. § 1-123 (1953). -
" Compare Pressley v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 226 N.C. 518,
39 S.E.2d 382 (1946), where plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to join against
his employer causes of action for (1) injury caused by negligence, and (2)
wrongful discharge for refusal to sign a release from liability for the injury.
The Court found different subjects of action. "This is certainly a situation
in which common sense indicates that joinder ought to be permitted. There
is an argument to be made that the basic subject of action is the negligent in-
jury, and that the transaction involving the discharge is a transaction 'con-
[Vol. 42
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Two factors, however, prevent reaching that general conclusion.
First, the litigation involved the assets of an estate.3 7 And second, as
expressed by the Court, "the adjustment of plaintiff's claim and
defendant's counterclaim is necessary to a full and final determination
of the controversy.
3 8
Variance
As previously noted in the Review, 9 Whichard v. Lipe4 ° intro-
duced a strict view of variance by which parties are held substantially
to proof of those facts alleged as the basis of their cause of action, and
of those facts alone. A "material variance" is now said to be "fatal"
even though the evidence at variance has not been objected to, and a
"material and fatal" variance requires nonsuit, a result formerly re-
quired only when the discrepancy could be characterized as a "total
failure of proof" as contemplated in G.S. § 1-169.
In Noland v. Brown, 1 proof that plaintiff worked an eight-hour
day where the allegation had been that plaintiff worked a twenty-
hour day was held to constitute a material variance, thus requiring
nonsuit in plaintiff's action to recover for services rendered under an
alleged contract. On the other hand, in Chappell v. Winslow,42 where
plaintiffs alleged and sought to enjoin defendants' construction of
north-south ditches, but their evidence showed they were attempting
to prevent connection of east-west ditches with a highway drainage
ditch, the Court found no material variance. Properly emphasized
was the critical factor that "no element of surprise appears. ' 43 Thus,
in Chappell v. Winslow, the Court adhered to the statutory scheme
that "no variance between the allegation in a pleading and the proof
shall be deemed material, unless it has actually misled the adverse
party to his prejudice in maintaining his action upon the merits."44
nected with' that subject." Brandis, Permissive Joinder of Parties and Causes
in North Carolina, 25 N.C.L. REv. 1, 12 (1946).
"' "In litigation involving the assets of an estate, even though complicated
as to parties and involving multiple demands for relief, objection for mis-
joinder of causes and parties has an excellent chance of being overruled."
Brandis, supra note 36, at 22.
88259 N.C. 473, 479, 131 S.E.2d 27, 32.
41 N.C.L. REv. 647 (1963).
'0221 N.C. 53, 19 S.E.2d 14 (1942).
41258 N.C. 778, 129 S.E.2d 477 (1963).
4 258 N.C. 617, 129 S.E.2d 101 (1963).
Id. at 622, 129 S.E.2d at 105.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-168 (1953).
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PARTIES
Joinder of Parties and Causes
In Conger v. Travelers Ins. Co.,45 the Court allowed joinder of
alternative causes of action against two defendants. Plaintiff alleged
that the first defendant was liable on an insurance policy, or, in the
alternative, that the second defendant was liable for failure to pay
the premiums on the policy. This case is the subject of a previous
note in the Review.46
While a plaintiff may not ordinarily join in one cause of action
claims against the owners of different tracts of land, dictum in
Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins47 suggests that urban renewal
condemnation proceedings should be tried in one action for the whole
planned area, leaving the question of just compensation due each land-
owner for determination in seperate inquiries.
Proper Parties
In Burton v. Dixon,4 the Court allowed defendant to set up a
counterclaim against plaintiff and her husband for conspiracy. The
husband was a Virginia resident, and not then a party. But because
conspirators are jointly and severally liable, the Court reasoned that
the counterclaim could be maintained, "with or without the husband
as a party."49 Yet if jurisdiction could be lawfully acquired over
him," the Court regarded him as "a proper, and perhaps a necessary,
party." 51
"'260 N.C. 112, 131 S.E.2d 889 (1963).
" 42 N.C.L. REv. 242 (1963).
'1258 N.C. 220, 225, 128 S.E.2d 391, 394 (1962). This case is discussed
in EMINENT DOMAIN, infra., and in MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS, Urban Re-
development, infra.
"259 N.C. 473, 131 S.E.2d 27 (1963). Also discussed in Subject of the
Action, supra.
'Id. at 478, 131 S.E.2d at 31.
"' The Court observed that a party over whom there is no jurisdiction
cannot be ordered before a court as a proper or necessary party to an action.
Because the action was in personam, jurisdiction could be acquired only by
personal service of process within the State, or by acceptance of service, or
or by general appearance, active or constructive. See Worlick v. H.P.
Reynolds & Co., 151 N.C. 606, 66 S.E. 657 (1910). See generally 1 Mc-
INTOsHr, op. cit. supra note 13, §§ 911-17.
0259 N.C. at 480, 131 S.E.2d at 32. An inconsistency is apparent.
Because the counterclaim could be maintained "with or withou't the husband
as a party," he cannot be a "necessary party." "A person is a necessary party
to an action when he is so vitally interested in the controversy involved in
the action that a valid judgment cannot be rendered in the action completely
[Vol. 42
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Plaintiffs in Simon v. Board of Educ.52 sought to recover the
alleged balance due on a construction contract entered into with
defendant. Denying plaintiffs' allegation of substantial performance
of the contract, defendant alleged that breach of the contract neces-
sitated employment of additional parties and supervising architects
to complete the construction, and that the architects should be com-
pensated from the balance plaintiffs claimed due. On defendant's
motion, the architects were ordered to interplead. Plaintiffs appealed,
assigning as error the order making the architects additional parties.
Although the Court dismissed plaintiffs' appeal,13 it rejected the
grounds on which the architects were made parties. The defendant
was not entitled to a bill of interpleader 4 because he had an interest
in the subject matter and furthermore because the plaintiffs and the
architects did not claim a common fund. Nor was defendant entitled
to a bill in the nature of an interpleader,55 as no common source or
obligation gave rise to the claims of plaintiffs and the architects.
Since a complete adjudication of the controversy between plaintiffs
and defendant was possible without directly affecting the architects
rights, they were not necessary parties whose presence could be com-
pelled under the first section of G.S. § 1-73."6
Nevertheless, the Court allowed the architects to remain in the
and finally determining the controversy without his presence as a party."
Garrett v. Rose, 236 N.C. 299, 307, 72 S.E.2d 843, 848 (1952). See gen-
erally 1 MCINTosHr, op. cit. supra note 13, §§ 571-84.
*2258 N.C. 381, 128 S.E.2d 785 (1963).
"The Court held that the order making the architects additional parties
did not adversely affect a "substantial right" of plaintiffs, therefore no ap-
peal existed under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-277 (1953).
" The Court stated that the second and third sections of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-73 (1953), provide for interpleader, but that the statute does not supersede
the equitable remedy with its four requisites: "1. The same thing, debt or
duty, must be claimed by both or all the parties against whom the relief is
demanded. 2. All their adverse titles or claims must be dependent, or be de-
rived from a common source. 3. The person asking the relief-the plaintiff
-must not have nor claim any interest in the subject-matter. 4. He must
have incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants; that is, he
must stand perfectly indifferent between them, in the position merely of a
stakeholder." 258 N.C. at 386, 128 S.E.2d at 789.
" "[T]he material difference between a strict interpleader and a bill
in the nature of an interpleader seems to be that in the latter the plaintiff
may show that he has an interest in the subject matter of the controversy
between the claimants." 258 N.C. at 387-88, 128 S.E.2d at 790.
G'"[W]hen a complete determination of the controversy cannot be made
without the presence of other parties, the court must cause them to be
brought in." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-73 (1953).
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action as proper parties on the stated basis that, "both convenience
and the ends of justice will be promoted by making the architects
parties so that both claims can be settled in one suit. '57 The result
is that a defendant has been allowed to bring in a third party to
litigate a claim not germane to plaintiffs' cause of action. It may
presage a more liberal approach to third party practice than has been
evident in the past. 18
Real Party in Interest
In a civil action arising from an automobile collision, P recovered
judgment against both 0, owner of one of the vehicles involved, and
D, driver of O's vehicle. No appeal was taken. 0 and his insurer
partially paid P on the judgment, which was then assigned to a
trustee pursuant to G.S. § 1-240. The trustee brought action against
D's insurer to recover complete indemnification of the amount paid
by 0 on the judgment. Defendant demurred for failure to state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action and for defect in parties plain-
tiff and defendant. In Ingram v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.," the
Court held that the demurrer was properly sustained because the
complaint contained no allegation that a right to indemnification had
been judicially established, but the Court remanded with leave to
amend to so allege. The Court found no defect in parties plaintiff
and defendant. Thus, in such a situation the trustee may recover any
indemnification to which his cestui que trust has been found entitled
by taking direct action against the indemnitor's insurer, without
joining the indemnitor or his cestui que trust.
r7 258 N.C. at 389, 128 S.E.2d at 792.
" The traditional limitation has been that only those claims might be
asserted between defendants, whether original or impleaded, that are germane
to the plaintiff's cause of action. This restriction has practically confined
impleading as of right to parties against whom contribution and legal in-
demnification claims could be asserted. For discussion of third party practice,
see Brandis and Graham, Recent Developments in the Field of Permissive
Joinder of Parties and Causes in North Carolina, 34 N.C.L. REv. 405, 425-29
(1956); Brandis, A Plea for Adoption by North Carolina of the Federal
.Toinder Rules, 25 N.C.L. REv. 245, 263-68 (1947).
r 258 N.C. 632, 129 S.E.2d 222 (1963).
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CONFLICT OF LAWS
CONFLICTING DECISIONS
Under a North Carolina statute1 the Department of Motor
Vehicles may suspend the drivers license of a resident of this state
upon receiving notice of his conviction in another state of an offense
which, if committed in North Carolina, would be grounds for revoca-
tion. Under North Carolina law forfeiture of bail is equivalent to
conviction.2 In In re Donnelly,' petitioner was arrested in South
Carolina for drunken driving. Petitioner posted fifty dollar bond and
returned to North Carolina but no warrant was served on him.
The North Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles sought to sus-
pend his drivers license but petitioner contended that there had not
been a valid forfeiture of bond, citing a previous North Carolina
decision4 holding that there is no valid forfeiture of bail unless a
warrant is issued. This case, though, is directly contra to South
Carolina law which holds that no warrant is necessary.5
The Court held that the South Carolina decision was not binding
on the North Carolina Court on the question of whether there had
been a valid forfeiture of bond, and that a North Carolina drivers
license can be suspended only in accordance with statutes written and
construed in this state. Since under the decisions of the North
Carolina Court these circumstances (lack of a warrant) do not con-
stitute forfeiture of bail, the petitioner's license was returned. It
seems clear from the instant case that the procedure resulting in the
foreign state forfeiture of bail must be such as would constitute valid
forfeiture in North Carolina.'
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-23 (1953).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-24(c) (1953).8260 N.C. 375, 132 S.E.2d 904 (1963).
'In re Wright, 228 N.C. 301, 45 S.E.2d 370 (1947), rehearing, 228 N.C.
584, 46 S.E.2d 696 (1948). This case also concerned an arrest and "for-
feiture" of bail in South Carolina and is directly in point with the exception
of the intervening South Carolina decision.
State v. Langford, 223 S.C. 20, 73 S.E.2d 854 (1952).
'A general rule is that matters of procedure are governed by the law of
the forum, while in matters of substance the law of the foreign state governs.
GooDRIcH, CoNFLicT OF LAWs § 80 (3d ed. 1949). The Court did not men-
tion this rule but it would seem that forfeiture of bail is a matter of pro-
cedure. Also this case raises the problem of whether any foreign state con-
viction (not just forfeiture of bail under G.S. § 20-24(c)) must be such as
would constitute a valid conviction in North Carolina. E.g., the right to
jury trial in petty offenses may differ. Should the fact that defendant
19641
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INTERSPOUSAL TORT ACTIONS
Shaw v. Lee7 involved a suit by a wife against her husband's
estate for negligent injuries received in a Virginia automobile ac-
cident.' The Court, in sustaining a demurrer, reaffirmed its rule
that in interspousal negligence suits the le. loci governs,0 and refused
to follow a trend allowing the le. domicilii to control.10
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DUE PROCESS
In two cases the Court dealt with the problem of a request for
an extension of time to allow counsel to collect and present evidence
in support of a motion to quash a criminal indictment on the grounds
of systematic exclusion of Negroes from the grand jury. State v.
CovizgtonW reiterated the rule that the defendant must be given
reasonable time to investigate and secure evidence on the question
of jury exclusion; he must be allowed process to compel the pro-
duction of such evidence, and he must be given an opportunity to
present his evidence. Here the trial court found' that there was
no discriminatory exclusion and denied motions to set a hearing on
the motion to quash and to cause process to issue. The Supreme
Court, following State v. Perry,3 reversed, holding that defendant
must be given an opportunity to compile and present his case.4
would have had a right to jury trial in North Carolina, but not in the foreign
state, mean there was no valid conviction for the purposes of G.S. § 20-23 ?
"258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288 (1963). Noted in 41 N.C.L. REV. 843
(1963).
8In Virginia one spouse cannot sue the other for negligent injury.
Keister's Adm'r v. Ieister's Ex'rs, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918). North
Carolina has abrogated this common law rule by statute. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-10.1 (Supp. 1963).
9 Howard v. Howard, 200 N.C. 574, 158 S.E. 101 (1931).
"°Thompson v. Thompson, 193 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1963); Haumschild v.
Continental Cas. Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959). But see Holder
v. Holder, 384 P.2d 663 (Okla. 1963).
1258 N.C. 495, 128 S.E.2d 822 (1963).
2 258 N.C. at 497, 128 S.E.2d at 824.
2248 N.C. 334, 103 S.E.2d 404 (1958).
'A companion case, State v. Covington, 258 N.C. 501, 128 S.E.2d 827
(1963), involves identical parties and identical questions as to the motion
to quash. However, here defendant pleaded guilty following the denial of his
motion. The Court, in reversing, noted on its own motion that a plea of
guilty does not waive a timely objection to the grand jury made on the
grounds that Negroes were systematically excluded therefrom. This case is
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State v. Inman5 held, per curiam, that defendant's counsel must
be allowed more time to compile information on possible exclusion,
even though counsel had been employed for more than four weeks,
and had not issued any subpoena to substantiate his motion. The
Court made it clear6 that a liberal amount of time is guaranteed
counsel to compile his case on this point.
In State v. Lane7 the Court again held that adequate time for
counsel to prepare the defense is inherent in the constitutional rights
to counsel and confrontation. 8 An indigent defendant's case was
called at 9:30 A.M., at which time counsel was appointed. At
2:30 P.M. on the same day the trial was begun, counsel's motion for
a continuance in order to prepare the defense having been overruled.
The Court, in a per curiam opinion, granted a new trial on the
grounds that the rights of counsel and confrontation of accuser had
been denied the prisoner. This case marks a liberal extension of the
right to continuance in order to preserve constitutional rights.'
In State v. Hubert'0 the defendant assigned as error the action of
the trial judge in summarizing the testimony of a state's witness
whom the jury complained they could not hear, instead of requiring
the solicitor to re-question the witness. The Court granted a new
trial on the authority of State v. Payton." It is clear from the instant
case that due process rightly demands that the jury hear all testimony
directly from the lips of the witness.
In State v. Patton'2 the defendant complained: (1) That he had
been denied the right to a speedy trial; and (2) That loss of defend-
ant's key witnesses by death and incapacity during the delay
resulted in a violation of due process. Defendant was arrested in
discussed in CRIMINAi LAw, Jurisdictional Defect not Waived by Guilty
Plea, infra.
260 N.C. 311, 132 S.E.2d 613 (1963) (per curiam).
260 N.C. at 312, 132 S.E.2d at 614.
258 N.C. 349, 128 S.E.2d 389 (1962) (per curiam).
8U.S. CoxsT. amend. XIV; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 11.
'For a complete discussion of the ramifications of this case see 41 N.C.L.
REV. 863 (1963).
1 259 N.C. 140, 129 S.E.2d 888 (1963) (per curiam).
1255 N.C. 420, 121 S.E.2d 608 (1961) (per curiam). This case in-
volved the examination of an eight year old rape victim outside the presence
of the jury, the court reporter reading her testimony to the jury. The
Supreme Court reversed per curiam.1260 N.C. 359, 132 S.E.2d 891 (1963).
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1958 for armed robbery and in 196013 was found guilty. In March,
1963, the Fourth Circuit, in habeas corpus proceedings, found
that the defendant had been denied a fair trial and ordered
that the state be given a reasonable opportunity to retry him.14 Ac-
cordingly, defendant was tried at the May, 1963 term of superior
court. Between 1958 and 1963 one of defendant's key witnesses died
and another became incapacitated. The Court, citing numerous
authority, 5 held there was no denial of a speedy trial, as the delay
in the retrial was caused not by arbitrary delay by the prosecution,
but by defendant's successful effort to reverse his first conviction.
Also the fact that defendant's witnesses are unavailable due to death
and incapacity during the period between trials is not a denial of due
process, 16 since the state is under no duty to guarantee that all
defendant's witnesses will be available." The problem inherent in
this situation is obvious, since all too often a long delay will com-
pletely destroy the defendant's chances of recompiling his case. How-
ever, the state should not be denied a retrial since the filing of the
petition for habeas corpus is controlled by the prisoner and he should
exercise it within a reasonable time.'
8
STATUTES
The Supreme Court upheld as constitutional three previously un-
tested statutes dealing respectively with parental liability for a
child's malicious property damage, commercial bribery, and denial
of unemployment compensation to certain persons. In a case of first
impression 9 the Court upheld a statute 0 which imposes liability up
"
3 During 1960 defendant was in federal prison. He did not claim that his
first trial was unduly delayed.
" Patton v. State, 315 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1963).
" E.g., State v. Dehier, 257 Minn. 549, 102 N.W.2d 696 (1960); State v.
Hadley, 249 S.W.2d 857 (1952).
" There is little authority on this point. State v. Dehier, 257 Minn. 549,
102 N.W.2d 696 (1960), holds that even though a lapse of seventeen years
made proof of insanity difficult, the defendant could still be retried.
'" In the present case the Court took judicial notice of an affidavit filed
by the incapacitated witness during a post conviction hearing and held that
the loss of the admissiable portion of the testimony was not prejudicial to
the defendant.
" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), requiring counsel for in-
digent defendants, should partially answer the argument that the prisoner
without counsel often is ignorant of his right to petition for habeas corpus.
"9 General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963).2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (Supp. 1963).
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to five hundred dollars on the parents of a minor child who wilfully or
maliciously damages or destroys the property of another. Defendant's
eleven year old son allegedly set fire to school property which resulted
in over two thousand dollars damage. In a suit by the insurance
company to recover five hundred dollars the lower court sustained a
demurrer by the parents, who claimed that the statute fixed liability
without fault on the parents and thus constituted a taking of property
without due process of law." The Supreme Court reversed on the
grounds that the statute was a valid exercise of the police power, its
purpose being to curb juvenile delinquency by stimulating closer
parental attention to and supervision over children. The statute
was not intended to provide compensation for the injured party, as
evidenced by the five hundred dollar limitation, and therefore does
not affix liability without fault.
North Carolina is one of thirty-two states with similar statutes, 22
yet this case marks only the second constitutional challenge, a similar
Texas statute having been upheld.23 It has been suggested that
decisions upholding the "family car" statutes provide authority for
the validity of the child vandalism statutes,24 though the North
Carolina Court does not rest its holding on this basis.
In the case of State v. Brewer 6 the Court upheld the validity of
North Carolina's "commercial bribery" statute,2" which makes it a
misdemeanor to give or receive gifts or promises with the intent to
influence the action of an agent in relation to his principal's or em-
ployer's business. The Court held the statute was not void for vague-
ness, nor was it an arbitrary exercise of the police power. North
Carolina is one of only thirteen states with such a statute," and litiga-
tion relating to them is scarce.29 New York upheld the validity of a
"U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1; N.C. ColsT. art. I, § 17.
.. See Ligon, Parental Responsibility Statute, 40 N.C.L. REv. 619, 625
(1962), for a discussion of the statute when passed.
'Kelly v. Williams, 346 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
'55 Mica. L. RLv. 1205 (1957); 28 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 185, 186
(1960).
" This case is discussed in DOMESTIC RELATIONS, Parent and Child, infra,
EQUITABLE REMEDIES, Subrogation, infra, and INSURANCE, Fire Insurance,
infra.
., 258 N.C. 533, 129 S.E.2d 262, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 9 (1963).
This case is discussed in CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, Criminal Law, infra.27N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-353 (1953).
Note, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 848, 864 (1960).
"
0E.g., People v. Jacobs, 309 N.Y. 315, 130 N.E.2d 636 (1955) ; People
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similar statute in what appears to be the only constitutional test
prior to the instant case. 0
In In re Abernathy8 ' the Court upheld as constitutional the 1961
amendment to the Workman's Compensation Act which deletes the
so-called escape clause by which certain non-striking employees were
allowed unemployment compensation. Eight other states have
similar clauses in their statutes and none have been struck down. The
North Carolina Court held the amendment to be a change of degree,
not substance, and well within the police power.
CONTRACTS
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
In Prentzas v. Prentzas' the plaintiff and defendant's deceased
husband formed a partnership for the purchase of real estate. Three
tracts were purchased by the partnership and title was taken in
defendant's name. On several occasions thereafter plaintiff called for
an accounting and in 1950 defendant and her husband conveyed one
tract to the plaintiff. After the conveyance defendant's husband in-
formed plaintiff the deed was in full settlement of plaintiff's claim to
partnership assets. Plaintiff refused to recognize the deed as a settle-
ment but did not reconvey the property. Plaintiff later brought an
action for a partnership accounting. On the issue of accord and
satisfaction the trial judge charged the jury that if it should find the
plaintiff did not intend to accept the deed in full settlement then
accord and satisfaction was no defense.' On appeal a new trial was
granted. The Court recalled that when a demand for an accounting
is met with an offer of property in full discharge an acceptance and
retention of the property usually constitutes a complete discharge.'
v. Davis, 160 N.Y. Supp. 769 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1915). Cases also arise under
civil law in attempts to set aside contracts. E.g., Sirkin v. Fourteenth St.
Store, 108 N.Y. Supp. 830 (App. Div. 1908).
" People v. Davis, 160 N.Y. Supp. 769 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1915), upheld the
second section of the New York statute dealing with improper commissions
paid to purchasing agents. The North Carolina statute contains a similar
section.
259 N.C. 190, 130 S.E.2d 292 (1963). This case is discussed in LABOR
LAw, Unemployment Coipensation--Disqualification for Benefits, infra.
'260 N.C. 101, 131 S.E.2d 678 (1963).
260 N.C. at 105, 131 S.E.2d at 682.
'See, e.g., Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Nello L. Teer Co., 179 F. Supp. 538
(M.D.N.C. 1960); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Nello L. Teer Co., 250 N.C. 547,
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The Court held, however, that in the case of a partnership the prop-
erty might be accepted and retained for the benefit of the partner-
ship. Thus, the question for the jury was whether the plaintiff
retained title to the property for his own benefit or for the benefit of
the partnership rather than whether he intended to accept the deed in
full settlement of his claim to partnership assets.
ASSIGNMENT
In Morton v. Thornton4 the Court considered the validity of the
assignment of fifteen separate claims for wages to three of the claim-
ants who instituted this suit. In an earlier action5 the plaintiffs had
brought suit on the claims "jointly and as Assignees."6  The
defendants demurred for misjoinder of parties and causes. The Court
held that a claim for unpaid wages could be assigned, but the nature
of the alleged assignment was not clear so the Court remanded to
allow amendment. The amended complaint which came before the
Court in the present case included copies of the fifteen identical
instruments purporting to assign all wages due the assignors. The
instruments assigned the claims to the plaintiffs "individually and
collectively ' 7 and empowered the plaintiffs "to act individually or
together in their individual names as assignees or in the event, for
any reason, this assignment is held void, they shall be deemed to
act in their own name or names and individual capacity or capacities
for me as my agent coupled with an interest.""
On appeal the Court applying the rule that an assignment requires
an assignor, an assignee and a thing assigned9 found that the as-
signors were clearly denoted but the interest created in the purported
assignees was ambiguous. Since the interest created in the assignees
was unclear, the instrument was ineffective as an assignment. The
109 S.E.2d 171 (1959); Moore v. Greene, 237 N.C. 614, 75 S.E.2d 649(1953). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-540 (1953), provides, "In all claims, or money
demands, of whatever kind, and howsoever due, where an agreement is made
and accepted for a less amount than that demanded or claimed to be due, in
satisfaction thereof, the payment of the less amount according to such agree-
ment in compromise of the whole is a full and complete discharge of the
same."
'259 N.C. 697, 131 S.E.2d 378 (1963).
'Morton v. Thornton, 257 N.C. 259, 125 S.E.2d 464 (1962).
OId. at 262, 125 S.E.2d at 466.
259 N.C. at 699, 131 S.E.2d at 380.8Ibid.
Boyd v. Campbell, 192 N.C. 398, 135 S.E. 121 (1926).
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Court found that the instruments did operate to appoint the plaintiffs
as agents for the other salesmen. Since an agent is not the real party
in interest10 he cannot sue under our statute;" hence, plaintiffs were
not entitled to maintain this suit.'
2
REFORMATION
In McCallum v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co. 13 the complaint al-
leged that the effective and termination dates on a credit life in-
surance certificate had been typed in incorrectly and that all parties
intended the effective date to be three days later and the term of the
policy to be twelve months. It further alleged that the dates were
inserted by mutual mistake or were inserted by defendant with the
intent to defraud the insured. The Court held the complaint stated a
cause of action for reformation of an insurance contract. 4 The Court
further held that an allegation in the complaint that the insured, an
eighty-three year old woman in feeble health, failed to read the
certificate did not, as a matter of law, bar an action to reform the
certificate.' 5 Although seemingly in conflict with statements in North
Carolina that reformation will not be granted where a person fails to
read an instrument which he was able to read,'" the Court stressed
Choate Rental Co. v. Justice, 211 N.C. 54, 188 S.E. 609 (1936).
11N.C. GEx. STAT. § 1-57 (1953).
12 If the Court had found a valid assignment it may well have proven an
assignment for collection only. In North Carolina such an assignee is not
the real party in interest. First Nat'l Bank v. Rochamora, 193 N.C. 1, 136
S.E. 259 (1927).
13259 N.C. 573, 131 S.E.2d 435 (1963). This case is discussed in EQUiT-
AtmB RmmiIs, Reformation of Insurance Policy-Failure of Insured to
Read Policy, infra.
" Other jurisdictions have also dealt with efforts to change the date in an
insurance contract. See Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Cox, 104 F.2d 321(6th Cir. 1939); Kentucky Home Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Marshall, 291 Ky.
120, 163 S.W.2d 45 (1942); Bleam v. Sterling Ins. Co., 360 Mich. 208, 103
N.W.2d 466 (1960); Prudential Fire Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 191 Okla. 506, 131
P.2d 88 (1942). See generally Malone, The Reformation of Writings Under
the Law of North Carolina, 15 N.C.L. Rav. 155 (1937).
1 It is the majority rule that failure to read an insurance policy in a short
time is not a defense to an action to reform the policy. See, e.g., National Re-
serve Ins. Co. v. Scudder, 71 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1934) ; Broida v. Travelers'
Ins. Co., 316 Pa. 444, 175 At. 492 (1934); Bankers Fire Ins. Co. v. Hender-
son, 196 Va. 195, 83 S.E.2d 424 (1954). See generally Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d
7 (1962).
" E.g., W. B. Coppersmith & Sons, Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 222 N.C. 14,
21 S.E.2d 838 (1942). See generally Malone, The Reformation of Writings
Under the Law of North Carolina, 15 N.C.L. REv. 155, 174-76 (1937).
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insured's age and condition as preventing a fair opportunity to read
the instrument.
TENDER
In Parks v. Jacobs17 the plaintiff who had an option to purchase
land informed defendants she wanted to exercise the option and
would pay defendants if they would come by her attorney's office.
On refusal of defendants to do so plaintiff brought suit on the option
contending she had made proper tender within the required time.
The Court affirmed a non-suit on the ground the act of the plaintiff
did not constitute a tender' in that nothing required defendants to
come to plaintiff to receive payment.' 9 A valid tender requires an
offer to perform accompanied by the actual production of the subject
matter and not merely a readiness and ability to perform.20 Here the
act of the plaintiff exhibited a readiness and ability to perform but
nothing more.
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS
EXECUTION SALES
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Forbes,1 plaintiff furnished labor
and materials to construct a motel for the defendant. Plaintiff filed
a lien for 6,249.95 dollars against the land upon which the motel was
built, which had a fair market value of 126,000 dollars. This lien was
subordinate to those of a mortgage for 35,000 dollars and judgments
previously rendered against the defendant in excess of 43,000 dollars.
17259 N.C. 129, 129 S.E.2d 884 (1963).
" In Bane v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 171 N.C. 328, 88 S.E. 477
(1916), the plaintiff sued to recover a statutory penalty for each day the
railroad refused to accept a carload of cattle for shipment. The Court held
that although plaintiff did not have to drive the cattle to the depot each day
he had to offer to do so for each day he wished to collect. The burden was
not on defendant to request of the plaintiff if he desired shipment each day
to avoid the penalty.
i" When no place of payment is specified in an offer to sell real property
the law implies payment shall be made at the residence of the vendor. See
Hall v. Jones, 164 N.C. 199, 80 S.E. 228 (1913). See generally Annot.,
3 A.L.R.2d 256 (1949).
" Jacobs v. Automotive Repair Center, Inc., 137 So.2d 263 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1962); Mark v. Rizzo, 6 Misc. 2d 2, 162 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1957);
Bane v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 171 N.C. 328, 88 S.E. 477 (1916); Uni-
versal Credit Co. v. Cole, 146 S.W.2d 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940).
'258 N.C. 426, 128 S.E.2d 875 (1963). This case is discussed in REAL
PROPERTY, Execiution--Jvdicial Sales, infra.
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judgment was obtained for the amount owed in an action to enforce
the lien. On an execution sale pursuant to the judgment a bid was
induced by representations of the owner's attorney that the proceeds
of the sale would be used to discharge prior encumbrances on the
property. This was untrue, since an execution sale transfers the
property subject to prior liens.2 The Court held that the bidders were
properly released from enforcement of the bid.
The Court relied on a California cases in which the judgment
creditor induced a purchaser to buy by misrepresentations as to the
priority of his judgment. There it was held that the doctrine of
caveat emptor would not be extended to validate a purchase at an
execution sale induced by fraud or misrepresentation. The California
court pointed out that the maxim "let the buyer beware" presumes
knowledge on the part of the purchaser as to what he is purchasing
and that he does so at his own risk. But the presumption of knowl-
edge may be overcome by showing lack of knowledge of the condition
of the thing purchased and inducement to purchase through mis-
representations by persons who should be thoroughly acquainted with
it.4
Thus, while the doctrine of caveat emptor is applicable to execu-
tion sales,5 it will not bar our Court from preventing an injustice to
the purchaser not due to his own fault or neglect."
FORECLOSURE SALES
In Gaskins v. Blount Fertilizer Co.,' the plaintiff had executed
two deeds of trust conveying the same tract of land. The junior deed
IN.C. GEn. STAT. § 1-339.68(b) (1953), provides: "Any real property
sold under execution remains subject to all liens which became effective
prior to the lien of the judgment pursuant to which the sale is held, in the
same manner and to the same extent as if no such sale had been held."
'Webster v. Haworth, 8 Cal. 21 (1857).
'Earlier North Carolina decisions involving fraud and misrepresentation
as voiding a deed executed as a result of a public auction of real property
are: Woods v. Hall, 16 N.C. 411 (1830), where the vendor misrepresented
the land to be fertile, good for growing tobacco and containing a good water
supply; McDowell v. Simms, 41 N.C. 278 (1849), where an agent of de-
fendant misrepresented the land to contain valuable gold deposits; and Davis
v. Keen, 142 N.C. 496, 55 S.E. 359 (1906), where the defendant informed
persons attending the sale that the title was dubious and then bid the land
in at a fraction of its fair market value.
'Richardson v. Wicker, 74 N.C. 278 (1876); see generally Annot., 68
A.L.R. 659 (1930).
'Accord, Clayton v. Glover, 56 N.C. 371 (1857).
"260 N.C. 191, 132 S.E.2d 345 (1963).
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of trust was foreclosed and the land sold to one Massey. Plaintiff
brought this action to enjoin a subsequent sale under foreclosure of
the senior deed of trust upon the ground that the substituted trustee
of that conveyance was not appointed in accordance with our statute.
It was held that Massey, the purchaser at foreclosure of the
junior deed of trust, acquired plaintiff's equity of redemption under
the senior deed of trust,8 leaving plaintiff divested of all interest in
the land. This being so, plaintiff was not a party aggrieved by an
order dissolving the injunction against foreclosure of the senior
deed of trust, and had no standing to sue.f
MATERIALMEN'S LIENS
In Priddy v. Kernersville Lumber Co.,' 0 defendant furnished
materials to one Davis for the erection of a house pursuant to a
contract providing for payment when Davis sold the house. Since it
was feared that the filing of a lien by defendant would make the house
harder to sell, defendant furnished various small items from time to
time after it was completed for the purpose of keeping the lien alive
under the statute" requiring filing within six months after the final
furnishing of materials. More than six months after completion of
the furnishing of materials actually used in the construction of the
house, two deeds of trust on the property to secure loans by plaintiff
were made and recorded. Thereafter defendant's lien was filed. The
superior court decided that the lien took priority over the deeds of
trust, but the Supreme Court reversed and granted a new trial.
According to the Court the time for filing the lien dates from the
furnishing of the last item of material required by the contract,' 2 and
8 Staunton Military Academy, Inc. v. Dockery, 244 N.C. 427, 94 S.E.2d
354 (1956); Merchants Bank & Trust Co. v. Watson, 187 N.C. 107, 121
S.E. 181 (1924); Brett v. Davenport, 151 N.C. 56, 65 S.E. 611 (1909);
Bobbitt v. Blackvell, 120 N.C. 253, 26 S.E. 817 (1897).
'Only the party aggrieved by a judgment may appeal therefrom. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-271 (1953) ; Coburn v. Roanoake Land & Timber Corp., 260
N.C. 173, 132 S.E.2d 340 (1963).
10258 N.C. 653, 129 S.E.2d 256 (1963).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-39 (1950), provides: "Notice of lien shall be
filed... except in those cases where a shorter time is prescribed, at any
time within six months after the completion of the labor or the final furnish-
ing of the materials, or the gathering of the crops."
" But the lien relates back to the date on which the labor or materials
were first furnished so as to take priority over the rights of third parties
which arose between that date and the date on which the labor or materials
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the furnishing must be in good faith for the purpose of fully perform-
ing the contract, and not merely for the purpose of extending the
time of filing the lien.18 Otherwise purchasers have nothing to warn
them of the existence of the lien when the building has been completed
and the time for filing has expired.
USURY
In Carolina Indus. Bank v. Merrimon,"4 the defendant purchased
an automobile from a used-car dealer, paying five hundred dollars
down and executing a note and chattel mortgage to the plaintiff to
secure the balance due. A "differential for time payment" of nearly
four hundred dollars was added to the total amount due. Plaintiff
brought this action to foreclose the mortgage and for judgment on
the note. The defendant filed a counterclaim alleging that the transac-
tion was usurious. The Court held that the counterclaim should have
been nonsuited.
If in fact a transaction is a bona fide sale and not a loan, there
can be no usury. 5 But if the form of the transaction is a subterfuge
to make what is in substance a loan appear to be a sale, the courts
will look at the substance of the matter and the lender will be held
liable if the interest rates are usurious.' 6
If there is a bona fide purchase rather than a loan, as in the
principal case, the transaction is not usurious even though the price is
exhorbitant and a note is given at legal rates of interest to secure
payment, since usury statutes strike only at the exaction of more than
the legal rate for the hire of money and a purchaser is not, unlike a
borrower, thereby victimized since he can refrain from the purchase
if he does not chose to pay the price.'
were finally furnished. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Basnight, 234 N.C.
347, 67 S.E.2d 390 (1951).
1 Beaman v. Elizabeth City Hotel Corp., 202 N.C. 418, 163 S.E. 117
(1932). There the Court held that an extension of time for filing a lien
would be granted only where three conditions were met: (1) The additional
material or labor is embraced within the original contract; (2) The owner
assents or requires the additional items; and (3) The items are not of a
trivial nature. For an exhaustive study of the North Carolina law with
respect to these liens, see Mangum, Mechanics' Liens in North Carolina,
41 N.C.L. Rmv. 173 (1963).
'260 N.C. 335, 132 S.E.2d 692 (1963).
"Yarborough v. Hughes, 139 N.C. 199, 51 S.E. 904 (1905).
1" Ripple v. Mortgage & Acceptance Corp., 193 N.C. 422, 137 S.E. 156
(1927).
" General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262
S.W. 425 (1924). The Court in the principal case cited as controlling the
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WARRANTY-GUARANTY
In Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. and Sales Co. 8 plaintiff
manufactured for the defendant patented mechanical devices which
caused radiator fans on automobiles to cease functioning when the
automobile reached a certain speed. Defendant was a corporation
organized for the purpose of purchasing the devices and selling them
to Radiator Speciality Co. for resale to the trade. Radiator Speciality
Co. guaranteed payment of all purchases made by Product Develop-
ment and Sales Co. from the plaintiff. When Product Development
and Sales Co. refused to accept further deliveries of the devices
from the plaintiff upon the ground that the devices did not comply
with the contract specifications, plaintiff brought this action against
both Radiator Speciality Co. and Product Development and Sales Co.
for breach of contract. Radiator Speciality Co. entered a counter-
claim for breach of both express and implied warranties.
It was held that the Radiator Speciality Co. could not assert as a
basis for its counterclaim that plaintiff had breached its express
warranty of fitness of the goods, because plaintiff was not suing it on
the contract, but upon its guaranty of payment of purchases made by
Product Development and Sales Co. which is separate and distinct
from the primary undertaking of Product Development and Sales
Co.1
9
The Court stated that when a principal debtor and a guarantor
are sued jointly, a claim of the debtor may be set off by the
guarantor,20 unless the claim constitutes an independent cause of
action in favor of the debtor. The Court recognized that there is
authority for the position that a warranty does not inure to the
benefit of the guarantor,2 ' but said that even if it did, it would be
available only by way of setoff and not as a basis for an affirmative
recovery by the guarantor.22
per curiam opinion in Hendrix v. Harry's Cadillac Co., 220 N.C. 84, 16
S.E.2d 456 (1941).18259 N.C. 400, 131 S.E.2d 9 (1963). The case is discussed in DAMAGES,
Breach of Manufacturer's Sales Contract, infra.
Rayfield v. Rayfield, 242 N.C. 691, 89 S.E.2d 399 (1955).
"Jarratt v. Martin, 70 N.C. 459 (1874).
"Fulton Bank v. Mathers, 183 Iowa 226, 166 N.W. 1050 (1918).
"259 N.C. at 418, 131 S.E.2d at 23. It is difficult to see any significance
in the view that a warranty in favor of the debtor cannot inure to the benefit
of the guarantor when sued jointly with the debtor. Without question the
debtor can assert the breach of warranty and reduce or eliminate any re-
covery. Then obviously there can be no greater recovery from the guarantor.
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It was further held that Radiator Speciality Co. could not
counterclaim on the basis of breach of an implied warranty. It
purchased the products from Product Development and Sales Co.,
not from the plaintiff-seller. The benefit of an implied warranty in
the sale of personal property does not run with the chattel on its re-
sale and does not benefit a subsequent purchaser so as to give him a
cause of action on the warranty against the original vendor.23
Privity between the parties is required for a recovery for breach of
warranty and any party to an action for breach of warranty must,
therefore, have been a party to the contract.24 The subsequent pur-
chaser has rights only against his immediate vendor.
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
CRIMINAL LAW
"Commercial Bribery"
North Carolina's "commercial bribery"' statute2 was applied
recently for the first time in State v. Brewer.3 The defendants were
indicted on one count charging conspiracy to violate the statute4 and
on eleven counts charging substantive violations. Two of the defend-
"Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923 (1961); Wyatt v.
North Carolina Equip. Co., 253 N.C. 355, 117 S.E.2d 21 (1960); Rabb v.
Covington, 215 N.C. 572, 2 S.E.2d 705 (1939); Daniels v. Swift & Co.,
209 N.C. 567, 183 S.E. 748 (1936); Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co.,
208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935).
" Prince v. Smith, 254 N.C. 768, 119 S.E.2d 923 (1961).
'The term "commercial bribery" has been defined as "the advantage
which one competitor secures over his fellow competitors by his secret and
corrupt dealing with employees or agents of prospective purchasers." Ameri-
can Distilling Co. v. Wisconsin Liquor Co., 104 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir.
1939).
2 "Any person who gives, offers or promises to an agent, employee or
servant, any gift or gratuity whatever with intent to influence his action in
relation to his principal's, employer's or master's business; any agent, employee
or servant who requests or accepts a gift or gratuity or a promise to make
a gift or to do an act beneficial to himself, under an agreement or with an
understanding that he shall act in any particular manner in relation to his
principal's, employer's or master's business... shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor and shall be punished in the discretion of the court." N.C. GEaN.
STAT. § 14-353 (1953).
'258 N.C. 533, 129 S.E.2d 262, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 9 (1963).
This case is discussed in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Statutes, supra.
'The first count of the Brewer indictment is treated under Conspiracy-
Statute of Limitations, infra and Conspiracy-Non-merger of Conspiracy and
Substantive Offenses, infra.
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ants had allegedly offered "money, gifts, gratuities and other
things of value" 5 to the third defendant, a State Highway Com-
mission official, who had allegedly accepted these with the under-
standing that he would attempt to obtain for the offerors certain
highway sign contracts. The North Carolina Supreme Court af-
firmed the convictions of all three defendants as to the actual viola-
tions of the statute, holding that their activities fell within the
statutory prohibition.'
The defendants contended on appeal that G.S. § 14-353 is uncon-
stitutional as violative of the fourteenth amendment "due process"
requirement, in that the statute is so vague that they were uncertain
as to what acts are prohibited, and that the statute is an unreason-
able and capricious exercise of the State's police powers. These
arguments were dismissed as untenable.7
Though the Court's first exposition of the prohibitions of G.S.
§ 14-353 was not as full as might have been hoped, it appears that the
offense of "commercial bribery" may be committed even where the
principal has knowledge of or is uninjured by the bribing of his
agent. Even in the absence of a betrayal of the principal-agent rela-
tionship the injury to competition as a whole warrants the invocation
of the statute.8
Conspiracy--Statute of Limitations
The statutory period during which a prosecution for a non-malic-
ious misdemeanor may be initiated in North Carolina is two years
from the date of its occurrence.' In State v. Brewer"0 the Court was
presented with the question of whether prosecution for a conspiracy
begun in 1957 was barred by the statute of limitations. The first
count of the indictment charged that the defendants had entered into
258 N.C. at 556, 129 S.E.2d at 279.
'In deciding what offenses were prohibited by G.S. § 14-353 the Court
discussed at length N.Y. PiqAL LA-w § 439 (1953), which is substantially
similar to the North Carolina statute. For an excellent summary of cases
arising under the New York law and a tabulation of other state commercial
bribery laws see Note, 108 U. PA. L. Rv. 848 (1960).
'See CONSTiTUTIONAL LAW, Statutes, supra.
8 258 N.C. at 553, 129 S.E.2d at 276-77.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-1 (1953).
10258 N.C. 533, 129 S.E.2d 262 (1963), discussed in "Commercial
Bribery," supra, and Conspiracy--Non-merger of Conspiracy and Substantive
Offenses, infra. This case is also discussed in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
Statutes, supra.
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a conspiracy in 1957 to violate the North Carolina "commercial
bribery" statute" and had violated that statute from time to time
since 1957 in pursuance to the conspiracy. The violations were al-
leged to have occurred periodically until February 1, 1962. The
indictment was returned in April of 1962.
Two of the defendants were convicted of conspiracy and appealed,
asserting that the denial of their motion to quash the first count of
the indictment was erroneous. They contended that the conspiracy
was completed (and, therefore, terminated) in 1957 when all of the
plans had been laid and that any prosecution therefor was barred by
the statute of limitations. In overruling these contentions the North
Carolina Supreme Court recognized the continuing nature of a con-
spiracy,12 and said that the conspiracy may be kept alive by crimes
committed periodically in effectuating the purposes of the con-
spiracy.
13
Since in North Carolina the crime of conspiracy is complete as
soon as the plans are laid 4 and requires no overt act,l' a conspiracy
may exist over a period of time even in the absence of any action
taken in carrying out its objectives.' The proposition espoused in
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-353 (1953), discussed in "Commercial Bribery,"
sup ra.
" "A conspiracy is the unlawful concurrence of two or more persons in a
wicked scheme-the combination or agreement to do an unlawful thing or
to do a lawful thing in an unlawful way by unlawful means." State v.
Anderson, 208 N.C. 771, 786, 182 S.E. 643, 652 (1935); "As soon as the
union of wills for the unlawful purpose is perfected, the offense of conspiracy
is complete." State v. Knotts, 168 N.C. 173, 188, 83 S.E. 972, 979 (1914);
A conspiracy has been termed "a partnership in criminal purposes."
United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910) (quoted at length in the
Brewer opinion). As such, it exists as a continuing crime which if sus-
pended at any point in time would be complete. See generally Hyde v.
United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912). The conspiracy retains vitality until
its purpose is accomplished or until the conspirators abandon their plan.
PERKINS, CImINlAL LAW 548 (1957).
" This idea, that a conspiracy may be kept alive by acts done periodically
pursuant to it, seems to have crept in from the basic federal conspiracy statute,
18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (1950), which requires some overt act in order to com-
plete the crime of conspiracy. Since an overt act is an element of the federal
crime, the federal statute of limitations will necessarily run from the most
recent act. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912). See generally 29
N.Y.U.L. Rnv. 1470 (1954).
"State v. Knotts, 168 N.C. 173, 83 S.E. 972 (1914).
"State v. Davenport, 227 N.C. 475, 42 S.E.2d 686 (1947).
"Thus, hypothetically, where A and B conspire in 1957 to violate a law
in 1962 and by 1961 have not yet done any overt act pursuant to the con-
spiratorial plan, the conspiracy is nonetheless alive and may be prosecuted
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Brewer is that overt acts are good evidence that the conspiratorial
combination is still in being, although it might be possible to show
the continuation in other ways.
1 7
In ruling that the conspiracy count could be tried the Court
adopted the sound view that there had been only one punishable con-
spiracy in the case'L-that the overt acts did not punctuate a number
of separate and distinct "smaller" conspiracies.' 9
Conspiracy-Non-merger of Conspiracy and Substantive Offenses
One of the defendants in State v. Brewer20 was acquitted of con-
spiracy but was convicted under several of the counts charging
violation of G.S. § 14-353.2 Since the overt acts alleged in the
conspiracy count included the actual violations of the statute of which
the appellant had been convicted, he claimed that an acquittal of the
in 1961. See 29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1470, 1477 (1954), which suggests that this
strictly logical approach raises a presumption that the conspiracy continues
in existence and requires the defendant to meet an unduly heavy burden of
proving its termination.
"7 "We decide here that a conspiracy may have a continuance in time, and
count one and the indictment here allege that the conspiracy did so continue
with the commission of overt acts by the alleged conspirators in furtherance
of conspiracy...." State v. Brewer, 258 N.C. 533, 544, 129 S.E.2d 262,
270 (1963). The implication is that the allegation of overt acts is merely one
way in which the conspiracy may be alleged to have continued.
181d. at 543, 129 S.E.2d at 270. So long as the purpose of the conspiracy
has not been fully accomplished or abandoned and the combination has not
been dissolved, the original conspiracy continues intact, so that there can
be but one conspiratorial offense. See United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601
(1910). "[W]hen the plot contemplates bringing to pass a continuous result
that will not continue without the continuous cooperation of the conspirators
to keep it up, and there is such a continuous cooperation, it is a perversion of
natural thought and natural language to call such a continuous cooperation a
cinematographic series of distinct conspiracies, rather than to call it a single
one." Id. at 607.
" Typical of the older, and generally discredited, thought that there may
be several indictable conspiracies is Commonwealth v. Bartilson, 85 Pa. 482(1877) (conspiracy to defraud the prosecutor of various sums of money over
a period of time). Bartilson has been interpreted as finding "new" con-
spiracies only for the purpose of avoiding the statute of limitations, since
there was only one conspiracy alleged in that case. Commonwealth v. Kirk,
340 Pa. 346, 17 A.2d 201 (1941). The doctrine of separate conspiracies has
been impliedly rejected in Commonwealth v. Fabrizio, 197 Pa. Super. 45,
176 A.2d 147 (1961).
20258 N.C. 533, 129 S.E.2d 262 (1963), discussed in "Commercial Brib-
ery" and Conspiracy-Statute of Limitations, supra. This case is also dis-
cussed in CoxsTniuTo oxAL LAw, Statutes, supra.
2 These counts of the indictment are discussed in "Commercial Bribery"
supra.
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conspiracy charge was, in effect, an adjudication that he was not
guilty of the substantive offenses (the "overt acts"). The Court, in
dismissing this contention, reiterated the position it had taken earlier
in State v. McCullough12 to the effect that conspiracy to act is not
merged in the act itself, but that the two are separate and distinct
offenses and that a defendant may be acquitted of one and convicted
of the other.3
False Pretenses
It is a felony in North Carolina for one to obtain money, goods,
or other valuable property by means of any "false pretense whatso-
ever" with the intent to defraud.2" In State v. Hargett" an under-
taker was convicted under an indictment charging him with violating
G.S. § 14-100-by showing the prosecutor a casket, manifesting his
intention to use it in burying the prosecutor's infant child, and sub-
sequently breaching the argeement to bury the infant in a decent
manner. On appeal the conviction was reversed, the Court holding
that for the purposes of the statute a state of mind is not such a "fact"
or pretense as is capable of being misrepresented. Parker, J., con-
curred in result on the ground that the indictment was insufficient to
charge a misrepresentation of the defendant's intentions, but ex-
pressed the view that the state of a man's mind is a fact which may
be misrepresented just as any other fact, and that a misrepresentation
of that state of mind would be within the false pretenses statute.
Clearly the Court's holding is consistent with previous cases,20
22244 N.C. 11, 92 S.E.2d 389 (1956).
22 "Conspiracy alleged may fail in proof, as well as proven conspiracy
may fail in execution. Failure, then, to prove the existence of a conspiracy
alleged to have been formed to commit a particular character of crime cannot
affect the right of the State, regardless of the conspiracy, to prove that a
crime of the same character was actually committed." State v. Brewer, 258
N.C. 533, 560, 129 S.E.2d 262, 281 (1963). See Pinkerton v. United States,
328 U.S. 640 (1946), where the defendants were indicted for conspiracy
and for doing the conspired acts. They were convicted of both conspiracy
and the substantive violations. The convictions were affirmed, the United
States Supreme Court holding that "the commission of a substantive offense
and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct offenses." Id. at 643.
N'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-100 (1953).
2 259 N.C. 496, 130 S.E.2d 865 (1963).
26 State v. Knott, 124 N.C. 814, 32 S.E. 798 (1899) ; State v. Phifer, 65
N.C. 321 (1871). "It is settled that a promise is not a pretense. No matter
what the form, or however false the promise, to do something, in the future,
it will not come within the statute. There must be a false allegation of some
subsisting fact .... " Id. at 324.
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but the wisdom of the distinction drawn between the fact of the
defendant's intentions and other concrete facts is questionable."
Such a distinction allows the defendant to defraud with impunity so
long as he makes no false representations except those pertaining to
his state of mind. 8
Inest
In State v. Rogers9 the defendant was convicted under G.S. § 14-
17830 of incest with a girl whom he had adopted as his daughter.
Though there was evidence that the defendant was her natural
father, the Court held that this evidence was insufficient to prove a
blood relationship,3 and then interpreted the statute as prohibiting
A promise made without a present intention of performing is a criminal
false pretense in California. People v. Otterman, 154 Cal. App. 2d 193, 316
P.2d 85 (1957). In New Jersey a false promise is made a false pretense
indictable by statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:111-1 (1953).
"' The rationale of the majority rule may be found in Chaplin v. United
States, 157 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1946)-that if false promises or false state-
ments of intention were indictable, "the way would be open for every victim
of a bad bargain to resort to criminal proceedings to even the score with a
judgment proof adversary [who has, perhaps, been guilty only of a simple
commercial default]." Id. at 699.
For criticism of the majority rule see 43 CAL. L. Rnv. 719 (1955);
16 LA. L. REv. 807 (1956); MODEL PENAL CODE §206.1 (6)(a), com-
ment F (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1953).
" In State v. Phillips, 240 N.C. 516, 82 S.E.2d 762 (1954), the prosecuting
witness had been induced to pay money to the defendant both by reason of
false representations of existing (outside) facts and by the defendant's mis-
representations of his intention to perform certain future services for the
prosecutor. The Court held that as long as the prosecutor had relied in part
on the misstatements of concrete facts the conviction would not be over-
turned, although the prosecutor also relied in part on misrepresentations of
the defendant's intentions. (The conviction was reversed on other grounds.)
Misrepresentation by the defendant of his intentions to do a particular
act in the future may be actionable in a civil suit based on fraud. Pierce v.
American Fid. Ins. Co., 240 N.C. 567, 83 S.E.2d 493 (1954); Mitchell v.
Mitchell, 206 N.C. 546, 174 S.E. 447 (1934). See generally 24 N.C.L. REv.
49, 50 (1945).2 260 N.C. 406, 133 S.E.2d 1 (1963).
oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-178 (1953), makes a felony "carnal intercourse
between grandparent and grandchild, parent and child, and brother and sister
of the half or whole blood ......
" The prosecutrix's mother was married to a third party some months
before her birth. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the State to rebut the
"conclusive" presumption of legitimacy of a child born in wedlock by proving
that the husband could not have been the prosecutrix's natural father. State
v. Tedder, 258 N.C. 64, 127 S.E.2d 786 (1962); State v. McDowell, 101
N.C. 734, 7 S.E. 785 (1888).
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sexual relations only in cases of consanguity and not where the
kinship is purely legal.3 2
Perjury
In North Carolina perjury is "a false statement under oath,
knowingly, wilfully and designedly made, in a proceeding in a court
of competent jurisdiction . . . as to some matter material to the
issue .... -3 In State v. Allen " the defendant had testified in two
trials as a State's witness, and his testimony in the second was flatly
contradictory to that given in the first.35 While conceding that one of
the defendant's statements was obviously false, the Supreme Court
reversed his perjury conviction and held that the State had to show
which was the false statement."0 Though this rule is quite illogical3
it is widely followed.38
"2 State v. Rogers, 260 N.C. 406, 409, 133 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1963). Accord, EX
Parte Bourne, 300 Mich. 398, 2 N.W.2d 439 (1942) (stepdaughter); State
v. Lee, 196 Miss. 311, 17 So. 2d 277 (1944) (adopted daughter); State v.
Youst, 74 Ohio App. 381, 59 N.E.2d 167 (1943) (adopted daughter).
" State v. Smith, 230 N.C. 198, 201, 52 S.E.2d 348, 349 (1949). See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-209 (1953).
'260 N.C. 220, 132 S.E.2d 302 (1963).
"As a State's witness the defendant had testified in police court that
he and a companion, then being tried, had broken into and robbed certain
telephone change boxes. In a trial de novo in the superior court he had testi-
fied that he had been intoxicated at the time of the robbery and did not know
whether his companion had even been present. The defendant claimed that
his testimony in police court had been coerced, but the Supreme Court failed
to reach this point. Id. at 221, 132 S.E.2d at 303.
'"Accord, State v. Sailor, 240 N.C. 113, 81 S.E.2d 191 (1954). The
falsity of the testimony alleged to be perjurious must be established by two
witnesses, or by one witness and corroborating circumstances. State v.
Hill, 223 N.C. 711, 28 S.E.2d 100 (1943). This is the so-called "two-witness
rule."
The difficulty of proving perjury has been explained as resulting from:
(1) The historical nature of the crime, in that it was first tried in the
ecclesiastical courts which required a certain number of witnesses. 7 WIG-
mopE, EVIDENCE § 2040 (3d ed. 1940). (2) The fact that perjury was re-
garded as a heinous and enormous crime. State v. Courtright, 66 Ohio St.
35, 63 N.E. 590 (1902). (3) The necessity of protecting witnesses from their
innocent mistakes and from the wrath of a defeated litigant. Weiler v.
United States, 323 U.S. 606 (1945).
"' The "two-witness rule," note 36 supra, sets up a quantum of proof
necessary to establish that the defendant has made a false statement. Where
it can be shown that he has wilfully made two conflicting statements under
oath the "two-witness rule" is entirely unnecessary to show falsity and
should not apply. See generally Comment, Proof of Perjury: The Two Wit-
ness Requirement, 35 So. CAL. L. Rv. 86 (1961); Comment, 53 Mxci. L.
REv. 1165 (1955).
"8 See, e.g., United States v. Goldberg, 290 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1961);
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Involuntary Confessions
The truth or falsity of evidence tending to show that a confession
has been involuntarily made is a matter for the decision of the trial
court and is non-reviewable,3 9 but whether a certain set of circum-
stances do or do not render a confession inadmissible is a question of
law and may be reviewed on appeal.4°
In State v. Woodruff4 a purported confession was ruled to be in-
admissible by virtue of inducements made to the defendant by the
sheriff who held him in custody. The defendant was being held on
several forgery charges when he volunteered to assist in the solution of
certain murders2 if the sheriff would use his influence to help him.
Over a period of several months the sheriff had the forgery charges
consolidated for trial, arranged for the defendant's cousin to serve her
term in the county jail rather than in Raleigh, obtained the defendant's
release from prison on temporary parole, paid hotel and motel bills
for him, gave him spending money, and allowed him to spend a week
at home. The sheriff eventually came to suspect that the defendant
was involved in the murders and told him that he "certainly would try
to help him" 43 if he confessed. Some time thereafter 4 the defendant
confessed his part in the crimes.
The Supreme Court's holding, that the sheriff's actions and as-
surance that he would try to help rendered the confession void, appears
Williams v. State, 34 Ala. App. 462, 41 So. 2d 605, cert. denied, 252 Ala.
445, 41 So. 2d 608 (1949); McGuire v. State, 171 Ark. 238, 283 S.W. 980
(1926); Hall v. State, 136 Fla. 644, 187 So. 392 (1939); Roddenberry v.
State, 37 Ga. App. 359, 140 S.E. 386 (1927); People v. Glenn, 294 Ill.
333, 128 N.E. 532 (1920); State v. Burns, 120 S.C. 523, 113 S.E. 351, 25
A.L.R. 414 (1922); Paytes v. State, 137 Tenn. 129, 191 S.W. 975 (1917);
State v. Woolley, 109 Vt. 53, 192 At. 1 (1937). Contra, ARiz. CODE ANN.
§§ 13-562 to -564 (1956); State v. Storey, 148 Minn. 398, 182 N.W. 613
(1921).
"State v. Hammond, 229 N.C. 108, 47 S.E.2d 704 (1948); State v.
Whitener, 191 N.C. 659, 132 S.E. 603 (1926).
o State v. Crowson, 98 N.C. 595, 4 S.E. 143 (1887) ; State v. Andrew,
61 N.C. 205 (1866).
" 259 N.C. 333, 130 S.E.2d 641 (1963).
"The defendant's brother had been convicted of these murders and was
at the time imprisoned.
"259 N.C. at 336, 130 S.E.2d at 643.
"The length of the interval between inducement and confession was not
set out in the case; but, unless shown by the State clearly to the contrary,
it is presumed that the inducement continues to influence the defendant
until the time he confesses. State v. Drake, 113 N.C. 625, 18 S.E. 166 (1893).
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to be consistent with the view announced repeatedly in North Carolina
that any material inducement deprives the confessor of his free will
and makes his confession inadmissible against him."
Jurisdictional Defect not Waived by Guilty Plea
A valid warrant or indictment is necessary to establish criminal
jurisdiction,46 and an indictment returned by a grand jury from
which Negroes have been systematically excluded does not confer
jurisdiction on the court if the defendant is a Negro.17 In State v.
Covingtoni8 the defendant, a Negro, had moved to quash three indict-
ments which he alleged had been returned by such a grand jury. He
was not given a sufficient hearing on the question49 and subsequently
pleaded guilty. The North Carolina Supreme Court overturned his
convictions and ruled, apparently for the first time, that a consti-
tutional objection to the validity of an indictment raised by a timely
motion to quash 50 is not waived by a later plea of guilty.51
Sentencing
Breaking and entering is punishable in North Carolina by im-
prisonment for not less than four months nor more than ten years. 2
Possession of housebreaking equipment is a felony punishable by fine
or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the trial judge. 8
" "The true rule is that a confession cannot be received in evidence where
the defendant has been influenced by any threat or promise... a confession
obtained by the slightest emotions of hope or fear ought to be rejected."
State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. 259, 260 (1827). Accord, State v. Gibson, 216
N.C. 535, 5 S.E.2d 717 (1939) (first confession); State v. Livingston, 202
N.C. 809, 164 S.E. 337 (1932). See generally Coates, Limitations on In-
vestigating Officers, 15 N.C.L. RFv. 229, 233 (1937).
" State v. Morgan, 226 N.C. 414, 38 S.E.2d 166 (1946) ; State v. Beasley,
208 N.C. 318, 180 S.E. 598 (1935).
" State v. Covington, 258 N.C. 495, 128 S.E.2d 822 (1963). This case
is discussed in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Due Process, supra.
48258 N.C. 501, 128 S.E.2d 827 (1963). This case is discussed in Cox-
STITuTIONAL LAW, Due Process n.4, supra.
," The defendant had moved that the court issue process to require the
county officials to appear in court with their records pertinent to the selec-
tion of grand juries. The court refused to issue this order. State v. Coving-
ton, 258 N.C. 495, 128 S.E.2d 822 (1963), the companion case to State v.
Covington, 258 N.C. 501, 128 S.E.2d 827 (1963).
"Under N.C. GEx. STAT. § 9-26 (1953), the motion to quash is timely if
it is made prior to pleading to the indictment.
51258 N.C. at 504-05, 128 S.E.2d at 830.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-54 (1953).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-55 (1953).
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In State v. Blackmon54 the defendant had pleaded guilty both to
breaking and entering and to possession of burglary tools. He had
been sentenced to imprisonment for from eight to ten years on the
first charge and from ten to twenty years on the second. He appealed
his sentence for possession, contending that he was subjected to
"cruel and unusual punishment" by virtue of his receiving a longer
sentence for possession than for breaking and entering. In vacating
the possession sentence the North Carolina Supreme Court did not
reach the constitutional issue. Instead the Court held that G.S. §
14-2" limits the length of sentence the trial judge may pronounce in
a felony case when the length of sentence is not otherwise specified
in the particular statute under which the defendant is convicted.
The question answered by the Court in Blackmon is whether a
"fine or imprisonment.., in the discretion of the court""56 is a "spe-
cific punishment" within the meaning of G.S. § 14-2. This question
was answered in the negative and it was adjudged that the trial court
could impose a sentence of no longer than ten years.57
In holding that it was necessary that quantum as well as type of
punishment 58 be set out by statute in order to render the punishment
"specific" under G.S. § 14-2, the Court was forced to overturn the
position previously taken in North Carolina. State v. Cain,9 which
held that the trial judge was empowered by G.S. § 14-55 to sentence
a defendant to twenty-five to thirty years for possession of burglary
tools and that the sentence was not "cruel and unusual," and State v.
'260 N.C. 352, 132 S.E.2d 880 (1963).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-2 (1953), insofar as pertinent provides: "Every
person who shall be convicted of any felony for which no specific punishment
is prescribed by statute shall be imprisoned.., not less than four months nor
more than ten years, or be fined."
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1455 (1953).
"' "Therefore, if the punishment to be imposed in the discretion of the
court, as provided in G.S. § 14-55, for the possession of the implements of
housebreaking, is not limited by the provisions of G.S. § 14-2, then we have
'the anomolous situation of upholding the imposition of a sentence in the
State's Prison three times as long as could be legally imposed for the actual
commission of the crime of housebreaking under G.S. § 14-54. We have come
to the conclusion that the Legislature never intended to authorize any such
disparity." State v. Blackmon, 260 N.C. 352, 357, 132 S.E.2d 880, 884 (1963).
" Earlier cases had held that the ten year maximum of G.S. § 14-2 did
not apply where the statute under which a defendant was convicted prescribed
a type of punishment, i.e., a fine or imprisonment in the discretion of the
court, even though the maximum amount of the fine or duration of the im-
prisonment was not specifically provided.
209 N.C. 275, 183 S.E. 300 (1936).
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Szindell,60 which held that the trial judge could impose a thirty year
sentence, the overall ten year maximum notwithstanding, were
specifically overruled. 1
It seems unjust that a man could receive heavier punishment for
equipping himself to commit an offense than for doing the act itself.
The result in Blackmon corrects this injustice and is desirable, but it
is debatable whether such a long-standing statutory interpretation
should be within the power of the courts to reverse.0 2 The effect of
Blackmon is to limit the trial court's discretion in sentencing for a
significant number of other felonies where there is no maximum term
specifically set out.63
DAMAGES
BREACH OF MANUFACTURER'S SALES CONTRACT
In Perfecting Serv. Co. v. Product Dev. & Sales Co.,' defendant
entered into a contract with the plaintiff for the manufacture by
the plaintiff of ten thousand units of a fuel saving device to be at-
tached to automobile engines. After the plaintiff had purchased the
necessary materials to fill the order and had manufactured and de-
livered over three thousand of the units, the defendant declared the
contract rescinded and refused to make any further payments. Judg-
60 189 N.C. 151, 126 S.E. 417 (1925) (carnal knowledge of a child).
e' The Court also overruled what it called "dictum" in State v. Rippy, 127
N.C. 516, 37 S.E. 148 (1900) (carnal knowledge of a child), and part of
the opinion in State v. Richardson, 221 N.C. 209, 19 S.E.2d 863 (1942)
(involuntary manslaughter).
" Parker, J., took the position in his dissent that the rule of the earlier
cases should be changed only by legislative action. 260 N.C. at 357, 132
S.E.2d at 884.
" See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-12.1 (Supp. 1963) (subversive activi-
ties); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18 (1953) (involuntary manslaughter); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-26 (1953) (carnal knowledge of a child twelve to sixteen
years of age); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-33 (1953) (various aggravated as-
saults) ; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-60 (1953) (burning a school building); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-62.1 (Supp. 1963) (burning a building or structure in the
process of construction); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-65 (1953) (fraudulently
setting fire to a dwelling); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-67 (1953) (attempting to
burn dwellings and other buildings); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-92 (1953) (em-
bezzlement of funds by public officers and trustees); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-98
(1953) (embezzlement of partnership property by the surviving partner);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-150 (1953) (disturbing graves); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-328 (1953) (selling recipes for adulterating liquors).
1259 N.C. 400, 131 S.E.2d 9 (1963). This case is discussed in CREDIT
TRANsAcrIoNs, Warranty---Guaranty, infra.
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ment in the lower court was for the plaintiff and damages of fifty-one
thousand dollars were assessed. The Supreme Court reversed on the
issue of the amount of damages because the charge of the lower
court gave the jury "no legal guidance to assess damages."' The
Court then set forth the following rules as to items of damage re-
coverable in an action for breach in mid-performance of a sales
contract:
(1) Where one violates his contract he is liable for gains pre-
vented and losses sustained which may fairly be supposed to have
entered into the contemplation of the parties when they made the
contract.
3
(2) Gains prevented means loss of profits, and where the goods
have already been manufactured and there is available market at
the time fixed for delivery, the measure of damages is the difference
between the contract price and the market price at the time fixed for
delivery. Where there is no general market value, the measure of
damages is the difference between the contract price and the cost
of manufacture. If when the breach occurs a part of the goods has
been manufactured and delivered, seller may recover as damages the
full contract price for the goods delivered and, as to the portion not
delivered, may recover the difference in the contract price of the un-
delivered goods and what it would have cost the seller to manufacture
and deliver the undelivered portion.4
(3) There may be recovery for reasonable expenditures incurred
for labor and materials in part performance of the contract, to the
extent they are wasted when performance is abandoned and if such
expenses might reasonably have been contemplated by the buyer.5
The charge to the jury was: "The damages... are such as arise naturally
from the breach thereof, or such as may be reasonably supposed to have been
within the contemplation of the parties at the time of the making of the
contract as a probable result of the breach .... " 259 N.C. at 415, 131 S.E.2d
at 21.
-259 N.C. at 415, 131 S.E.2d at 21. Accord, Tillis v. Calvine Cotton
Mills, Inc., 251 N.C. 359, 111 S.E.2d 606 (1959).
'259 N.C. at 415-16, 131 S.E.2d at 21-22. Accord, Cleveland-Canton
Springs Co. v. Goldsboro Buggy Co., 148 N.C. 533, 62 S.E. 637 (1908).
See generally, 3 WILLISTON, SA.Es § 5 83.a (rev. ed. 1948) ; Annot., 44 A.L.R.
215 (1926), supplemented in 108 A.L.R. 1482 (1937).
259 N.C. at 416, 131 S.E.2d at 22. Accord, Lieberman v. Templar Motor
Co., 236 N.Y. 139, 140 N.E. 222 (1923). The Court in the principal case
pointed out that recovery is limited to such damages and expenses that
accrued prior to the notification by the buyer that he would accept no further
1964]
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The salvage value of unused materials must be deducted and the
seller must use due diligence to minimize damages.0
(4) When the seller has a going business and is manufacturing
and selling goods to various buyers, overhead and fixed charges
constitute elements of cost of manufacturing and are the subject of
proper inquiry.7 Thus overhead and fixed charges are elements
of damage for wasted labor and expenses, insofar as they are reason-
ably applicable."
INTEREST
In General Metals, Inc. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 9 a case involving
a breach of contract, the Court reviewed the North Carolina cases
decided since the enactment of G.S. § 24-510 and concluded that they
establish the following rule: When the amount of damages in a
breach of contract action is ascertained from the contract itself, or
from relevant evidence, or from both, interest should be allowed
from the date of the breach."
Loss OF PROFITS
In Smith v. Corsat'2 there was an action to recover damages
resulting from the collision of two automobiles. Plaintiff sought to
deliveries. See Novelty Advertising Co. v. Farmers Mutual Tobacco Ware-
house Co., 186 N.C. 197, 119 S.E. 196 (1923).
8259 N.C. at 416, 131 S.E.2d at 22. Accord, Atalah v. Wilson Lewith
Mach. Corp., 200 F.2d 297 (4th Cir. 1952); Bennet v. S. Blumenthal & Co.,
113 Conn. 223, 155 At. 68 (1931).
7259 N.C. at 416, 131 S.E.2d at 22. Accord, Worrell & Williams v.
Kinnear Mfg. Co., 103 Va. 719, 49 S.E. 988 (1905).
8 259 N.C. at 417, 131 S.E.2d at 22. Accord, Georgia Power & Light Co.
v. Fruit Growers Express Co., 55 Ga. App. 520, 190 S.E. 669 (1937). Cf.
Harris & Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain & Denbo, Inc., 256 N.C. 110, 123 S.E.2d
590 (1962), where due to the peculiarities of the case overhead expenses were
not allowed as an item of damage for breach of a construction contract.
:259 N.C. 709, 131 S.E.2d 360 (1963).
'This statute provides that "all sums of money due by contract of any
kind, excepting money due on penal bonds, shall bear interest, and when a
jury shall render a verdict therefor they shall distinguish the principal from
the sum allowed as interest; .... " N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-5 (1953).
" The cases relied on by the Court as establishing this rule were Harris
& Harris Constr. Co. v. Crain & Denbo, Inc., 256 N.C. 110, 123 S.E.2d 590
(1962); Thomas v. Piedmont Realty & Dev. Co., 195 N.C. 591, 143 S.E.
144 (1928); Perry v. Norton, 182 N.C. 585, 109 S.E. 641 (1921); Bond v.
Pickett Cotton Mills, Inc., 166 N.C. 20, 81 S.E. 936 (1914). See McCormick,
Interest as Damages, 9 N.C.L. RPv. 237 (1931), for a thorough discussion
of this subject.
12260 N.C. 92, 131 S.E.2d 894 (1963).
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recover for personal and property damages suffered by him; and the
defendant, owner and sole operator of a small wholesale phonograph
record business, counterclaimed for like damages.' In the trial
court defendant was permitted to introduce evidence that his net in-
come, which was derived solely from the net profits of his business,
had been "about 10,000 dollars" for the last three years.
On appeal the Court noted that the admissibility of evidence
of profits of a business in which the party is interested had never
before been considered in North Carolina,-4 but it was concluded
that such evidence was admissible as an aid (considered with other
evidence) in determining the pecuniary value of the defendant's
loss of time or impairment of earning capacity. The Court stated
the general rule to the effect that where the profits depend for the
most part on employment of capital, labor of others, and similar
variable factors, evidence thereof is inadmissable and cannot be con-
sidered for the purpose of establishing the pecuniary value of lost
time or diminution of earning capacity, since loss of such profits is
not the necessary consequence of the injury. In such cases the
measure of damages is the loss in value of the injured person's serv-
ices in the business.35
The Court pointed out, however, that where the business is small
and the income which it produces is principally due to the personal
services and attention of the owner, earnings of business may afford
a criterion for determining the owner's earning power. Thus evi-
dence of profits may be used for the purpose of aiding in establishing
a standard for the calculation of damages and is useful in determin-
ing the pecuniary value of loss of time or impairment of earning
capacity.16
" The defendant had been a field engineer for the Navy, and through
his connections in the Navy he was able to sell records to aircraft carriers
and other Naval outlets. He was in full control of his business and served
in all capacities-truck driver, janitor, salesman and peddler. After the
accident in which he suffered extensive injuries, he was unable to keep the
business on a paying basis because of his inability to travel.
1 Wallace v. Western N.C.R.R., 104 N.C. 442, 10 S.E. 552 (1889), was
cited by the Court as a North Carolina case with the "nearest approach" to
the principal case.
IG260 N.C. at 96, 131 S.E.2d at 897. Accord, Hendler v. Coffey, 278
Mass. 339, 179 N.E. 801 (1932) ; Flintjer v. Kansas City, 204 S.W. 951 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1918). See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 288 (1950).10 260 N.C. at 97, 131 S.E.2d at 898. Accord, Osterode v. Almquist, 89
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The defendant also prayed for special damages of ten thousand
dollars for "loss of business," that is, loss of profits from business
enterprise. The Court pointed out that in actions where such re-
coveries are allowed there is usually some special contract or en-
gagement from which the injured party would have realized a rela-
tively definite profit but for the injury, or some seasonal or separable
transaction from which the claimant would have realized a profit
but for the injury." Here recovery for "loss of business" as special
damages was not permissible and evidence of lost profits was not
admissible on the theory of special damages because (1) special dam-
ages were not properly pleaded"8 and (2) the evidence of loss of
profits did not reach the degree of certainty required as a founda-
tion for special damages. 9
Cal. App. 2d 15, 200 P.2d 169 (1948); Amelsburg v. Lunning, 234 Iowa 852,
14 N.W.2d 680 (1944). See generally, Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 288 (1950).
" The Court cited inter alia the following cases from other jurisdictions
where loss of profits resulting from personal injury were recovered as special
damages: Hollander v. Wilson Estate Co., 214 Cal. 582, 7 P.2d 177 (1932),
where a dealer in rugs and furniture was unable to conduct his business
for eight months after his injury; Hetler v. Holtrop, 285 Mich. 570, 281
N.W. 434 (1938), where the owner and operator of a fruit stand was unable
to carry on his occupation for three weeks after being injured; Steitz v.
Gifford, 280 N.Y. 15, 19 N.E.2d 661 (1939), where a truck farmer who
grew a special variety of corn was unable, due to his injuries, to harvest the
corn and deliver it by the due dates specified in his contracts. 260 N.C.
at 99, 131 S.E.2d at 899-900.
Although there was no prior North Carolina authority on tort cases which
involved lost business profits resulting from personal injury, the Court
analogized the recovery to one where property damage was involved in which
loss of profits therefrom has been allowed as a foundation for recovery of
special damages, and cited a number of North Carolina cases on this point.
Thus the door was left open to recovery of business profits as special damages
in personal injury cases if the "essential elements" are present. 260 N.C. at
100, 131 S.E.2d at 900. These "essential elements" are discussed infra at nn.
18 and 19.
18260 N.C. at 100, 131 S.E.2d at 900. The Court cited Binder v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 222 N.C. 512, 23 S.E.2d 894 (1943), where the
rule was laid down that in order to recover special damages it is necessary
that the complaint state specifically and in detail the damages sought to
be recovered. See McINT SH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1079 (2d ed. 1956).
9 260 N.C. at 100, 131 S.E.2d at 900. Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line
RR., 140 N.C. 574, 53 S.E. 362 (1906), a property damage case, was cited
by the Court. In that case it was held that only the profits lost that are
reasonably definite and certain are recoverable.
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NOMINAL DAMAGES
In Ballenger Paving Co. v. North Carolina State Highway
Comm'n,20 a case on appeal to superior court from a State Highway
Commission Board of Review decision, the judge assessed "nominal
damages" of nine hundred dollars. In remanding the case the Su-
preme Court pointed out that "an award of $900.00 cannot be de-
nominated nominal damages which is 'a small trivial sum awarded in
recognition of a technical injury which has caused no substantial
damage.' ... Inflation has not yet reached the stage where $900.00
can be called trivial." 21
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
ALIMONY WITHOUT DIVORCE
In Deal v. Deal,' the wife instituted an action for alimony with-
out divorce pursuant to G.S. § 50-16.2 The lower court denied
plaintiff's motion for alimony pendente lite, finding that she was be-
ing adequately provided for. Plaintiff appealed, asserting that the
lower court failed to pass on the issue of whether defendant had
abandoned her, and that a mere finding that plaintiff was adequately
provided for would not warrant denial of the motion.
The Court held that the lower court must, on a motion for ali-
mony pendente lite under G.S. § 50-16, find that the husband had
20258 N.C. 691, 129 S.E.2d 245 (1963). The appeal here to the Wake
County Superior Court was taken under the provisions of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 136-29 (1958). This case is discussed in ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, Judicial
Review, supra.
21 258 N.C. at 695, 129 S.E.2d at 248. In Hairston v. Atlantic Greyhound
Corp., 220 N.C. 642, 644, 18 S.E.2d 166, 168 (1942), cited in the instant
case, the Court gave the usual version of the rule for nominal damages:
"Nominal damages, consisting of some trifling amount, are those recoverable
where some legal right has been invaded but no actual loss or substantial
injury has been sustained." See generally, McCORMIcx, DAMAGES §§ 20, 21(1935).
-259 N.C. 489, 131 S.E.2d 24 (1963).
"If any husband shall separate himself from his wife and fail to provide
her and the children with the necessary subsistence according to his means
and condition in life, or if he shall be a drunkard or a spendthrift, or be
guilty of any misconduct or acts that would be or constitute cause for di-
vorce, either absolute or from bed and board, the wife may institute an action
in the superior court of the county in which the cause of action arose to have
a reasonable subsistence and counsel fees allotted and paid or secured to her
from the estate or earnings of her husband .... ." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16
(Supp. 1963).
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abandoned the wife or was guilty of conduct which would entitle
her to a divorce absolute or from bed and board. The Court quoted
with approval Cameron v. CameroiO to the effect that the judge,
"[M] ust, by application of his sound judgment, pass upon its truth
or falsity and find according to his conviction."4 Thus, to warrant
a holding for the plaintiff, the judge must find the alleged fact of
abandonment to be true. Accordingly when the judge makes no
formal findings, there being nothing to indicate that he decided truth
or falsity, it is presumed that such issue was resolved against the
plaintiff. Since there were no formal findings made by the lower
court in the principal case, the presumption that such findings were
made and were against the plaintiff prevailed,5 and denial of the
motion for alimony pendente lite was affirmed.'
On the issue of necessity of support as a requisite to alimony
pendente lite, if sufficient grounds should have been found, the Court
stated that there is a "conflict of authority as to whether, in a case
in which a husband has abandoned his wife, allegations and proof
that he is providing her adequate support is a defense to her motion
for alimony pendente lite."' The Court stated that the trend in
North Carolina was toward the view that pendente lite awards were
not based on the wife's needs for subsistence, but rather on the theory
that the wife was entitled to the security of a court order. Both of
the cases relied upon as establishing the trend were also decided pur-
suant to G.S. § 50-16.1
a 231 N.C. 123, 129, 56 S.E.2d 384, 388 (1949). It is interesting to note
here that the action in that case involved G.S. § 50-15, which at the time of
the decision required the judge to find that the allegations of the complaint
were true. Since then, that statute has been amended, and now only requires
that the judge find that the facts were "probably" true. See note 6 infra.
'259 N.C. at 492, 131 S.E.2d at 27.
Quaere whether the judge here found such facts in view of the lower
court finding that "It is the opinion of the court that plaintiff and the three
children are being adequately provided for at this time by defendant and
therefore her motion for alimony pendente lite is denied." Id. at 490, 131
S.E.2d at 25.
' It is well to note here that in 1961, G.S. § 50-15 was amended so as to
require the judge to find that the facts "probably entitle her to the relief de-
manded." N.C. GEN'. STAT. § 50-15 (Supp. 1963). Thus, on motion for ali-
mony pendente lite under G.S. § 50-15, the judge must find the facts alleged
were probably true, while on a similar motion pursuant to G.S. § 50-16, he
must find them to be absolutely true.
'259 N.C. at 491, 131 S.E.2d at 26.
'Thurston v. Thurston, 256 N.C. 663, 124 S.E.2d 852 (1962); Butler v.
Butler, 226 N.C. 594, 39 S.E.2d 745 (1946).
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G.S. § 50-15, relating to actions for divorce, expressly provides
that in an action for divorce, pendente lite will be awarded if the
wife's complaint or affidavit shows that "she has not sufficient means
whereon to subsist during the prosecution of the suit .... -9 This
statute by its terms seems to require necessity as a basis for relief."
Yet the Court in the principal case talked of alimony pendente lite
without making any reference to or distinction from actions under
G.S. § 50-15. If the decision on this point was intended by implica-
tion to apply to pendente lite motions under G.S. § 50-15, then it
is clearly contra to the terms of that statute." Yet it would be of
questionable value to have different standards for the two statutes.
The present indication of willingness to provide alimony pendente
lite regardless of necessity for support would seem to be the pre-
ferred position.
ANNULMENT
In Ivery v. Ivery,'2 the brother of the deceased testator sought
to have his marriage declared void ab initio on the grounds that the
deceased was mentally incompetent to contract a marriage at the
time of the wedding ceremony. The effect of dissolution of the mar-
riage would be revocation of those provisions in the testator's will
favorable to his spouse, including her appointment as executrix.' 3
The Court stated that whether the marriage could be attacked after
the death of one of the parties depended on whether the marriage
was void in the true sense or only voidable.'
Briefly, a voidable marriage is considered valid until annulled,
and the right to have it annulled is personal and hence extinguished
on the death of one of the parties.'5 On the other hand, a void mar-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-15 (Supp. 1963).
"0 "[I]f... it appears to the judge... that she has not sufficient means
whereon to subsist...." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-15 (Supp. 1963).
" But, the Court has in earlier cases taken the view that necessity was not
a requirement under G.S. § 50-16. Mercer v. Mercer, 253 N.C. 164, 116
S.E.2d 795 (1960); Rowland v. Rowland, 253 N.C. 328, 116 S.E.2d 795
(1960). See also 39 N.C.L. REv. 189 (1961); 39 N.C.L. Rzv. 365 (1961).
12258 N.C. 721, 129 S.E.2d 457 (1963).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.4 (Supp. 1963).
" 258 N.C. at 726, 129 S.E.2d at 460.
" R.g., Christensen v. Christensen, 144 Neb. 763, 14 N.W.2d 613 (1944);
lit Re Romano's Estate, 40 Wash. 2d 796, 246 P.2d 501 (1952). For a dis-
cussion of void and voidable marriages in North Carolina, see Watters v.
Watters, 168 N.C. 411, 84 S.E. 703 (1915).
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riage is void ab initio and ipso facto, and as such needs no court
decree declaring it so, and "its invalidity may be maintained in any
proceeding in any courit between any proper parties whether in the
lifetime ,or after the death of the supposed husband and wife."'u
Thus the Court was clearly correct in stating the issue as to whether
the marriage could be attacked after the death of one of the parties
depended on whether the marriage was void or voidable.
At common law, and in North Carolina before statute,17 the
marriage of an incompetent was void. North Carolina now has a
statute, G.S. § 51-3, which by its terms seems to say that where one
of the parties is incompetent, the marriage is void.' However, our
Court has held that in North Carolina the only marriages which are
absolutely void are those contained in the proviso to G.S. § 51-3-
marriages between a white person and a Negro or Indian, and
bigamous marriages-all others are voidable.'0 In the principal
case, however, the Court stated that: "Our decisions are incon-
clusive as to whether a marriage contracted when a party thereto is
'incapable of contracting for want of understanding' is void or void-
able."2 Accordingly, the Court held that where there is no cohabita-
18 Christensen v. Christensen, supra note 15, at 766, 14 N.W.2d at 615;
"Where a marriage is void, no decree of any court is necessary to terminate
it, because in law the marital status never existed." In Re De Conza's Estate,
13 N.J. Misc. 41, - , 176 A. 192, 193 (Orphans Court 1934).
1 Gathings v. Williams, 27 N.C. 487 (1845).
18 "All marriages between ... persons either of whom is at the time...
incapable of contracting from want of understanding, shall be void; Provided,
double first cousins may not marry; and provided further, that no marriage
followed by cohabitation and the birth of issue shall be declared void after
the death of either of the parties for any of the causes stated in this section,
except for that one of the parties was a white person and the other a negro
or of negro descent.., and for bigamy .... " N. C. GnN. STAT. § 51-3 (Supp.
1963).
19 "This recognizes that the only absolutely void marriages are those
named in the proviso.., and that the other need to be 'declared void.' Though
the declaration may be, if granted, that the marriage was void ab initio, such
marriage is valid until this declaration by the Court .... " Watters v.
Watters, 168 N.C. 411, 413, 84 S.E. 703, 704 (1915). "The code.., it is
true, provides that a marriage by a female under fourteen years of age or
a male person under sixteen, is void, but the proviso speaks of its being
declared void, and the construction of the statute by the courts has always
been that the meaning is that such marriages are voidable." State v. Parker,
106 N.C. 711, 712, 11 S.E. 517, 518 (1890).
S20258 N.C. at 729, 129 S.E. 2d at 463. The Court in the Wafters case,
supra note 19, had before it an action to declare void a marriage in which the
defendant was an alleged incompetent. In that case, the Court intimated that
such a marriage was voidable only, and held that the plaintiff husband was
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tion and birth of issue of the marriage, the action to annul may be
brought after the death of the incompetent, thereby apparently con-
struing the proviso to embrace those who are incompetent at the
time of the marriage.2
CUSTODY
In Bunn v. Bunn,2 the husband instituted an action for divorce
from bed and board, requesting the custody of a minor child. The
wife filed a cross action for alimony without divorce pursuant to
G.S. 50-16, also requesting custody. Both the plaintiff's action and
the defendant's cross action were dismissed, but the judge awarded
custody of the child to the defendant and the plaintiff appealed. The
issue before the Court was whether jurisdiction to award custody
remained after dismissal of the action and the cross action. The
Court held that jurisdiction to award custody was present, citing
G.S. § 50-13, which provides that:
After the filing of a complaint in any action for divorce, whether
from the bonds of matrimony or from bed and board, both before
and after final judgment therein, it is lawful for the judge of the
court in which such application is or was pending to make such
orders respecting the care, custody, tuition, and maintenance of
the minor children of the marriage as may be proper ... 23
The courts are not in accord as to whether a divorce court has
the power to award custody of children when neither party to the
suit is granted a decree.24 Though North Carolina has not ruled on
estopped by living with the wife for eight years and having five children.
This seems contra to Sims v. Sims, 212 N.C. 297, 28 S.E. 407 (1897).
" This holding is in effect saying that such a marriage is valid until de-
clared void-a characteristic of a voidable marriage, for a voidable marriage
is valid until a decree declaring its invalidity is issued. See note 15 supra
and accompanying text. Yet under this decision, the marriage is subject to
attack after the death of one of the parties-a characteristic generally at-
tributed to void marriages, see note 16 supra and accompanying text, and
explicitly attributed only to those classes enumerated in the proviso to G.S.
§ 51-3 dealing with attack of marriages after the death of one of the parties.
" 258 N.C. 445, 128 S.E.2d 792 (1963).
" N.C. GEE. STAr. § 50-13 (1950).
2 Absent any statute, courts are generally recognized to have power to
award custody. E.g., Braden v. Braden, 280 Ky. 563, 133 S.W.2d 902 (1939) ;
Davis v. Davis, 194 Miss. 343, 12 So. 2d 435 (1943). Contra, Gatton v.
Gatton, 41 Ohio App. 397, 179 N.E. 745 (1931). See generally, Annot., 151
A.L.R. 380 (1944). The result in the principal case seems justified by the
language of G.S. § 50-13 giving the judge power "[T]o make such orders
respecting the care, custody, tuition and maintenance of the minor children
of the marriage as may be proper .... " N.C. GEar. STAT. § 50-13 (1950).
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this specific point before, statutory authority is given in an action for
habeas corpus to determine the issue of custody.26 The Court in
the principal case reasoned that there was no good reason to turn the
parties out of one courthouse door and admit them right back
through another.26 Apart from this reason, this holding seems to
be good public policy, as a decree fixing the rights of the parties
to custody of the children would save much strife from the stand-
point of all parties involved.
DIVORCE
Husband instituted an action for absolute divorce based on two
years separation. The attorney for the wife informed the attorney
for the husband that a cross action for alimony without divorce would
be filed in the cause based on adultery and willful abandonment, but
before such cross action was in fact filed, husband's attorney moved
for a voluntary nonsuit. The next day, a motion to amend the answer
by setting up the cross action was made. The clerk then declined to
pass on plaintiff's motion for voluntary nonsuit and plaintiff ap-
pealed. Thus, in Scott v. Scott,27 the question was whether, before
filing of a claim for affirmative relief by defendant, the plaintiff was
entitled to a voluntary nonsuit as a matter of right in a divorce
action. The Court held that plaintiff was entitled to his nonsuit as
a matter of right, and that after granting it there was no action
remaining in which defendant could file a cross action.
It is true generally, and in North Carolina, that the plaintiff is
entitled to take a voluntary nonsuit as a matter of right.2 8 However,
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 17-39.1 (Supp. 1963) provides in part that "[A]ny
superior court judge having authority to determine matters in chambers
may, in his discretion, issue a writ of habeas corpus requiring that the body
of any minor child whose custody is in dispute be brought before him or
any other qualified judge. Upon return of said writ, the judge may award
the charge or custody of the child...!'
"0 The solution reached by the Court in the principal case seems to be
the logical one in view of Cox v. Cox, 246 N.C. 528, 98 S.E.2d 879 (1957),
in which the Court held it was error for the lower court to dismiss the action
for divorce of the wife on motion for voluntary nonsuit when the husband
had filed a custody petition in the cause because the custody request was in
the nature of a request for affirmative relief, and the defendant had a right
to have it determined in that action.
'T259 N.C. 642, 131 S.E.2d 478 (1963).8 McKesson v. Mendenhall, 64 N.C. 502 (1870). However, plaintiff may
not take a voluntary nonsuit as a matter of right when the defendant has
asserted a counterclaim arising out of the same contract or transaction.
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there is a split of authority on the question of whether the plaintiff is
entitled to a nonsuit in a divorce action when the defendant has filed
no claim for affirmative relief.2" North Carolina, in Caldwell v. Cald-
well," when confronted with the problem said:
The better rule seems to be that a motion by the plaintiff for judg-
ment dismissing his action for divorce upon a voluntary nonsuit
will not be allowed by the court as a matter of right, but is ad-
dressed to the sound discretion of the court, which will be exer-
cised in the interest not only of plaintiff, but defendant and the
State. The State and defendant, each, have an interest in the
status of plaintiff and defendant, and the purpose of an action for
divorce is to change or alter this status3 1
This language led some writers to the conclusion that North Carolina
was in accord with those jurisdictions holding that the plaintiff did
not have the right to a nonsuit 3 2 In the principal case, however, the
Court discounts this language by saying that in Caldwell the holding
was not that the granting of a nonsuit was within the discretion of the
lower court. The case was reversed, but not remanded, which pro-
hibited the exercise of discretion at the trial level, and the Supreme
Court could not exercise judicial discretion. Thus the Court held
that in reality the rule applied in that case was that the plaintiff was
entitled to a nonsuit as a matter of right."8
Whether overruling Caldwell or merely indicating its true hold-
ing, the Court made it clear in the instant case that it did not consider
the interests of public policy strong enough to warrant distinguishing
between motions for voluntary nonsuit in divorce cases from other
cases.
Bynum v. Powe, 97 N.C. 374, 2 S.E. 170 (1887). But, the plaintiff is entitled
to a voluntary nonsuit when the defendant files a counterclaim arising out of
other than the same transaction or contract. Samuel H. Shearer & Son v.
Herring, 189 N.C. 460, 127 S.E. 519 (1925).
"' For a case holding it within the discretion of the judge see Mayott v.
Mayott, 167 Misc. 860, 4 N.Y.S.2d 57 (Sup. Ct. 1938). Other courts do not
distinguish between actions for divorce and other actions. See Johnson v.
Gerald, 216 Ala. 581, 113 So. 447 (1927). See generally, Annot., 138 A.L.R.
1100 (1942).189 N.C. 805, 128 S.E. 329 (1925).
li Id. at 812, 128 S.E. at 333.
"In a divorce proceeding, a motion by plaintiff for a judgment of vol-
untary nonsuit is not allowed as a matter of right, but is addressed to the
sound discretion of the judge, to be exercised in the interest, not only of the
plaintiff, but also of the defendant and the State." II McINTosH, NORTH
CAROLINA P.AcTics & PRocEDuRE § 1645 at 125 (2d ed. 1956).
3 259 N.C. at 648, 131 S.E.2d at 482.
19641
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
PARENT AND CHILD
The North Carolina statute3 4 imposing liability of five hundred
dollars on a parent for the willful or malicious damage to property by
a child under eighteen years old was before the Court for the first
time in General Insurance Co. of America v. Faulkner.85 The Court
held that the statute was constitutional, and said the underlying
policy was not to provide a compensatory remedy to one injured by a
minor, but rather was a measure to curb juvenile delinquency."0 This
policy is evidenced by the five hundred dollar limit and the restriction
of the application of the statute to willful and malicious torts.3 7
EMINENT DOMAIN
In Guilford Reality & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co.1 action was
brought against a contractor for blast damage to the plaintiff's houses
caused by concussion and vibration. The defendant in its answer
alleged that it was engaged in the construction of a sewer for a city,
in accordance with the specifications prescribed by the city. The
defendant claimed that since the construction of a sewerage system
was a governmental function when performed by a city, defendant as
contractor for the city was entitled to the protection from suit
afforded to the city by the doctrine of governmental immunity.
In sustaining the plaintiff's motion to strike that portion of the
defendant's answer relating to governmental immunity, the Court
expressly noted that it was not deciding that the defendant had no
defense of the nature it attempted to allege. Rather the decision was
simply that the facts alleged by the defendant were insufficient to con-
stitute a defense to the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff.2 In the
course of the opinion the Court had the following to say concerning
issues raised by the allegations of the answer:
(1) The facts here did not present a case for the application of
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (Supp. 1963).
S259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963). This case is discussed in CoN.
STITUTIONAL LAW, Statutes, supra, EQUITABLE REMEDIES, Subrogation, infra,
and INSURANCE, Fire Insurance, infra.
6 For a comment on this statute, see Ligon, Parental Responsibility
Statute, 40 N.C.L. RBV. 619 (1962).
1260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900 (1963). This case is discussed in MUNICIPAL
CoRPoRATIoNs, Municipal Innunity, infra; TORTS, Absolute Liability, infra.2 Id. at 80, 131 S.E.2d at 908.
[Vol. 42
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
the doctrine of governmental immunity.3 Even where performing a
governmental function a municipality cannot maintain a nuisance
which causes appreciable damage to the property of a private land-
owner without incurring liability for such damage.' The test for
liability is whether, notwithstanding the governmental acts, the munic-
ipality's acts amount to a partial taking of property. Here the acts did
amount to such a taking, thus rendering the city liable and destroy-
ing the basis of the alleged defense. The Court left open, however,
the question of whether the plaintiff's remedy against the city was by
special proceeding under the general eminent domain statutes,5 or by
civil action.6
(2) While not deciding whether, if the city were immune, such
immunity would extend to the defendant here, the Court did note that
there was authority in the United States that a contractor or agent
acting for his principal who holds the power of eminent domain, can-
not be held liable for damages if he is in the process of making a
public improvement and it is made without negligence on his part.7
The Court held in Redevelopment Comm'n v. Haginss that the
3Id. at 78, 131 S.E.2d at 907.
' Spaugh v. City of Winston-Salem, 249 N.C. 133, 105 S.E.2d 280 (1958);
Young v. City of Asheville, 241 N.C. 618, 86 S.E.2d 408 (1955); McKinney
v. City of High Point, 237 N.C. 66, 74 S.E.2d 440 (1953); City of Raleigh
v. Edwards, 235 N.C. 671, 71 S.E.2d 396 (1952).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-12 to -29 (1950) as amended N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 40-11 to -20 (Supp. 1963).
' No cases were cited by the Court in support of either of the remedies
mentioned, but in Mason v. Durham County, 175 N.C. 638, 96 S.E. 110
(1918), it was held that the statutory remedy is not exclusive and where the
entity vested with the power of eminent domain appropriates property, the
owner of the land has the right, at his election, to sue for permanent damages
and on the payment of same an easement passes to the defendant. See also
Eller v. Board of Educ., 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955).
7 Tidewater Constr. Corp. v. Manly, 194 Va. 836, 75 S.E.2d 500 (1953).
See also Valley Forge Gardens, Inc. v. James D. Morrissey, Inc., 385 Pa. 477,
123 A.2d 888 (1956). Contra, Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol Chem.
Corp., 37 N.J. 396, 181 A.2d 487 (1962) ; Scranton v. L. G. DeFelice & Son,
137 Conn. 580, 79 A.2d 600 (1951).
While not necessary to the decision in Moore v. Clark, 235 N.C. 364, 70
S.E.2d 182 (1952), a case involving the State Highway and Public Works
Commission, statements were made in the opinion that are generally in line
with the Tidewater case. However, in Moore there seems to be some narrow-
ing of the Tidewater generalizations, because the allegation in Moore that the
principal case quoted with approval was to the effect that the work was
in strict conformity with the plans of the highway commission and under
the direction of its highway engineers.
8258 N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391 (1962). This case is discussed in CIVIL
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petitions for condemnation were fatally defective due to insufficient
allegations under the requirements of G.S. § 160-463.
The condemnor-petitioner had elected to institute separate pro-
ceedings for each parcel of land taken for a redevelopment project.
Although the Court did not expressly rule out this method of con-
demnation, it strongly suggested that a better course to follow would
be to institute proceedings covering the whole planned area, serve
all interested parties with process and hear all defenses, leaving only
the question of just compensation due each respondent to be deter-
mined in separate inquiries.9
In Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. King ° a condemnation pro-
ceeding was instituted by a utility company, alleging that the re-
spondents were owners of the property in question in fee simple.
Attached to the petition was a map of the property which indicated
that the utility company owned an existing easement over the prop-
erty. Evidence of this easement was excluded at the hearing, but
instead of challenging the award, the company paid the full amount
into court and then filed a "conflicting claim" petition under G.S. §
40-23 asking that it be refunded from the compensation paid the
value of its easement." This petition was denied and on appeal the
Court affirmed the denial, holding that when a condemnation award
is made, the condemnor has a right to object and except to a confirma-
tion of the award on the ground that it was based on an erroneous
assumption as to the property taken, and from an adverse ruling it
can appeal.'" But if the condemnor elects not to follow the procedure
outlined above, it is bound by the award and cannot thereafter by the
procedure utilized challenge the condemnee's right to the com-
pensation which has been awarded.' 3 It is not a "conflicting
claimant" within the meaning of the statute.
PROCEDURE, (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Joinder of Parties and Causes, supra
and MUNICIPAL CoE o0PATIoNs, Urban Redevelopment, infra.
Meyers v. Wilmington-Wrightsville Beach Causeway Co., 199 N.C. 169,
154 S.E. 74 (1930), was cited as authority for a single condemnation pro-
ceeding against property belonging to different individuals.
10259 N.C. 219, 130 S.E.2d 318 (1963).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-23 (1950), sets up procedure to determine who
is entitled to money paid pursuant to a condemnation award where there are
conflicting claimants. The Court cited with approval language from Grand
River Dam Authority v. Simpson, 192 Okla. 338, 136 P.2d 879 (1943), in
support of its decision here.
'
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. 40-19 (Supp. 1963).
259 N.C. at 222, 130 S.E.2d at 321.
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In Midget v. North Carolina State Highway Comn'n 4 the Court
extended to ocean water the rule relating to the drainage of surface
waters overflowing from inland streams. The following rule is, there-
fore, applicable to both ocean water and inland streams: the law
confers upon the owner of each upper estate an easement in lower
estates for drainage of surface water flowing in its natural course
without obstruction by the owner of the lower estate to the detriment
of the upper estate.15
This rule of property was then called upon for application in the
instant case where the highway commission constructed an elevated
road behind the plaintiff's beach lots. The plaintiff's property was
inundated by overflow waters from the ocean caused by a storm
because the highway formed a dam which prevented the overflow
from being dissipated toward the sound that lay on the west side of
the property.
The plaintiff brought a civil action to recover damages for a
"taking" of his property for public use under the principle of eminent
domain, alleging that the obstruction of the road constituted a con-
tinuing nuisance which substantially impaired the value of his prop-
erty. In discussing applicable principles the Court noted that the
right to have water flow in the direction provided by nature is a
property right, and if it is materially interfered with by the con-
struction of a highway, it is a taking of property for public use for
which compensation must be paid. 6 To create enforceable liability
the overflow must be a direct result of the structure established by
the government and must constitute a permanent invasion of the land
amounting to an appropriation and not merely an injury. Here the
highway was permanent in nature and the Court held that, tested by
the above principles, the complaint stated a cognizable cause of action
for the appropriation of land for a public use.17
The rule is that ordinarily a statutory remedy for recovery of
damages to private property taken for public use is exclusive ;18 how-
ever, the Court held that the plaintiff was not restricted to his statu-
tory remedy because a constitutional prohibition against taking
1'260 N.C. 241, 132 S.E.2d 599 (1963). This case is also discussed in
REAL PROPERTY, Surface Water, infra.
' Id. at 246, 132 S.E.2d at 605.1 Id. at 248, 132 S.E.2d at 606.
1 7 Id. at 249, 132 S.E.2d at 607.
8Id. at 249-50, 132 S.E.2d at 607-08.
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private property for public use is self executing and requires no law
for its enforcement. Where statute affords no adequate remedy under
a particular fact situation, the common law will furnish an ap-
propriate action.19
In Bane v. Norfolk-Southern R.R.2" defendant, owner of a right
of way over the plaintiff's property, entered upon the right of way
and replaced a burned wooden trestle with one of dirt and concrete.
The Court held that an action for conspiracy and trespass could not
thereupon be maintained by the plaintiff even though the actions of
the defendant prevented the plaintiff from passing under the railway.
The plaintiff's remedy would be by a condemnation proceeding under
G.S. § 40-12, the general condemnation statute, if the construction of
the new trestle and preclusion of access thereunder placed a heavier
burden on the plaintiff's property than that permitted by the terms
of the original easement.
EQUITABLE REMEDIES
DISSOLUTION OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER-AMICABLE AND
VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT OF PARTIES
G.S. § 1-496 and G.S. § 1-497 construed together permit a party
enjoined to sue and recover damages on the injunction bond when it
is finally determined that the person procuring the injunction was
not entitled thereto. In Blatt Co. v. Southwelll a temporary restrain-
ing order was dissolved pursuant to agreement between the parties
that the defendant would voluntarily refrain from committing the
"0 The Court found the instant case indistinguishable from Eller v. Board
of Educ., 242 N.C. 584, 89 S.E.2d 144 (1955), and held Eller to be controlling,quoting from the opinion as follows: "It [defendant] does not claim plaintiffs'
land. Presumably, it had no intention to 'take' or pay for plaintiffs' land or
any other rights therein. G.S. 40-12 et seq... are applicable only to in-
stances where the condemnor acquires title and right to possession of speci-fled land. They have no application here." Id. at 587, 89 S.E.2d at 146.
Another reason for giving the plaintiff a common law remedy was that,if he were required to follow the statutory procedure exclusively, his remedy
would have been barred because the maximum statutory period for filing for
an award after a highway has been completed is tvelve months. N.C. GEN.STAT. § 136-103 (Supp. 1963). The statute of limitations in an action fordamages resulting from the maintenance of a nuisance, however, runs only
from the date that the damage occurs, which here was upon the inundation
of the property.
20259 N.C. 285, 130 S.E.2d 406 (1963).
1259 N.C. 468, 130 S.E.2d 859 (1963).
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acts prohibited by the order. Defendant subsequently moved the
court to award it damages on the injunction bond on the ground that
it had finally been determined that plaintiff was not entitled to the
temporary restraining order. The lower court awarded the defendant
three hundred dollars. This was held to be error on appeal and the
case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, the
Court stating:
The burden of proof was on defendant to show, as a prereq-
uisite to his right to recover damages from plaintiff and its surety,
either that the court had finally decided plaintiff was not entitled
to the temporary restraining order or that something occurred
equivalent to such a decision.2
The Court reviewed the law in this area and stated that the
"voluntary and unconditional dismissal of the proceedings by the
plaintiff is equivalent to a judicial determination that the proceeding
for an injunction was wrongful, since thereby the plaintiff is held to
have confessed that he was not entitled to the equitable relief
sought."3 On the other hand, a dismissal resulting from "an amic-
able and voluntary" agreement of the parties does not operate as a
confession by the plaintiff that he had no right to the injunction
granted. Thus, in this latter situation, there must be a judicial deter-
mination as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to the injunction.'
The purport of the case is that dismissal of the proceedings re-
sulting from a compromise settlement of the dispute will not operate
as an automatic determination that the plaintiff was not originally
2 Id. at 473, 130 S.E.2d at 862. At the hearing to show cause why the
teinporary restraining order should not be continued, defendant had tendered
a proposed order for dissolution containing the phrase "it appearing to the
Court upon such hearing that the plaintiff was not entitled to the said Re-
straining Order." 259 N.C. at 469, 130 S.E.2d at 860. This phrase was
deleted by the judge whose final order simply stated that "the Restraining
Order should not be continued." 259 N.C. at 469, 130 S.E.2d at 860. There
was no indication in the order of a determination as to'whether or not the
plaintiff was initially entitled to the restraining order. The court pointed
out that no recovery could be had on the bond until such a determination was
made.
" Id. at 472, 130 S.E.2d at 862. Accord, Nansemond Timber Co. v. Roun-
tree, 122 N.C. 45, 29 S.E. 61 (1898); Raleigh & Western Ry. v. Glendon &
Gulf Mining & Mfg. Co., 117 N.C. 191, 23 S.E. 181 (1895).
'The decision appears to accord with the majority view throughout the
country. See, e.g., St. Joseph & Elkhart Power Co. v. Graham, 165 Ind. 16,
74 N.E. 498 (1905) ; Large v. Steer, 121 Pa. 30, 15 Atl. 490 (1888). See gen-
erally 28 AM. JuR. Injunctions § 340 (1959) ; 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 292b(2)
(1945); Annot., 91 A.L.R.2d 1312 (1963).
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entitled to the injunction. It is not clear, however, whether the
decision also operates to effectively foreclose the possibility of defend-
ant's ever recovering on the injunction bond, since it is conceivable
that the defendant might otherwise prove that the plaintiff was not
initially entitled to the restraining order. In the light of this un-
certainty, it would seem advisable for plaintiffs' attorneys, simultane-
ously with the dissolution of the restraining order, to secure releases
for their client and the client's surety so as to preserve the apparent
finality of the settlement.
INJUNCTIONS
Injunctions were properly granted to enjoin a former employee
from violating an agreement not to compete,5 to restrain upper land-
owners from collecting and discharging surface waters in volume
upon the plaintiff's lands,6 to enjoin the enforcement of a City Code
provision alleged to be unconstitutional,' and to restrain a lessor
from violating the covenants of the lease.8
In Pleaters, Inc. v. Kostakes, plaintiff was a shopping center
lessee under a lease providing that, "the lessors will grant exclusive
Dry Cleaning and finished laundry rights to the lessees and no other
dry-cleaning or finished laundry or other building will be added to
Westover Shopping Center.""° Plaintiff sought to permanently en-
join defendant from constructing another building in violation of the
terms of the lease. The Court affirmed the lower court's continuance
of a temporary restraining order until trial.
The defendant contended on appeal that the terms of the lease
were ambiguous and that the provision quoted above was only
intended to prevent the addition of another dry-cleaning or finished
laundry building to the shopping center."1 The Court failed to deal
'Local Fin. Co. v. Jordan, 259 N.C. 127, 129 S.E.2d 882 (1963) (tem-
porary restraining order properly continued to trial when principal relief
sought is permanent injunction).
' Chappell v. Winslow, 258 N.C. 617, 129 S.E.2d 101 (1963) (permanent
injunction).
'Schloss v. Jamison, 258 N.C. 271, 128 S.E.2d 590 (1962) (temporary
restraining order properly continued to trial).
'Pleaters, Inc. v. Kostakes, 259 N.C. 131, 129 S.E.2d 881 (1963) (tem-
porary restraining order properly continued to trial).
p259 N.C. 131, 129 S.E.2d 881 (1963).
'Old. at 132, 129 S.E.2d at 881.
"Defendant proposed to lease this building to a drug store. 259 N.C. at
132, 129 S.E.2d at 881.
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with this contention in its disposition of the case.12 It would seem
that when the plaintiff bases his right to relief on a patently ambigu-
ous contract provision, the extraordinary remedy of injunction
should not always be preliminarily available, since the ambiguity at
least casts doubt on the probability of plaintiff's being able to main-
tain his primary equity at the trial. The result in the Pleaters case,
however, seems perfectly justified, since the apprehension of ir-
reparable injury that might befall either party if the injunction were
not continued was so great as to outweigh whatever equities the
defendant might have urged in his favor.
QUANTUM MERUIT-EVIDENCE AS TO VALUE AFFECTING
RECOVERY
Two cases involved the sufficiency of the evidence as related to
the amount of damages recoverable in quantum meruit actions. In
Cline v. Cline,'3 plaintiff sought to recover the reasonable value of
services rendered her mother-in-law14 during the last three years of
her life. Plaintiff presented evidence as to the type and extent of the
services which she performed,' 5 but failed to present evidence as to
the value of these services. On appeal, she contended that such evi-
dence was unnecessary since her services were of a value readily
12 The Court disposed of the case on the general proposition that ordinarily
a temporary restraining order will be continued to trial if there is probable
cause to believe that plaintiff will be able to maintain his primary equity at the
trial and a reasonable apprehension of irreparable loss if the restraining order
is not continued. 259 N.C. at 133, 129 S.E.2d at 882. Accord, Cobb v. Clegg,
137 N.C. 153, 49 S.E. 80 (1904).
"It is generally proper, when the parties are at issue concerning the legal
or equitable right, to grant an interlocutory injunction to preserve the right
in statu quo until the determination of the controversy, and especially is this
the rule when the principal relief sought is in itself an injunction, because
a dissolution of a pending interlocutory injunction, or the refusal of one,
upon application therefor in the first instance, will virtually decide the case
upon its merits and deprive the plaintiff of all remedy or relief, even though
he should be afterwards able to show ever so good a case." Local Fin. Co.
v. Jordan, 259 N.C. 127, 128-29, 129 S.E.2d 883, 883-84 (1963).18258 N.C. 295, 128 S.E.2d 401 (1963).
1, "The relationship of mother-in-law and daughter-in-law was not suffi-
cient to raise a presumption that the services were gratuitously rendered and
received." 258 N.C. at 298, 128 S.E.2d at 403. Accord, Lindley v. Frazier,
231 N.C. 44, 55 S.E.2d 815 (1949).
1 "Plaintiff described in some detail the services she performed. She in-jected insulin as needed. She washed decedent's clothes and bed linen, helped
bathe her, cooked for her, and did such other things as needed to make
decedent comfortable and happy." 258 N.C. at 299, 128 S.E.2d at 404.
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ascertainable by the jury even in the absence of evidence as to their
value. In awarding the defendant a new trial, the court stated:
"When a plaintiff seeks to recover compensation for . . . services
rendered, he must allege and prove [their] ... value."1 6
In Johnson v. Sanders,17 the plaintiff once again failed to prove
reasonable value and the lower court entered a judgment of involun-
,tary nonsuit. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that notwith-
standing the failure of proof of actual damages, plaintiff was
nevertheless entitled to nominal damages.
Though the implication of the Cline case is that the plaintiff
would not be entitled to even nominal damages, the cases are not in
conflict. The Cline case, in effect, holds that it is error to instruct the
jury that the plaintiff may recover more than nominal damages when
no evidence of the reasonable value of the services is presented, 8
whereas Johnson holds that failure to prove reasonable value is not
grounds for nonsuit since the plaintiff may always recover nominal
damages.
REFORMATION OF INSURANCE POLICY-FAILURE OF INSURED TO
READ POLICY
In McCallum v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co.,'" a feeble, eighty-
three year old woman applied to a credit association for a one year
loan. The association required the applicant to buy a group insurance
policy on her life as security for the loan. The policy as drafted by
the defendant and as executed by the applicant bore effective and ex-
piration dates of 31 December 1958 and 31 December 1959 respec-
tively. The loan was extended on 3 January 1959 and repaid during
the year. The insured died on 2 January 1960. Her administrator
sought to reform the policy by deleting the effective and expiration
dates mentioned above and inserting in lieu thereof the dates 3
January 1959 and 3 January 1960 so as to bring the death of the
10 Id. at 299, 128 S.E.2d at 404. "Damages are never presumed. The bur-
den is always upon the complaining party to establish by evidence such facts
as will furnish a basis for their assessment, according to some definite and
legal rule." Lieb v. Mayer, 244 N.C. 613, 616, 94 S.E.2d 658, 660 (1956).17260 N.C. 291, 132 S.E.2d 582 (1963).
In fact, the court apparently assumed, though not deciding, in this case
that nominal damages would be recoverable. See 258 N.C. at 299, 128
S.E.2d at 404.1 9 259 N.C. 573, 131 S.E.2d 435 (1963). This case is also discussed in
CONTRACTS, Refonnation, supra.
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insured within the coverage of the policy. The complaint alleged
that the insured had failed to read the policy before signing. The
Supreme Court, reversing the trial court's order sustaining a demur-
rer for failure to state a cause of action, held that the insured's failure
to read the policy would not preclude a subsequent suit for reforma-
tion.
The Court stated the rule in this manner:
The North Carolina Court has frequently said that where
no trick or device had prevented a person from reading -the paper
which he has signed or has accepted as the contract prepared by the
other party, his failure to read when he had the opportunity to do
so will bar his right to reformation.20
Indeed, this principle has often been applied in cases involving ref-
ormation of insurance policies." In the principal case, the Court
placed great emphasis on the fact that the policy was issued by the
defendant pursuant to a group plan participated in by the creditor
whose loan the policy was issued to secure. It was reasoned that in
such a situation the insured would be under no duty to anticipate that
the policy would bear an effective date several days before the loan
was actually made to her. Moreover, the insured's feeble condition
and extreme age were sufficient factors to justify the conclusion that
the insured had no opportunity to read the policy. Thus, the case
does not change existing law, but merely represents an extreme ap-
plication of well settled principles. 2
SUBROGATION OF INSURER TO CLAIM AGAINST PARENTS OF MINOR
MALICIOUSLY DAMAGING PROPERTY
At common law, absent special circumstances, parents are not
liable for torts committed by their children.23 G.S. § 1-538.1 was
enacted in 1961 to provide a limited 4 remedy against the parent of a
20 Id. at 581, 131 S.E.2d at 440, quoting from Setzer v. Old Republic Life
Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 396, 401, 126 S.E.2d 135, 139 (1962). (Emphasis added).
21 Setzer v. Old Republic Life Ins. Co., 257 N.C. 396, 126 S.E.2d 135
(1962); Coppersmith v. Aetna Ins. Co., 222 N.C. 14, 21 S.E.2d 838 (1942);
Welch v. Sun Underwriters Ins. Co., 196 N.C. 546, 146 S.E. 216 (1929);
Graham v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 176 N.C. 313, 97 S.E. 6 (1918);
Clements v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 155 N.C. 57, 70 S.E. 1076 (1911).
2 See generally Malone, The Reformation of Writings Under the Law of
North Carolina, 15 N.C.L. Rlv. 155 (1936); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 7 (1962).
-
3Lane v. Chatham, 251 N.C. 400, 111 S.E.2d 598 (1959).
"The statute limits recovery to five hundred dollars. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-538.1 (Supp. 1963).
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minor who maliciously or willfully damages the property of another.
In a recent case,25 the Court held that an insurer who compensated a
School Board for damage caused by a fire maliciously set by a minor
was subrogated to the School Board's claim against the parents of
the minor.
Though such statutes exist in thirty-two states,2 6 the Court found
the question of subrogation to be one of first impression. The ob-
jection usually voiced27 against the right of subrogation to claims
based on statutory liability is predicated on the notion that statutes
in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. 8 Thus,
it is argued that the absence of an express statutory provision for
subrogation should preclude its existence. Though the question of
subrogation was apparently novel in the principal case, it has arisen
in an analogous situation under the various tort claims acts-both
state and federal. State courts are not in agreement as to whether
a paying insurer is subrogated to the insured's claim against the
state.2 It is clear that such a right does exist under the North
Carolina Tort Claims Act,30 and the same rule prevails with respect
to claims arising under the comparable federal legislation.,,
Whether subrogation should be allowed under this statute would
seem to depend on the purpose of the statute. Subrogation is the
equitable remedy which affords relief to those who have paid a legal
obligation which another ought to have discharged. If G.S. § 1-538.1
is designed merely to provide a means of compensation for those
holding worthless claims against minors, it is arguable that subroga-
tion should not be allowed. The parents themselves are not im-
" General Ins. Co. v. Faulkner, 259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963).
This case is discussed in CONSTITUTIONAL LAv, Statutes, supra; DOMESTIC
RELATIONS, Parent and Child, supra; INSURANcE, Fire Insurance, infra.
" See Ligon, Parental Responsibility Statute, 40 N.C.L. REv. 619, 625(1962).
" See, e.g., United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
See also Squires v. Sorahan, 252 N.C. 589, 114 S.E.2d 277 (1960), involving
the right of the insurer of one joint tortfeasor to enforce statutory contribution
against the other joint tortfeasor upon payment of the claim.2 8Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 86 S.E.2d 925 (1955).
0 Turner v. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 235 Ala. 632, 180 So. 300 (1938)
(no subrogation); American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. State Hwy. Comm., 146
Kan. 239, 69 P.2d 1091 (1937) (no subrogation); Jeff Hunt Mach. Co. v.
South Carolina State Hwy. Dept., 217 S.C. 423, 60 S.E.2d 859 (1950)
(subrogation).
" Lyon & Sons v. State Bd. of Educ., 238 N.C. 24, 76 S.E.2d 553 (1953).
"United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
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mediately blameworthy or responsible for the damage caused by their
child, and, if the injured party has been compensated by insurance,
then the purpose of the statute has been accomplished. On the other
hand, if the purpose of the statute is not only to provide compensation
in these cases but also to stem the tide of juvenile deliquency, the
effectuation of its purpose would be thwarted absent the ultimate
liability of the parents in every situation which it covers. The Court
dealt with these considerations and very properly concluded that the
statute is primarily designed to curb the anti-social behavior of
children through bringing financial pressure to bear on the parents
who in many cases are at least indirectly responsible for such behav-
ior. In view of this the Court reasoned that it would be inequitable
to allow the parents in the principal case to reap the ultimate benefit
from the School Board's foresight in procuring fire insurance on its
premises.
EVIDENCE
CHARACTER EVIDENCE-SPECIFIC ACTS OF VIOLENCE OF DECEASED
SHOWN IN SUPPORT OF SELF-DEFENSE PLEA
In State v. Davis,1 the defendant, indicted for murder of one
Lester Green, was convicted of manslaughter. While admitting that
he shot the deceased, the defendant asserted that he knew deceased
to have a reputation of being dangerous and violent, and therefore
he claimed self-defense, justifying the killing of deceased. It seems
that shortly after the defendant entered a store, Green, the deceased,
entered, approached the defendant, and while informing defendant
that he knew defendant was carrying a gun, he grabbed the defend-
ant's arm. Defendant tried to free himself; but being unable to do so,
he made a move for his right hip, supposedly to get his pistol. The
deceased thereupon wrapped his arms around the defendant, and the
two struggled until defendant finally managed to reach his gun,
shooting the deceased three times.
In defense of the killing, defendant claimed that he had shot in
self-defense, justifiable because the deceased had a reputation for
violence of which the defendant knew at the time of the shooting.
The defense offered evidence of this reputation. However, it also
'259 N.C. 138, 129 S.E.2d 894 (1963).
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attempted to show on cross-examination of the State's witnesses
that the deceased had committed specific violent assaults on other
persons at various times. On objection by the State, this evidence
was excluded, to which the defendant excepted.
In upholding the ruling of the trial court, the Supreme Court said
that the defendant was not entitled to prove specific acts of violence
to prove deceased's reputation for violence, and that such holding
was consistent with prior decisions of the Court.2
The Court cited as authority for the ruling State v. Morgan,8
which case had in turn relied upon State v. LeFevers4 These cases
established the general rule that in support of a self-defense plea,
the defendant could not show specific acts of violence of the de-
ceased, although he could show the general reputation for violence.
However, an exception to the general rule enunciated in both Mor-
gan and LeFevers had been established by several previous decisions.'
This exception is employed to permit specific acts of violence to be
2 Id. at 139, 129 S.E.2d at 894.
"245 N.C. 215, 95 S.E.2d 507 (1956).
'221 N.C. 184, 19 S.E.2d 489 (1942). LeFevers said "Where there is
evidence tending to show that the defendant acted in self-defense, evidence
of the general reputation of the deceased for violence may be admitted, but
this rule does not render admissible evidence of specific acts of violence
which have no connection with the homicide." Id. at 185, 19 S.E.2d at 490.
The Court cited as authority State v. Hodgin, 210 N.C. 371, 186 S.E. 495
(1936), and State v. Melton, 166 N.C. 442, 81 S.E. 602 (1914). However,
Melton was a murder case in which the defendant tried to elicit from its
own witness the fact that deceased was a homosexual.
Nance v. Fike, 244 N.C. 368, 93 S.E.2d 443 (1956); State v. Mclver,
125 N.C. 645, 34 S.E. 439 (1899) ; STAN-SNBuY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE
§ 106 (2d ed. 1963) [hereinafter cited as STANSEURY]. See also, State v.
Blackwell, 162 N.C. 672, 78 S.E. 316 (1913), where the language seems to
be most appropriate: "Where one is drawn into a combat of this nature by
the very instinct and constitution of his being, he is obliged to estimate the
danger in which he has been placed, and the kind and degree of resistance
necessary to his defense. To do this he must consider, not only the size and
strength of his foe, . . . but also his character as a violent and dangerous man.
It is sound sense, and we think sound law, that before a jury shall be re-
quired to say whether the defendant did anything more than a reasonable
man should have done under the circumstances, it should, as far as can be,
be placed in the defendant's situation, surrounded with the same appearances
of danger, with the same degree of knowledge of the deceased's probable
purpose which the defendant possessed." Id. at 681, 78 S.E. at 319 (Emphasis
added.) See also, Annot., 121 A.L.R. 380, 390 (1939): "Although... the
courts in most jurisdictions formerly excluded evidence of specific acts, the
trend of the comparatively recent decisions, even in certain jurisdictions
which formerly denied the admissibility of testimony as to specific acts, is
towards the admissibility of such evidence."
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proved where the defendant was present or had knowledge of such
acts prior to the act of repelling a deceased in self-defense.6
It would seem that in Davis either the North Carolina Court
or the attorney for the defense had forgotten this vital ex-
ception, because there was no mention of whether or not the de-
fendant had knowledge of the unrelated specific acts of violence upon
others, which evidence was excluded.
DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
Under the North Carolina Dead Man's Statute, G.S. § 8-51,
a plaintiff may not testify in his action against the estate of a
decedent that he rendered services to or expected pay for services
rendered deceased, for such is considered a personal transaction be-
tween deceased and the plaintiff in which the plaintiff is directly
interested.7 However, it has generally been held in North Carolina
that one spouse may testify for the other concerning such rendition
of personal services when the latter institutes suit to recover for the
same against the estate of a deceased." The reason for this is that
the statutory prohibition extends only to those having direct legal
or pecuniary interests, and not merely to "the sentimental interest
the husband or wife would naturally have in the law suit of the
other."9 The pecuniary interest must be present and not speculative,
as would be the husband's or wife's in such a case.10
In Smith v. Perdue," the Court has followed these rules to their
logical extremes. In Perdue, two cases against the same two dece-
dents' estates were consolidated for trial. The two plaintiffs were
husband and wife, as were the two decedents, and they were suing
the estates for personal services rendered during decedents' lives.
Citing Burton v. Styers,'2 the Court held not violative of the Dead
Man's Statute each spouse's testifying in behalf of the other as to
the personal services rendered decedents.'3
6 See cases cited note 5 supra.
TPeek v. Shook, 233 N.C. 259, 63 S.E.2d 542 (1951).8 Burton v. Styers, 210 N.C. 230, 186 S.E. 248 (1936); Vannoy v.
Stafford, 209 N.C. 748, 184 S.E. 482 (1936); MvcCurry v. Purgason, 170
N.C. 463, 87 S.E. 244 (1915); Helsabeck v. Doub, 167 N.C. 205, 83 S.E.
241 (1914).
'Burton v. Styers, 210 N.C. 230, 231, 186 S.E. 248, 249 (1936).
"
0McCurry v. Purgason, 170 N.C. 463, 87 S.E. 244 (1915).
'258 N.C. 686, 129 S.E.2d 293 (1963).
12210 N.C. 230, 186 S.E. 248 (1936).
See also STANSBuRY § 69.
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DECLARATIONS AGAINST INTEREST AND
ADMISSIONS DISTINGUISHED
Perhaps a more interesting aspect of the Perdue case' 4 is the
fact that plaintiffs' son was permitted to testify against both estates
that on the afternoon after the deceased wife's death, her husband
told plaintiffs' son that "Willis and Troy [plaintiffs] have continued
to care for us as they said they would and I am sure they will con-
tinue to care for me and I plan to well pay them for this service."' 5
The statement was held admissible against the deceased husband's
estate as an admission.' However, against the wife's estate, the
statement was held admissible as a declaration against interest, one
of the well-known exceptions to the hearsay rule ;17 this holding was
based upon the theory that the wife having died, her estate descended
to her husband. Since at the time of the litigation he was dead, the
facts being within his personal knowledge, there being no motive to
misrepresent, and the statement being against his pecuniary interest
when made, the declaration met the requirements for admissibility
as a declaration against interest.
The distinctions between admissions and declarations against
interest are often difficult to see; however Perdue presents a perfect
example of the application of both with both emanating from the
same statement.'
DECEDENT'S BAD CHARACTER IN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
In Sanders v. George,'9 two wrongful death actions arising out
of an automobile accident were consolidated for trial. The defendant
was permitted to go into great detail in exposing character faults of
the intestates. Among other things, a police officer testified for the
defendant that he had observed Susie Green, one of the intestates,
wandering the streets between Beaufort and Morehead City in a
drunken state during a snowstorm. Other events detailing bad con-
1" Smith v. Perdue, 258 N.C. 686, 129 S.E.2d 293 (1963). This case is
discussed in Dead Man's Statute, supra.
15258 N.C. at 689, 129 S.E.2d at 296.
See STANSBURY § 174, for the essentials of "admissions."
STANSBUtPY § 147.
"* Roe v. Journegan, 175 N.C. 261, 95 S.E. 495 (1918). This case is
generally regarded as the landmark American case showing the distinction
between admissions and declarations against interest. The court in Perdite
cited Roe as authority for its holding. See also, STANSBURY §§ 147, 174.15258 N.C. 776, 129 S.E.2d 480 (1963).
[Vol. 42
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
duct and behavior both in court proceedings and private activities
were placed before the jury. While granting the plaintiff a new
trial mainly on other grounds,"0 the Supreme Court sounded a
warning to the trial court that it should not permit the defendant
to go to such lengths in the expos6 of the intestates' shortcomings:
"The result seems to have carried the jury too far from the critical
question involved; that is, the fair and just compensation for the
pecuniary injuries resulting from death."21
The result of the Sanders case leaves the North Carolina posi-
tion on the admissibility of improvident attitude of intestates in
wrongful death actions in more confusion than it had been in
previously. It would seem that the great majority of the cases
decided prior to Sanders held that the character of the deceased
might be considered in determining the earning capacity of the
deceased.2 2 However, the cases in North Carolina are not in agree-
ment as to who sustains the pecuniary loss: the deceased's family
or his estate. The majority of these cases hold that the damage
resulting from the death is the net pecuniary loss to the estate.2 3 In
Hanks v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,24 however, in a four to three decision,
the Court held that the defendant could show the bad character of
the deceased because it tended to show improvident attitude on be-
half of the deceased toward his family. It would seem that the dis-
senting opinion of the Hanks case took the correct view: viz, that
such evidence should be admissible only when it is relevant to the
earning capacity of the decedent.
In the light of the majority of the North Carolina decisions, the
"warning" given the trial court in Sanders was not entirely war-
ranted. Such evidence as the defendant submitted concerning the
bad character of the intestates should be admissible if it has any
relevancy to the earning capacity of the decedent. Surely the facts
that one of the intestates wandered the streets at night in drunken
-- Id. at 778, 129 S.E.2d at 482. The defendant had been permitted by
the trial court to testify as to his own injuries in the accident which the
Supreme Court held erroneous.
258 N.C. at 778, 129 S.E.2d at 482.22E.g., Bums v. Asheboro & M. R.R., 125 N.C. 304, 34 S.E. 495 (1899);
Burton v. Wilmington & W. R.R., 82 N.C. 505 (1880) ; STANSBRY § 105.
" E.g., Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N.C. 379, 38 S.E.2d 194 (1946) ; 28 N.C.L.
REv. 106 (1949).24230 N.C. 179, 52 S.E.2d 717 (1949).
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stupors and that she was regularly in and out of court should have
some relevancy to her earning capacity.
EVIDENCE OF LIABILITY INSURANCE
In Modern Elec. Co. v. Dennis,25 the plaintiff, an electrical con-
tractor, brought suit against the defendant, the owner of a motor
service company, on the theory that the defendant was an independent
contractor and that defendant's agent, one Gooch, through negligent
operation of a crane-hoist, damaged a switchboard during installa-
tion of same. The defendant contended that he was not an inde-
pendent contractor, but that Gooch was a servant leased to the
plaintiff, in which case, the defendant would not be liable to the
plaintiff for Gooch's negligence.
For the purpose of showing that he was not acting in the ca-
pacity of an independent contractor, the defendant attempted to
testify that he carried no liability insurance on this job, and that
his unfailing custom when he assumed responsibility was to procure
such insurance. This evidence was excluded by the trial court, and
exception thereto on appeal was overruled.2
The fact that a defendant carried liability insurance on a par-
ticular occasion is almost universally held to be irrelevant on the
issue of negligence.27 In Dennis, the Court also recognized a corol-
lary to this general rule which says that a showing by the defendant
of an absence of liability insurance is usually immaterial and ir-
relevant because such a showing would amount to no more than a
plea of poverty.28
The North Carolina Court has held, however, that the existence
of liability insurance may be relevant if there is some probative
value; consequently, the fact that the defendant has protected itself
against its liability for injury to or damages inflicted by one of its
25259 N.C. 354, 130 S.E.2d 547 (1963).20Id. at 357, 130 S.E.2d at 549. The defendant was awarded a new trial,
however, on other grounds.
27-259 N.C. at 357, 130 S.E.2d at 551. See generally, STANSEURY § 88;
Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Lab., Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961);
Hoover v. Gregory, 253 N.C. 452, 117 S.E.2d 395 (1960); Luttrell v. Hardin,
193 N.C. 266, 136 S.E. 726 (1927).
28259 N.C. at 357, 130 S.E.2d at 550. See also Piechuck v. Magusiak,
82 N.H. 429, 135 Atl. 534 (1926); Rojas v. Vuocolo, 142 Tex. 152, 177
S.W.2d 962 (1944); King v. Starr, 43 Wash. 2d 115, 260 P.2d 351 (1953);
Graham v. Wriston, 120 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 1961).
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employees may be shown to prove that the employee was de-
fendant's agent at the time of the event in question.2 9 The defendant
in Dennis asserted that the converse of the exception to the general
rule ought to be true also: viz, that the fact that defendant had not
protected itself against employees' negligence by liability insurance
ought to be relevant to disprove agency. The Court, however, re-
jected this contention for the reason that such argument is fallacious;
there could have been many reasons for failure to secure insurance,
such as lack of funds, deliberate assumption of risk, mere forget-
fulness or neglect, or the job may have been uninsurable."0
It would seem that the Court in Dennis has reached a very logical
result.
EVIDENCE OF PLEA OF GUILTY
Until 1963, the North Carolina Supreme Court had experienced
only one occasion to decide whether or not a plea of guilty to a
criminal charge was admissible in evidence as an admission by the
defendant in a subsequent civil action arising out of the same auto-
mobile accident. 1 In that case, a per curiam opinion, the Court
said that a plea of guilty by the defendant to a criminal charge of
following too closely in violation of G.S. § 20-15232 was an admis-
sion sufficient to require jury determination of the question of
actionable negligence."
In State v. Ingran 4 and State v. Libby,"5 the Court had held
that a plea of guilty to a criminal charge in a municipal court was ad-
missible in a subsequent trial in the Superior Court for the same
offense. The Court had also held that a plea of nolo contendere
was not admissible in any subsequent action, be it civil or criminal,
because such a plea is not an admission of guilt.
36
Recently, in Grant v. Shadrick,7 the North Carolina Court was
" Isley v. Winfrey, 221 N.C. 33, 18 S.E.2d 702 (1942); Davis v. North
Carolina Shipbuilding Co., 180 N.C. 74, 104 S.E. 82 (1920).80 259 N.C. at 358, 130 S.E.2d at 550.
"
1McGinnis v. Smith, 253 N.C. 70, 116 S.E.2d 177 (1960).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-152 (1953).
"McGinnis v. Smith, 253 N.C. 70, 116 S.E.2d 177 (1960).
'204 N.C. 557, 168 S.E. 837 (1933).
209 N.C. 363, 183 S.E. 414 (1936).
"State v. Stone, 245 N.C. 42, 95 S.E.2d 77 (1956); Winesett v. Scheidt,
239 N.C. 190, 79 S.E.2d 501 (1954).
"' 260 N.C. 674, 133 S.E.2d 457 (1963).
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again faced with the problem. The plaintiffs sought damages for
personal injuries and property damage arising out of an automobile
accident. Both plaintiffs alleged that the defendant had "swerved
out" from behind the car she was following, left her right side of
the highway, and collided with the plaintiffs' car on the plaintiffs'
right side of the highway. As proof of these facts, the plaintiffs
were allowed over the defendant's objection to testify that the in-
vestigating officer charged the defendant with "failing to yield the
right of way," and that shortly thereafter the defendant pleaded
guilty to this charge before the local justice of the peace. On ap-
peal, the Court realized that plaintiffs were not contending that the
defendant's plea before the justice of the peace constituted res
judicata or any kind of estoppel. The testimony was admissible as
an admission as to whether or not the defendant did, in fact, drive
her automobile on her left side of the road into the path of plaintiff's
oncoming car. The Court went on to say that the evidence of the
plea of guilty and other occurrences before the justice were not con-
clusive, but were subject to explanation and contradiction, the weight
of which was to be determined by the jury.s8
It would appear from this decision that North Carolina has
definitely placed itself in the liberal majority as to the admissibility
in civil action of pleas of guilty in prior criminal actions arising out
of the same transaction.89
EVIDENCE OF VOLUNTARILY ADOPTED SAFETY CODES
In two unprecedented decisions, the North Carolina Supreme
Court has further liberalized proof of standard of care and breach
thereof in medical malpractice and products liability cases by allow-
ing the plaintiff to use, as evidence of the standard, voluntarily
adopted safety codes.40
In Stone v. Proctor,41 the plaintiff brought a malpractice action
38 260 N.C. at 676, 133 S.E.2d at 459.
" See, e.g. 8 Am. JUR. 2d Aieornobiles and Highway Traffic § 944 (1963);
Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287, 1307 (1951); 9C BLASHrIrLD, CYCLOPEDIA OF
AuTomoBLE LAw AND PnAcMcn § 6196 (Perm. ed. 1954); 31 C.J.S. Evi-
dence § 300(b) (1942).
o Stone v. Proctor, 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963); Wilson v.
Lowe's Asheboro Hardware, Inc., 259 N.C. 660, 131 S.E.2d 501 (1963).
These two cases are discussed in TORTS, Negligence, infra.
"4 259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963). See also, Sanzari v. Rosenfeld,
34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961) (cited by the Court in Stone v. Proctor.)
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against the defendant psychiatrist for injuries sustained through the
defendant's alleged negligence in the administration of electroshock
therapy. In all, there were five treatments. Immediately after the
first, the plaintiff related the fact to defendant that he was experi-
encing great pain in his back; however, the defendant continued the
treatments with increased intensity and duration, and without taking
any X-rays to determine whether there had been any fractures to
the plaintiff's vertebrae.
The plaintiff put into evidence no medical testimony from psy-
chiatric specialists. However, on cross-examination of the de-
fendant, it was determined that the defendant was a 'Fellow in the
American Psychiatric Association; that he was familiar with its
publication, the Journal of the American Psychiatric Association;
and that he was familiar with the standards for electroshock therapy
which had been prepared by the Association's Committee on Therapy
and approved by the Association's Council in 1953. The defendant's
objections to putting the standards into evidence and asking the
defendant if he were familiar with same were sustained. The
plaintiff appealed.
Contained in the excluded standards was a rule that if, after a
shock treatment, a patient should complain of pain or impairment of
function, he should receive a physical examination which should in-
clude X-rays to ascertain whether he has suffered accidental damage.
In holding the exclusion erroneous, the Court has apparently
held that the standard of care for a psychiatrist using electroshock
therapy may be proved in part through the use of standards with
which the doctor is familiar, and that other expert medical testi-
mony is unnecessary in such a case.
In this case, the New Jersey court said that a manufacturer's brochure ac-
companying an anesthetic prescribing the correct procedure for administra-
tion of the drug which did not say anything of obtaining a case history of the
patient could not be used as a standard of care when the standard allegedly
breached was failure to take a case history. The court, however, held the
brochure admissible for another purpose: viz, to show that the defendant
was put on notice as to the dangers in the use of the anesthetic. See also,
Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 272 P.2d 718 (1954) and Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170
(1957). In these two cases, manufacturers' brochures were held admissible
as prima facie proof of the standard of care in the administration and use
of the drug which the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had breached.
Thus the brochures were not conclusive on the standard of care, but were
sufficient to be held to be prima facie evidence of such standard.
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
In Wilson v. Lowe's Asheboro Hdwe.,42 the Court, citing Stone
v. Proctor, held that "the voluntary adoption of a safety code as a
guide to be followed for protection of the public" 48 was evidence
to be considered by the jury in determining the standard of care in
the manufacture of wooden ladders. The plaintiff had been in-
jured when a ladder manufactured by the defendant broke. Alleging
negligence in the manufacture of the ladder, the plaintiff elicited
from the defendant that it had adopted the "American Standard Safety
Code for Portable Wooden Ladders." The plaintiff's evidence
tended to show that the manufacturer had not followed the manda-
tory provisions of the Code. The Court held this to be proper,
and that the question to be determined by the jury was whether or
not the defendant had conformed to these standards.4
IMPEACHMENT AND CORROBORATION
BY PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS
In McGinnis v. Robinson,45 the plaintiff sought damages for
injuries sustained in a collision between his automobile and one
owned by defendant McGhee, and allegedly being driven by de-
fendant Robinson. Robinson's answer alleged that McGhee had
been driving. In the presentation of his case, the plaintiff questioned
the investigating officer as to facts concerning the scene of the acci-
dent. However, he did not testify concerning the issue of who was
driving McGhee's car. On cross-examination of the officer, the
defense elicited testimony from the officer to the effect that Robin-
son had told him that she did not know who was driving, that she
had not been driving, and that she did not have a driver's license.
Defense counsel then presented a paper to the officer for identifica-
tion, and the officer identified it as a warrant he had sworn out
subsequent and in regard to the accident. Over the plaintiff's objec-
42259 N.C. 660, 131 S.E.2d 501 (1963).
,Id. at 666, 131 S.E.2d at 505.
"Ibid. In another recent case, Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531,
131 S.E.2d 601 (1963), the Court held that advisory administrative codes
which have not been given compulsory force by the Legislature are not
admissible as evidence of negligence in civil actions where the defendant
violated these codes. The case would seem to be distinguishable from Stone
and Wilson on the ground that the defendant in Swaney had not voluntarily
adopted the Code as a standard of care. This case is discussed in ToRTs,
Negligence, infra.
"258 N.C. 264, 128 S.E.2d 608 (1962).
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tion, the defense was allowed to read the warrant to the jury; it
charged McGhee with reckless driving and felonious assault with a
deadly weapon-viz, an automobile--on the plaintiff and others.
On re-direct, the plaintiff elicited from the officer that after investi-
gation subsequent to the issuance of the warrant, he had discovered
that McGhee had not been driving. The issue before the Supreme
Court was whether or not the warrant could be used either for the
purpose of impeachment of the officer, or for corroboration of the
later evidence that McGhee had been driving.
In holding the evidence inadmissible on either ground, the Court
first found that, from the evidence, the officer had no first-hand
knowledge of who was driving the car, and that any statement he had
made in the warrant must have been a mere guess or opinion, which
would have undoubtedly been inadmissible as substantive evidence.
However, the defendant tried to treat the sworn statement as a prior
inconsistent statement. The Court recognized the general rule that
prior inconsistent statements of a witness are admissible solely for
the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility;46 but because the
officer had not testified previously as to who had been driving the
car, the statement was not inconsistent with any previous testimony.
Further, the Court reasoned, the fact that the plaintiff on re-direct
solicited from the officer the testimony that subsequent investigation
brought to light the fact that McGhee had not been driving did not
cure the error and make the warrant admissible. Usually where the
incompetent evidence is admitted over objection, but the same evi-
dence had been previously admitted or is subsequently admitted
without objection, the benefit of the objection is lost.47 "The rule
does not mean [however] that the adverse party may not, on cross-
examination, explain the evidence or destroy its probative value,
or even contradict it with other evidence, upon peril of losing the
benefit of his exception.348
" Id. at 268, 128 S.E.2d 611. See also, State v. Cope, 240 N.C. 244, 81
S.E.2d 773 (1954); State v. Herndon, 223 N.C. 208, 25 S.E.2d 611 (1943);
Warren v. Pilot Life. Ins. Co., 217 N.C. 705, 9 S.E.2d 479 (1940); STANs-
BuRY § 46; 98 C.J.S., Witnesses § 573 (1957).
1 258 N.C. at 269, 128 S.E.2d at 612. See also, State v. Aldredge, 254
N.C. 297, 118 S.E.2d 766 (1961); Jones v. Bailey, 246 N.C. 599, 99 S.E.2d
768 (1957); State v. Tew, 234 N.C. 612, 68 S.E.2d 291 (1951); State v.
Godwin, 224 N.C. 846, 32 S.E.2d 609 (1945); STANSBURY § 30.
48258 N.C. at 269, 128 S.E.2d at 612. See also, Shelton v. Southern Ry.
193 N.C. 670, 139 S.E. 232 (1927).
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Concerning whether or not the evidence was admissible to cor-
roborate subsequent evidence, the Court held the warrant inadmis-
sible. In general, corroborating evidence is merely supplementary
to evidence already given, which tends to strengthen and confirm
it.4 9 It must, however, be competent evidence; and if incompetent,
it cannot be rendered competent merely because it tends to corroborate
another witness.5" Therefore, the opinion of the officer in the war-
rant, being incompetent, could not be rendered competent as cor-
roborative testimony because later testimony to the same effect by
Robinson was competent. "In no aspect of the law of evidence can
contradictory evidence be used as corroborating, strengthening, or
confirming evidence." 1
PHOTOGRAPHS
In State v. FoUst, 2 the defendant, a sixteen-year-old, was con-
victed of a shotgun murder of a girl his own age. The facts tended
to show that the defendant had been hunting on the morning in ques-
tion and had later gone to the deceased's home. The deceased was in
bed when the defendant entered, and the State contended that there-
upon the defendant and deceased began pranking with the shotgun,
which subsequently discharged killing deceased. The defendant
claimed the entire tragedy was a misadventure caused solely by the
act of deceased, and not through any act of recklessness of the de-
fendant.
At the trial, the defendant stipulated that deceased had died from
a blast from his shotgun. However, the trial court permitted the
coroner to testify from ten gory, color photographs of the corpse of
deceased to explain his testimony, in detail as to each photograph, as
to how death occurred from the wound in the side of the face. The
Supreme Court, as one of the grounds for reversing the conviction,
held that although the "fact that an authenticated photograph is gory,
or gruesome, and may tend to arouse prejudice will not alone render
" State v. Lassiter, 191 N.C. 210, 131 S.E. 577 (1926) ; State v. Mungeon,
20 S.D. 612, 108 N.W. 552 (1901).
"0 State v. Lassiter, 191 N.C. 210, 131 S.E. 577 (1926) ; State v. Springs,
184 N.C. 768, 114 S.E. 851 (1922) ; Holt v. Johnson, 129 N.C. 138, 39 S.E.
796 (1901).
' State v. Lassiter, 191 N.C. 210, 213, 131 S.E. 577, 579 (1926).
82258 N.C. 453, 128 S.E.2d 889 (1963).
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it incompetent to be so used,"53 under the present circumstances, it
would seem that there was an excessive use of the photographs by
the prosecution."' This decision is apparently in accord with prior
decisions of the Court, although the same result has never before
been reached. In State v. Gardner,5 the Court said that the fact
that such gory or gruesome photographs may tend to arouse prejudice
in the jury will not render them incompetent, "if the testimony
sought to be illustrated or explained be relevant and material to
any issue in the case....56
Although the Court in Foust did not specifically say that the
coroner's testimony would not be relevant and material to any issue,
the implication was present. The prejudice raised coupled with the
irrelevancy of the gruesome photographs, which irrelevancy arose
mainly from the fact that the defendant admitted the shooting, made
admission of the evidence erroneous. Such admission could accom-
plish nothing other than prejudice to the defendant.57
INSURANCE
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE
In Underwood v. National Grange Mut. Liab. Co.' the defendant
issued an automobile liability policy to C under the Assigned Risk
Plan.' The car covered by the policy was in C's name but was to be
operated by her son, J. Later when C moved to Florida she trans-
ferred title to the car to plaintiff, her sister-in-law, but I was to con-
tinue driving it. She also attempted to assign the insurance policy to
plaintiff. Insurer informed plaintiff that the Assigned Risk Policy
could not be assigned, then cancelled the policy effective June 27,
1958. On August 4, 1958 plaintiff's son was killed while riding in
the car driven by J. Following a judgment against 's estate plain-
tiff brought suit against the insurer to recover under the insurance
" Id. at 460, 128 S.E.2d at 894. See also State v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390,
64 S.E.2d 572 (1951); State v. Gardner, 228 N.C. 567, 46 S.E.2d 824
(1948); STANsBurY §34.
r1258 N.C. at 460, 128 S.E.2d at 894.
"228 N.C. 567, 46 S.E.2d 824 (1948).
';'Id. at 573, 46 S.E.2d at 828.
"' Compare: Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 769, 787-810 (1960).
1258 N.C. 211, 128 S.E.2d 577 (1962).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-279.34 (Supp. 1963).
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policy. Defendant denied coverage on the ground the policy provided
there could be no assignment without its consent. The trial court
found for the plaintiff and entered judgment thereon, apparently
basing its decision on the failure of defendant to give the proper
notice of termination of insurance as required by statute.3 On appeal
the Court reversed. In the eyes of the Court the question was not
one of proper statutory notice but whether the "non-assignment"
clause of the policy was valid under the Vehicle Financial Responsi-
bility Act of 1957.4 The Court held that the Act did not require
the insurance to follow the car as it changed hands. To do so would
place the burden of maintaining insurance on a vehicle on the in-
surer, and the Act clearly places this burden on the owner.5
Another question raised on appeal was whether the automobile
was operated with the insured's permission as contemplated by the
omnibus clause of the policy despite the fact that the policy could not
be assigned. The standard omnibus clause6 provides coverage on the
insured vehicle when operated by persons other than the insured if
operated with the insured's permission. The crucial question was
whether the insured had such an interest in the vehicle at the time
of the accident as would enable her to grant permission to another
person to operate it. The Court found that in order to grant permis-
sion as contemplated by the policy insured must have "such owner-
ship or control... as to confer the legal right to give or withhold
assent. ' 7 Since C had transferred her interest prior to the accident,
she did not retain ownership and control as required by the omnibus
clause. Coverage under the clause is thus prevented even though the
operator of the vehicle had actual permission (but not legal permis-
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-310 (Supp. 1963).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-309 to -319 (Supp. 1963).
'The Court adopted the reasoning of a recent Virginia case, Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cole, 203 Va. 337, 124 S.E.2d 203 (1962). The accident
out of which the suit arose occurred in Virginia. The negligent driver was
a North Carolina resident and the North Carolina Vehicle Financial Respon-
sibility Act was applicable. There was no insurance covering the car in the
present owner's name but title had been recently transferred and the prior
owner, a relative of the present one, had an Assigned Risk Policy which
covered the vehicle when it was in his name. The question was whether the
Act required transfer of the insurance with the vehicle. The Court answered
in the negative relying primarily on the language of G.S. § 20-309 and G.S.§ 20-313 for its conclusion that the burden of maintaining insurance was on
the owner.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (b) (2) (Supp. 1963).
"258 N.C. at 219, 128 S.E.2d at 583.
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sion) of the real owner of the car as well as permission of the fic-
tional owner, the plaintiff.
In Home Indem. Co. v. West Trade Motors, Inc.8 defendant
W sold an automobile that was insured by the plaintiff under a
standard garage liability policy to the defendant B. W executed and
delivered the necessary documents to B's lienholder rather than to B
as provided in G.S. § 20-72(b) and failed to notify the Department
of Motor Vehicles of the transfer as required by G.S. § 20-75. The
lienholder failed to apply for a new certificate as required by statute.'
Subsequently, B was involved in an accident with C. It was claimed
by C that under the decision in Community Credit Co. v. Norwood'0
W was still owner of the car. C contended that the Norwood case
held that title remained in the vendor until all provisions of G.S. §
20-72(b) and G.S. § 20-75 were met; hence, W was still owner of
the car. C further contended that B was driving the car with W's
permission and therefore his insurer was liable under the garage lia-
bility policy. Faced with this possibility the insurer sought to de-
termine its liability by declaratory judgment. The Court held W
and its insurer were not liable since W had put the certificate beyond
its control, and there was no reason why the vendor should be penal-
ized for the failure of the vendee to perform his statutory duty, that
is, to apply for a new certificate. 1 The Norwood case did not apply
258 N.C. 647, 129 S.E.2d 248 (1963). This case is discussed in SALES,
Automobiles-Certificates of Title, infra.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-73 to -74 (Supp. 1963).
1 257 N.C. 87, 125 S.E.2d 369 (1962). Discussed in Tenth Annual Sur-
vey of North Carolina Case Law, 41 N.C.L. Rnv. 439 (1963). This case
involved the application of G.S. § 20-72(b) and G.S. § 20-75. The statutes
were amended in 1961 by adding this sentence to each: "Transfer of owner-
ship in a vehicle by an owner (a dealer) is not effective until the provisions
of this subsection have been complied with." N.C. Sess. Laws 1961, ch. 835,
§§ 8, 9. The sentence was deleted from both statutes in 1963. N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 20-72(b), -75 (Supp. 1963). Norwood, the vendee under a con-
ditional sales contract, had submitted his application for a new certificate of
title in compliance with the provisions of the statutes. After application but
before issue of the new certificate the car was levied on by a second creditor
of the vendee. The assignee under the conditional sales contract had not
registered its lien until the new title was received. It contended the levy was
void because under the amendments to G.S. § 20-72(b) and G.S. § 20-75 the
vendee did not acquire title until the new certificate was issued. The Court
held that since issuance of a new certificate by the Department was not a
provision listed by the statute the vendee acquired title when his application
was properly submitted and not when the new certificate was issued.
" See statutes cited note 9 supra.
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because it involved a determination of the priorities between two
creditors rather than the liabilities of a vendor and his insurer.
In Levinson v. Travelers Indem. Co.,12 R purchased an automo-
bile liability policy covering a Buick from the defendant. Later R re-
quested that defendant substitute an Oldsmobile for the Buick. De-
fendant complied with the request and issued a Certificate of Insur-
ance (FS-1) ' to insured as provided under the rules promulgated
by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles14 rather than a Notice of
Termination (FS-4). Subsequently, the plaintiffs were injured by
R in an accident involving the replaced vehicle (Buick). The Buick
was still registered in R's name but no other insurance had been
purchased for it. Apparently R had failed to forward the FS-1 to
the Department of Motor Vehicles and had also failed to register the
Oldsmobile. Compliance with either of these requirements would
have informed the Department that R had an uninsured vehicle in
his possession. Failure to comply permitted R to operate the Buick
without insurance and without the knowledge of the Department.
Faced with the fact that the Buick was uninsured, plaintiffs brought
action against the insurer contending its failure to file an FS-4
was in violation of the statutory requirement of notice to the insured
of termination of insurance;15 therefore, the policy still covered the
Buick.:"
The Court held that where coverage on a vehicle is terminated
by the request of insured in order to substitute another vehicle for the
one presently covered the insurance policy is not terminated; there-
fore, the requirement of notice does not apply. Since the require-
ment of notice to insured was designed to protect the insured from
acts of the insurer the holding of the Court is sound as to its effect
on an insured party. But the additional requirement of notice to the
258 N.C. 672, 129 S.E.2d 297 (1963).13Issuance of the FS-1 form signifies that the insurer has issued and there
is in effect an owner's motor vehicle liability policy which complies with
G.S. § 20-279.21. Swain v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.C. 120, 116
S.E.2d 482 (1960).
1
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-315 (Supp. 1963).
* N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1393, § 2, as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§20-310(a) (Supp. 1963).
'" Where an insurer fails to give notice of termination as provided by
G.S. § 20-310 the contract remains in force. Crisp v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 256 N.C. 408, 124 S.E.2d 149 (1962). Discussed in Tenth Annual
Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 41 N.C.L. REv. 484 (1963).
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Commissioner is ignored.17 If the insurer had been required to in-
form the Commissioner of the substitution to relieve itself of relia-
bility the Commissioner would have had the information necessary
to prevent the operation of the Buick without insurance. The ap-
plicable statute at the time of this case required notice "upon the
termination of insurance by cancellation or failure to renew ..."'
In 1963 the statute was amended to read "no insurance policy...
may be terminated by cancellation or otherwise by the insurer with-
out having given... notice of such cancellation... ."19 It is ques-
tionable whether this amendment closes the loophole shown in the
Levinson case because the amended statute refers to the termination
of an insurance policy rather than the substitution of vehicles.
In Robinson v. United States Cas. Co.20 the plaintiff brought
suit against defendant-insurer for allegedly misrepresenting to the
Department of Motor Vehicles that he was not insured by defendant
at the time of an accident as required by statute.2 ' The Commis-
sioner, relying on such representation, revoked plaintiff's license
which resulted in extra expenditures for transportation. Recalling
a prior decision 22 which held that such action by the Commissioner
was quasi-judicial and not subject to collateral attack, the Court
held that the present suit was in effect a collateral attack on the act
of the Commissioner in suspending plaintiff's license. Plaintiff
had ten days before actual suspension to show he had insurance 3
"' This is not the first time it was ignored. In Nixon v. Liberty Mut. Ins.
Co., 258 N.C. 41, 127 S.E.2d 892 (1962) the Court held that where notice
to the insured conformed to the statute, failure to notify the Commissioner
did not prevent termination of the contract. Obviously, the Court did not
consider the duty to inform the Commissioner as important as the duty to in-
form the insurer. See note 16 supra. The applicable statute required notice
to the insured fifteen days prior to termination and notice to the Commissioner
within fifteen days after termination. N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1393, § 2.
The present statutes require similar notice to both parties. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§20-309(e), -310 (Supp. 1963).
"N.C. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 1393, §2, as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§20-310(a) (Supp. 1963).
"o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-309(e) (Supp. 1963).
2-260 N.C. 284, 132 S.E.2d 629 (1963). This case is discussed in AD-
NisTRATlV LAw, Liability of Witnesses in Administrative Determinations,
supra.
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-279.5(c)1 (Supp. 1963).
"
2Beaver v. Scheidt, 251 N.C. 671, 111 S.E.2d 881 (1960).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §20-279.5(b) (Supp. 1963).
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and upon an adverse ruling by the Commissioner could have ap-
pealed to the superior court.
24
FIRE INSURANCE
In General Ins. Co. of America v. Faulkner25 a school auditorium
insured by plaintiff suffered damage in a fire willfully and maliciously
set by defendants' eleven-year-old son. Plaintiff, insurance company,
paid the claim and then sued the parents to recover five hundred dol-
lars of the loss under the Parental Responsibility Statute.2' The de-
fendants demurred on the ground that plaintiff was not one of the
persons authorized to recover under the statute. The Court found
the purpose of the statute was to curb juvenile delinquency by im-
posing liability on those most responsible for the "anti-social be-
havior of children."27 To refuse to allow the injured owner's insurer
to sue under the statute would give the parents the benefit of the
property owner's prudence and defeat the purpose of the statute.
Therefore, the Court held the plaintiff was subrogated to the statu-
tory rights of the injured owner.
LABOR LAW
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION-
DISQUALIFICATION FOR BENEFITS
On June Z3, 1962, Eastern Air Lines' five hundred and seventy-
five flight engineers vent on strike, requiring Eastern to suspend its
operations, and more particularly, to close its terminals in North
Carolina. In In re Abernathy,1 petitioners, employees at terminals
in North Carolina and in no way connected with the flight engineers
2
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.2(b) (Supp. 1963).
259 N.C. 317, 130 S.E.2d 645 (1963). This case is discussed in CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW, Statutes, supra; DoMEsTic RELATIONS, Parent and Child,
supra; and EQUITABLE REMEDIES, Subrogation, supra.
2" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (Supp. 1963), makes the parents of any
minor child under eighteen, living with them, liable, in an amount not to
exceed five hundred dollars, to the owner of property for loss caused by its
willful or malicious destruction by the minor. Thirty one other states have
passed similar statutes. See generally Ligon, Parental Responsibility Statute,
40 N.C.L. Rv. 619 (1962).
2? 259 N.C. at 323, 130 S.E.2d at 650.
-259 N.C. 190, 130 S.E.2d 292 (1963), cert. denied, 32 U.S.L. WEEK
3204 (U.S. Dec. 3, 1963). This case is discussed in CONSTITUTIONAL LAw,
Statutes, supra.
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or their strike, sought to secure unemployment compensation for that
period during which they were unemployed as a result of the strike.
The Employment Security Commission denied them compensation
under authority of G.S. § 96-14(4) .2 The Superior Court reversed,
holding G.S. § 96-14(4) to be unconstitutional.' The Court rein-
stated the decision of the Employment Security Commission, holding
the statute to be a reasonable exercise of the police power.
The North Carolina Unemployment Compensation Law was
enacted in 1936 to take advantage of a federal grant provided by
the Federal Social Security Act of 1935." The basic purpose of the
state law was to provide a means to ease the economic burden of
those persons placed out of work through no fault of their own.
The statute provided that the fund should not be available to em-
ployees whose unemployment was due to some misconduct on their
part5 or a refusal to take other employment.6 Prior to 1961, an in-
dividual was also disqualified for benefits when his unemployment
was due to a stoppage of work caused by a labor dispute at the fac-
tory, establishment, or other premises at which he was last em-
ployed. However, consonant with the original philosophy of the
law, if the individual could show that he was not participating in,
financing, or interested in the labor dispute, and was not a member
of a class of workers who were so involved, he could escape disquali-
fication.7 Such escape provisions existed and now exist in the ma-
jority of statutes throughout the country.8 Had this law been on
'This statute provides for disqualification when the unemployment "is
caused by a labor dispute in active progress on or after July 1, 1961, at the
factory, establishment, or other premises at which he is or was last em-
ployed or caused after such date by a labor dispute at another place, either
within or without this State, which is owned or operated by the same em-
ploying unit which owns or operates the factory, establishment, or other
premises at which he is or was last employed and which supplies materials
or services necessary to the continued and usual operation of the premises at
which he is or was last employed .... " N.C. Gr . STAT. § 96-14(4) (Supp.
1963).
'The superior court held alternatively that petitioners were not disquali-
fied under G.S. § 96-14(4), or, if they were disqualified under its provisions,
G.S. § 96-14(4) was unconstitutional as being an unlawful discrimination
against petitioners.
' See Haggart, Unemployment Compensation During Labor Disputes,
37 NEB. L. REv. 668 (1958).
' N.C. GEx. STAT. §96-14(2) (1958).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(3) (1958).
'N.C. GEx. STAT. § 96-14(4) (1958).
'For a compilation of the statutes, see Lewis, The Law of Unemployment
Compensation in Labor Disputes, 13 LAB. L.J. 174 (1962).
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the books at the time of the Eastern strike, it is conceivable that
petitioners in the principal case would have been entitled to compen-
sation.9
The North Carolina law was radically amended in 1961.10 The
effect of the amendment was to delete the provision under which an
employee out of work due to a labor dispute might escape disqualifi-
cation. Indeed, the disqualification was extended to individuals whose
unemployment was due to a labor dispute in progress at another
place if such other place was owned or operated by the same employ-
ing unit by whom the individual was last employed and supplied ma-
terials or services necessary to the continued operation of the prem-
ises at which the individual was last employed. The Court held
that the petitioners were disqualified under this provision.
The Court reviewed the history of Unemployment Compensation
Acts, pointing out that they were enacted at a time when the coun-
try was recovering from the throes of a severe economic depression
and were apparently designed to ameliorate the economic hardship
brought about by cyclical unemployment. The very existence of the
labor dispute disqualification in the original state acts was evidence
that the legislators did not intend the fund to be used as a means of
indirectly financing such disputes. 1
At least eight other states12 have statutes containing, in one form
or another, no escape provision from the labor dispute disqualifica-
tion." These statutes represent a departure in disqualification theory,
since they deprive an employee of benefits when his unemployment
results through no fault of his own. They are obviously designed to
protect management against labor's use of the unemployment fund as
an indirect lever by which to achieve its demands. It is argued that
in light of such a statute, labor will think twice before resorting to
conduct that might cause economic distress to their nonunionized
fellow employees.' 4 It is arguable that such a statute may afford labor
See In re Ferrara's Claim, 10 N.Y.2d 1, 176 N.E.2d 43, 217 N.Y.S.2d
11 (1961).
"oN.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-14(4) (Supp. 1963), quoted in part note 2 supra.
1 259 N.C. at 195, 130 S.E.2d at 297. See generally Haggart, supra note
4; Comment, 56 Nw. U.L. Rlv. 662 (1961); 26 ALBANY L. REv. 116 (1962).
" Alabama, California, Delaware, Kentucky, Minnesota, New York,
Ohio, and Wisconsin.
" For a compilation of the statutes, see Lewis, supra note 8.
", Brief for the Harriet Cotton Mills and Henderson Cotton Mills as
Amicus Curiae, p. 23.
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a greater weapon than it had before, since non-unionized employees,
deprived of the employment security which they enjoyed under the
former law, will now have to look elsewhere for security-pre-
sumably to the union, thereby increasing rather than curbing union
strength.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF PARENT
FOR LOCAL'S MISCONDUCT
Two cases involved the application of agency principles to: (1)
Validate service of process on a non-resident union; and (2) Impose
vicarious liability on the parent union for secondary boycott activities
engaged in by the local. Reverie Lingerie, Inc. v. McCain 5 involved
a suit for damages against the International Ladies' Garment Work-
ers, a non-resident labor union, for tortious destruction of plaintiff's
manufacturing plant in Hillsboro, North Carolina. Service of process
was made upon the Secretary of State pursuant to G.S. § 1-97 (6)1,
on the premise that the nonresident union was "doing business in
North Carolina." There was evidence that one Shapiro and others
had been actively engaged in soliciting membership and otherwise
attempting to organize plaintiff's employees into a local of defendant
union. These activities culminated in a strike by plaintiff's employees
who had joined the union."T During the course of the strike, the
union filed unfair labor practice charges against the plaintiff with the
National Labor Relations Board. The Court held that the filing of
unfair labor practice charges by the union amounted to a ratification
of Shapiro's acts and conduct in North Carolina; that Shapiro was
at all times acting as the representative of the union; and therefore,
the union was "doing business in North Carolina" for purposes of
valid service of process upon the Secretary of State.
Jocie Motor Lines v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters"
" 258 N.C. 353, 128 S.E.2d 835 (1963). This case is discussed in
AGENCY, Proof of Agency-Ratification, supra; TRIAL PRACTICE, Process-
Waiver of Immunity, infra.
"6 This statute provides that service of process may be made on a non-
resident unincorporated association or organization doing business in this
state by serving such process on the Secretary of State. N.C. GEN. STAT.
§1-97(6) (1953).
" There was further evidence that the union had financed the strike by
renting a house across the street from plaintiff's plant which was used as
headquarters for the strikers, and by paying strike benefits in the form of
twenty dollars per week plus one meal per day.260 N.C. 315, 132 S.E.2d 697 (1963).
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involved a suit under section 303 of the Taft-Hartley Act"0 for dam-
ages arising out of alleged secondary boycott activities engaged in
by locals of the parent union. Various factors such as the control
which the International by charter possesses over the locals and the
International's financing of the particular boycott activities were
held sufficient to justify the conclusion that such activities were au-
thorized by the International union.
In comparing these two cases, it is noteworthy that different
requirements exist for proving agency under section 303 than may
exist in proving agency for some other purpose. For example,
Reverie Lingerie was decided by application of common law agency
principles, the union's subsequent ratification of Shapiro's acts be-
ing the basis for the determination that Shapiro was at all times the
agent of the union. On the other hand, section 303 (b) subjects
actions brought under its provisions to the "limitations and pro-
visions" of section 301. Section 301 (e) provides:
For purposes of this section, in determining whether any
person is acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make
such other person responsible for his acts, the question of whether
the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subse-
quently ratified shall not be controlling.20
Section 301 (e) is operative in damage suits arising out of secondary
boycott activities2' and is apparently designed to obviate the strictures
of the common law with respect to proving agency.22 Thus, it should
be somewhat easier to impose vicarious liability on the parent for
the local's activities.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
INTERPRETATION OF MUNICIPAL POWERS
In State v. Byrd,' the Court struck down another Raleigh ordi-
nance prohibiting the sale of ice cream along the city streets by
" Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 303, 61
Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1958), as amended, 73 Stat. 545 (1959),
29 U.S.C. § 187 (Supp. I, 1963).
"'Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301(e),
61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(e) (1958).
" See Schatte v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,
84 F. Supp. 669 (D.C. Cal. 1949), aft'd, 182 F.2d 158 (9th Cir. 1950), cert
denied, 340 U.S. 827 (1950).
2 See 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nnws 1172.
'259 N.C. 141, 130 S.E.2d 55 (1963).
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mobile bell-ringing vendors.2 The city council had passed the ordi-
nance in the interest of the public safety and general welfare, after
considering a number of factors.3 The defendant was charged with
wilfully violating this ordinance; however, the superior court
quashed the warrant and the Court affirmed.
The only powers which municipal corporations possess are those
expressly conferred by the legislature and those powers necessarily
implied from those expressly granted. The question for the Court,
therefore, was whether or not the General Assembly had authorized
the municipality to pass such an ordinance. Though no such express
authority had been given, the city of Raleigh did have express au-
thority to require a license and to levy a tax on vendors ;4 to regulate
the use of streets for the public welfare ;5 to regulate vehicular traffic
in congested areas ;' and to abate nuisances. 7 On the other hand,
peddling is a lawful business under general state law, and such law
contemplates the use of motor vehicles in the pursuit of such an oc-
cupation.8
From a consideration of these factors, the Court concluded that
the municipality had the express power to regulate peddling by
licensing and that it had implied power to pass reasonable regula-
tions concerning peddling.9 But there was no power either express
or implied to prohibit peddling, since this activity was expressly
sanctioned by the General Assembly.
'The Court previously struck down a Raleigh ordinance in Tastee-Freeze,
Inc. v. City of Raleigh, 256 N.C. 208, 123 S.E.2d 632 (1962).
'These factors included: the danger to the public, especially to children;
the obstruction of traffic; and the nuisance to the peace and quiet of the com-
munity caused by the constant ringing of the vendors' chimes and bells. 259
N.C. at 43, 130 S.E.2d at 57.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-53(g) (1958).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-200 (1952), as amended, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160-
200 (Supp. 1963).
8 Ibid.
Ibid.8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-53 (1958).
* "We express no opinion as to whether a regulatory ordinance, otherwise
reasonable in all respects would be invalid if it applied only to the sale or
offering for sale of ice cream products from mobile units." 259 N.C. at 148,
130 S.E.2d at 60.
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MUNICIPAL IMMUNITY
In Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co.,"° the de-
fendant undertook to build sewers for a municipality. When the
use of explosives in this undertaking allegedly damaged his property,
plaintiff brought suit. The contractor argued that the city's im-
munity extended to it, in that it was exercising a governmental func-
tion on behalf of the city. The Court stated that arguments as to
governmental immunity were inapposite due to the fact the blasting
was a nuisance and there is no immunity where a municipality main-
tains a nuisance. Since the city had no immunity, the defendant
could claim no protection."
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT
In Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hagins,'2 the Court struck down
a municipality's petition in a condemnation proceeding which was
incident to a redevelopment plan. The Court based its decision on
the municipality's failure to allege facts showing compliance with the
statutory requirements for carrying out such a plan,13 and reserved
opinion on whether expenses incurred in an urban redevelopment
plan were for a necessary purpose within the meaning of the North
Carolina Constitution. 4
10 260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900 (1963). This case is discussed in EMINENT
DOMAIN, supra and TORTS, Absolute Liability, infra.
" The damages resulting from such a nuisance, however, are regarded as
a taking of private property for a public use, and just compensation must
be paid. The Court indicated that the public taking might render the
municipality the only party liable, and therefore the contractor might escape
liability on this theory. Moore v. Clark, 235 N.C. 364, 70 S.E.2d 182
(1952), had indicated that a contractor was not liable for the non-negligent
performance of a governmental contract in strict conformity with the gov-
ernment's plans and under the direction of the government's engineers.
Whether the defendant might have this defense did not appear from the record,
in that the terms of the contract and its execution were not specified.
12258 N.C. 220, 128 S.E.2d 391 (1962). This case is discussed in CIVIL
PRocEDuRE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Joinder of Parties and Causes of
Action, supra and EMINENT DOMAIN, supra.
" The Court noted that article 37 of chapter 160 of the General Statutes
sets out these requirements: "Among the requisites are: a properly approved
redevelopment plan showing the boundaries of the area, existing uses, pro-
posed uses, population density, proposed changes in zoning ordinances, street
layouts, a feasible plan for the relocation of displaced families, and'... a
statement of the estimated cost and method of financing of acquisition of the
redevelopment area, and of all other costs necessary to prepare the area for
redevelopment.'" 258 N.C. at 224, 128 S.E.2d at 394.
"' N.C. CoNsT. art. 7, § 7. The Court had previously determined that the
[Vol. 42
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
The answer to this question, however, followed shortly in Horton
v. Redevelopment Comm'n,15 where the subject of litigation was
the following provision of the Constitution :16
No... municipal corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its
faith or loan its credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by
any officers of the same except for the necessary expenses thereof,
unless approved by a majority of those who shall vote thereon in
any election held for such purposes.17
In the Horton case, certain taxpayers of the municipality brought
an action to restrain the city from contracting any debts, lending any
credit, collecting any taxes, or using any funds for the purpose of
carrying out a specified urban renewal plan. Plaintiffs claimed that
the carrying out of this plan was not a necessary expense within the
meaning of the State Constitution and that no action could be taken
with respect to such plan until this plan had been approved by a
majority vote in an election held by the municipality on the desira-
bility of the plan. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, but
the Court reversed.
There was no question as to whether the municipality had the
power to provide for the redevelopment of an area. This power had
been specifically granted by statute.' The problem involved was
the fact that this statute did not require a vote of the people for the
approval of such expenditures. The Court reiterated its doctrine that
the determination of whether an expense is necessary within the
meaning of the Constitution is not a matter for the legislature to de-
cide. Only the Court has the authority to decide on "necessity," and
thereby determine whether there must be a vote of the people before
any expense can be incurred. Since the Court decided that the ex-
pense in question was not a necessary one, any statutory authorization
expenses of such an undertaking met the "public purpose" test. Redevelopment
Comm'n of Greensboro v. Security Nat'l Bank, 252 N.C. 595, 114 S.E.2d 688(1960).
'1259 N.C. 605, 131 S.E.2d 464 (1963).
" This provision has been and will be a constant breeding ground for
litigation. For a discussion of many of the cases involving the provision,
see, e.g., Coates and Mitchell, "Necessary Expenses," 18 N.C.L. REv. 93(1940). See also Coates, Green v. Kitchin, 27 N.C.L. REV. 500, 519-28(1949); 30 N.C.L. REv. 313 (1952).
" N.C. CONST. art. 7, § 7.
"N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 160-454 to -474 (1952), as amended, N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 160-455.1 to -474.1 (Supp. 1963).
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which did not require a vote of the people was necessarily unconsti-
tutional.
The judicial tests which have been contrived to determine what
constitutes a "necessary expense" are, at best, unwieldy. Perhaps
this is due to the desirability of a flexible standard in an area where
the responsibilities of local government are ever changing. The
judicial tests and the holding of the Court are well put by Justice
Parker:
[T]he expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by a municipality in
putting into effect an urban redevelopment plan, pursuant to the
authority vested in it by our Urban Redevelopment Law, are not
expenses incurred, or to be incurred, by a municipality in the
maintenance of public peace or administration of justice, do not
partake of a governmental nature, and do not purport to be an
exercise by a municipality of a portion of the State's delegated
sovereignty, and consequently are not "necessary expenses" within
the purview of the... North Carolina Constitution.10
Thus for the first time in North Carolina there is a clear holding
that urban redevelopment expenses are not "necessary" within the
meaning of the Constitution.
ZONING
Staley v. City of Winston-Salem20 involved the non-conforming
use provisions of a local zoning ordinance. At the time this ordi-
nance was passed, petitioner was: (1) Operating a restaurant; and
(2) Selling beer and wine. Under this ordinance, both of these
were non-conforming uses, and the ordinance prevented the re-
sumption of any non-conforming use which had been vacated for a
two year period. After the petitioner had stopped selling beer and
wine for a period of over two years, he resumed such sales. Suit
was initiated to determine whether the ordinance caused petitioner
to forfeit his right to sell. The Court held that the ordinance could
not have this effect. The determination of whether beer or wine
may be sold in a restaurant is a matter resting by statute2' with the
State Board of Alcoholic Control. To allow the local ordinance to
prohibit such sale would be in direct conflict with this statute, and
259 N.C. at 611, 131 S.E.2d at 468.
20258 N.C. 244, 128 S.E.2d 604 (1962).
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-109 (1953).
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the rule is that a local ordinance cannot have this effect.22 The Court
referred to the historical problems which the legislature had faced
concerning the sale of alcoholic beverages and pointed out that
these problems had been resolved by putting the matter under the
control of a statewide agency. An ordinance could not set this policy
at naught.
In re Markham23 involved attempts by a property owner to
amend a local zoning ordinance in order to have certain properties
reclassified from residential to commercial usage. Petitioner twice
appeared before the City Planning and Zoning Commission, but
each time the request was denied. She then obtained a public hear-
ing before the city council, but this resulted in the request being
denied again. Subsequently, on petitioner's application, the superior
court issued a writ of certiorari to review the city council's action.
The city moved to dismiss on the ground that certiorari was not a
proper means of acquiring jurisdiction to review a city council's
actions. The motion was denied, but this denial was held to be
error on appeal. The Court pointed out that when a city council acts
with respect to the amending of a zoning ordinance, the action which
it takes is purely legislative in nature. With this factor in mind,
it was obvious that a writ of certiorari could not be used to review
those actions, because such a writ lies only to review actions which
are judicial or quasi-judicial in nature.' The Court suggested that
petitioner's remedy probably would be to bring an action to declare
the zoning ordinance invalid as to his property.2 5
PUBLIC UTILITIES
FRANCHISES
In State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Forbes Transfer Co.,' a carrier
purchased additional operating rights, which purchase was approved
" A local ordinance cannot override statutes which apply to the entire
state. Davis v. City of Charlotte, 242 N.C. 670, 89 S.E.2d 406 (1955).
259 N.C. 566, 131 S.E.2d 329 (1963).
" Accord, State ex rel. Croy v. City of Raytown, 289 S.W.2d 153 (Mo.
App. 1956); Edward H. Snow Constr. Co. v. City of Albuquerque, 65 N.M.
133, 333 P.2d 877 (1958); Lang v. Town Council, 82 R.I. 361, 108 A.2d
166 (1954); Dunbar v. City of Spartanburg, 226 S.C. 360, 85 S.E.2d 281(1954).
11 For an illustration of such an action, see, e.g., Penny v. City of Durham,
249 N.C. 596, 107 S.E.2d 72 (1959).
1259 N.C. 688, 131 S.E.2d 452 (1963).
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by the Commission. Subsequently, the Commission issued a rule
that "no carrier acquiring operating authority... after the effective
date of this rule shall tack or join such authority to an authority
already held by said carrier without the written consent of the Com-
mission."2 When the carrier attempted to tack the additional opera-
ting authority, the Commission issued a cease and desist order. The
superior court upheld the order, but the Supreme Court reversed,
reasoning that no restrictions had been imposed by the Commission
when it approved the purchase of the additional operating rights,
nor was the Commission's rule in effect at that time.
In State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v Ryder Tank Lines,3 the Utilities
Commission granted a certificate authorizing the applicant carrier
to transport by irregular routes caustic soda and molten sulphur in
tank vehicles from Wilmington, N.C. and points within a radius
of twenty-five miles from Wilmington to all points in North Caro-
lina. Protestants were other carriers having authority under their
certificates to transport such commodities, along with others, but
these carriers were brased at places distant from Wilmington. The
Court, in upholding the Commission's order granting the certificate,
pointed to evidence that there was no existing carrier of such com-
modities based in Wilmington; that there were at that place large
storage facilities for these commodities which were needed in the
manufacture of textiles, paper and fertilizer; and that having trucks
available in Wilmington would make it unnecessary for manufac-
turers to maintain a large inventory of these chemicals. The Court
concluded that there was substantial evidence of convenience and
need and stated that what constitutes "convenience and necessity"
is primarily an administrative question. Courts will not reverse an
administrative agency's exercise of discretionary power except for
capricious, unreasonable or arbitrary action, or disregard of law. 4
Similar reasoning was used in the decision of State ex rel. Util.
Com ' n v. Carolina Coach Co.5 This was a three-way contest over
bus routes from Raleigh to Charlotte by way of the newly improved
'Id. at 691, 131 S.E.2d at 455.
"259 N.C. 363, 130 S.E.2d 663 (1963).
'See, e.g., State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Ray, 236 N.C. 692, 73 S.E.2d 870(1953); State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Great Southern Trucking Co., 223
N.C. 687, 28 S.E.2d 201 (1943).
260 N.C. 43, 132 S.E.2d 249 (1963).
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segment of Highway 49. The route in question was from Raleigh
to Asheboro via Highway 64 and from Asheboro to Charlotte on
Highway 49. Prior to the proceedings, Carolina Coach Company
(Carolina) had service between the two cities on two different routes,
one by way of Greensboro and another by way of Sanford. The Grey-
hound Corporation (Greyhound) had service by way of Pittsboro,
Asheboro, Winston-Salem, and Statesville. The Queen City Coach
Company (Queen City) was operating between Charlotte and Ashe-
boro over Highways 49 and 29.
Greyhound's application for service over the desired route was
granted, with closed-door service over the portion of Highway 49
served by Queen City. Carolina's application was also granted, with
closed-door service as to intermediate points over the entire route.
Carolina and Queen City appealed the granting of the franchise
to Greyhound, arguing that the Commission's findings of fact were
not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in
view of the entire record. The Court reviewed the evidence and con-
cluded that it sufficiently met these standards. It was admitted that
a public need for the services existed; however, Carolina and Queen
City argued that the grant to Greyhound would impair their financial
position and ability to serve the public and that, therefore, it would
not be in the public interest to give the franchise to Greyhound.
Both arguments were rejected. Queen City's position would be
damaged little, since Greyhound's operations were closed-door over-
the Queen City route. The Court recognized that Carolina's posi-
tion would be affected, but the fact that Carolina would also have
operating rights over the same route would tend to minimize the
competitive effect. The Commission's order was also supported by
the fact that Greyhound already had operating rights over a portion
of the new route (Asheboro to Raleigh). The Court stressed that
what constitutes "public convenience and necessity" requires con-
sideration of such imponderables as whether there is a substantial
need for the service; whether this need can be met by existing car-
riers; and whether it would jeopardize the operations of existing
carriers. Moreover, the Commission's determination of this mat-
ter is prima facie just and reasonable.
Greyhound protested the grant of operating rights to Carolina.
The Court felt that Greyhound was in a poor position to object since
1964]
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Carolina historically had the route from Charlotte to Raleigh. To
deny Carolina the new route would prejudice it greatly, since the
revenue from the Charlotte to Raleigh operations largely supported
its other activities.
Another aspect of the case was that before the proceedings were
initiated Greyhound had entered into a lease agreement with Caro-
lina whereby Greyhound had agreed not to compete with Carolina
for intrastate traffic moving between Raleigh and Charlotte. This
agreement had been approved by the Commission. Carolina at-
tempted to use this as a bar to Greyhound's petition; however, this
was rejected. Contracts between public utilities, when approved by
the Commission, become, in effect, orders of the Commission; and
the Commission can alter its orders in the interest of public con-
venience and necessity.6 Of course such alteration must be due to
some change in the circumstances which would justify it in the
interest of the public.7
Concerning the lease agreement, Greyhound petitioned for a
franchise to replace the operating rights which it had under the lease.
The Commission granted the franchise on the ground that the lease
did not promote harmony between the carriers. The Supreme Court
reversed, stating that a voluntary lease was more conducive to
harmony than a Commission's order to the same effect. Moreover,
no change of conditions was found which justified a recission of the
Commission's prior approval of the lease.
In State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Haywood Elec. Membership
Corp.,' Duke Power Company (Duke) and Nantahala Power
and Light Company (Nantahala) sought approval of a contract
whereby Nantahala would sell its distribution system and some of
its hydroelectric generating plants to Duke. Nantahala also sought
authorization to abandon service to the public. Customers, including
an electric membership corporation, several municipalities and two
counties, intervened in opposition to the application. The Commis-
sion granted the application but the Supreme Court remanded the
case to the Commission because it had failed to find facts essential
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-26.5 (1960).
"Accord, Chicago Housing Authority v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n,
20 Ill. 2d 37, 169 N.E.2d 268 (1960); Central Northwest Business Men's
Ass'n v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 337 Ill. 149, 168 N.E. 890 (1929).8260 N.C. 59, 131 S.E.2d 865 (1963).
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to a determination of the rights of the parties9 and because it might
have misinterpreted the law.
The Commission had found that the use of electricity by Nan-
tahala's public utility customers" ° had been increasing, that Nan-
tahala estimated that after 1965 it would not have sufficient genera-
.ting facilities to produce sufficient dependable power to supply the
needs of its public utility customers, and that Nantahala's studies
showed that the cost of additional hydroelectric generating facilities
would be greater than economically feasible. The Commission had
also found that Duke could supply the area economically and at
reasonable rates.
The Court stated that the finding that the cost of additional
necessary facilities "would be greater than economically feasible"
was a mere conclusion. The Court pointed to evidence that at one
of the sites available to Nantahala for further hydroelectric develop-
ment it would cost an estimated 13.3 mills per kw. to produce elec-
tricity compared to Nantahala's present cost of 7.8 mills and Duke's
cost of 12.138 mills. But although the cost of this site would be
greater than Duke's, still the cost at Nantahala's present plants and
at the new site seemingly would average less than ten mills, which
is lower than Duke's cost. The Court added that the Commission
neither interpreted nor made findings based on this evidence.
The Court also pointed out that there was nothing in the Com-
mission's findings concerning other sources of power which the evi-
dence indicated might be available to Nantahala.
The Court stated that when a corporation accepts a state's grant
of authority to acquire property for use in serving the public and
subsequently seeks to be relieved of its obligation to serve, it must
establish either that the public no longer needs these services or
that there is no reasonable probability of its being able to realize
sufficient revenue to meet expenses.:"
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-26.3 (1960).
" Nantahala's principal customer was its parent company, Aluminum
Company of America.
"
1N.C. GEx. STAT. § 62-118 (Supp. 1963), which is effective January 1,
1964. Prior to the enactment of the Public Utilities Act of 1963, this section
was codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-96 (1960). See N.C. Sess. Laws 1963,
ch. 1165, § 1.
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RATE CASES
In State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Tidewater Natural Gas Co., 2
the petitioner sought permission to raise its rates, and the request
was granted. One customer excepted to this ruling on the ground
that the new rates discriminated against it. The Court held that
the exception was untimely because it was not the proper subject for
a general rate case, rather it should be brought in a complaint case."
In a general rate case, the Commission is not required to go into
the aspects of how the increase will affect such customer. The Court
said that the crucial question is what is a fair rate of return on the
company's investment so as to enable it to pay a fair profit to its
shareholders and to maintain and expand its facilities and services
in accordance with the reasonable needs of its customers.14
Another customer objected to the rate increase because of the
denial of a request for more detailed evidence of the original cost
of the utility's property, its trended cost, the replacement cost, the
manner of computing depreciation, a detailed showing concerning
the portion of the rate base allocated to the transmission system and
the portion allocated to the distribution system, and other informa-
tion with respect to the utility's income. The Court affirmed the
denial of this request, stating that the Commission could have taken
more evidence if it wished, but that it was not obligated to do so.
Moreover, since the utility had already provided sufficient evidence
to justify a rate increase, it would be unreasonable to force the com-
pany to incur the additional expenses of more extensive cost studies,
which could not have affected the result.
Intrastate rate increases were sought by certain railroads in
State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Champion Papers.5 After the hear-
ing, the Commission found that the railroads' formula for the
2 259 N.C. 558, 131 S.E.2d 303 (1963).
"* See State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 250
N.C. 421, 109 S.E.2d 253 (1959), for a discussion of when a proceeding
will be determined in a complaint case rather than a general rate case.
This case is discussed in Seventh Annual Survey of Case Law, 38 N.C.L.
Rav. 506, 580-81. See also State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Carolinas Commit-
tee for Industrial Power Rates, 257 N.C. 560, 126 S.E.2d 325 (1962), where
the Court held that the Commission properly limited its hearing to a com-
plaint proceeding.
"A provision for the fixing of rates in a general rate case was made in
the Public Utilities Act of 1963. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133 (Supp. 1963).
15259 N.C. 449, 130 S.E.2d 890 (1963).
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separation of intrastate and interstate operations was insufficient
as a basis for a rate adjustment; however, the Commission allowed
a rate increase on other evidence. After the Commission's order was
made, the Commission on its own motion held a further hearing,
and the railroads' formula for separation of intrastate and interstate
operations was accepted. The Commission found it had been used
by the Interstate Commerce Commission and in some states. The
Commission then struck out its previous findings that the railroads
had failed to produce a sufficient formula. On appeal by an inter-
venor, the Court held, inter alia, that the Commission did not ex-
ceed its authority by changing the record after it had reopened the
proceedings. The specific statutory authority 6 to reopen the pro-
ceedings necessarily implied the authority to make changes in the
original record.
Faced with conflicting evidence as to the proper formula for
separating intrastate from interstate operations, the Court stated
that such conflicts are to be resolved by the Commission. Their
determination is binding on the Courts if, as here, it is supported by
competent, material, and substantial evidence in view of the entire
record.
In State ex rel. Util. Comm'n v. Western Carolina Tel. Co.,1 7 a
telephone company petitioned the Utilities Commission for an in-
crease in its rates. The Commission permitted the increase to
become effective March 1, 1962, upon the company's agreement to
refund to customers any amounts in excess of the rates ulti-
mately determined by the Commission. Thereafter some of the
customers filed a protest to the proposed increase and also moved to
dismiss the company's application on the ground that the company
intended to sell some of its exchanges and had been authorized to
do so. The Commission denied the motion to dismiss and heard the
company's petition for a rate increase on the merits. Later, however,
it did dismiss the petition because at the time it was made the com-
pany intended thereafter to convey some of its exchanges to a sub-
sidiary. When the petition was dismissed, the company already had
conveyed the exchanges with the approval of the Commission in
June, 1962. The Supreme Court held that the dismissal was invalid
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-26.4 (1960).17260 N.C. 369, 132 S.E.2d 873 (1963).
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because the company was entitled to have the commission fix lawful
rates as of March 1, 1962, since that would determine what, if any-
thing, the company had thereafter collected in excess of the lawful
rates. The Commission could not, when determining valid rates
as of March 1, consider what had occurred subsequently, that is,
the conveyance of some of the exchanges. The change might war-
rant fixing new rates, but they would relate to the time the change
occurred.
REAL PROPERTY
ADVERSE POSSESSION
In Internatiotal Paper Co. v. Jacobs,1 an action for trespass to
try title, the defendants claimed title to the specific area in dispute by
twenty years adverse possession. The Court held that the successive
possessions of the spouse of an heir and the ancestor of the heir
could be tacked to provide the continuity of physical possession
necessary to establish title by adverse possession. This would appear
to be an extension of the former holdings that the requirement of
privity is satisfied by the successive possession of an ancestor and
his heirs.2
'258 N.C. 439, 128 S.E.2d 818 (1963).
2The following relationships have been held to meet the requirement of
privity: An intestate and his heirs, Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N.C. 547, 69 S.E.
614 (1910); husband and his wife claiming homestead, Atwell v. Shook,
133 N.C. 387, 45 S.E. 777 (1903); husband and wife claiming dower, Jacobs
v. Williams, 173 N.C. 276, 91 S.E. 951 (1917) ; wife and husband claiming
curtesy consummate, Stockton v. Maney, 212 N.C. 231, 193 S.E. 137 (1937) ;
landlord and tenant, Alexander v. Gibbon, 118 N.C. 796, 24 S.E. 748 (1896).
Prior to the enactment of G.S. § 1-35 in 1868, North Carolina allowed tack-
ing between persons not in privity to establish the requisite period in actions
against the state. Price v. Jackson, 91 N.C. 11 (1884). A few states allow
tacking between any persons, without any requirement of privity whatsoever.
See generally 3 AMERIcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.10 (1952); 6 Powxx.L,
REAL PROPERTY § 1021 (1958).
Privity may exist by deed, devise or purchase, as well as by descent, and
the privity requirement is satisfied by a completely oral inter vivos transmuta-
tion of possession. However, our Court refuses to allow a grantee to tack
to his own the adverse possession of his grantor of a strip of land not within
the description of his deed. Jennings v. White, 139 N.C. 23, 51 S.E. 799
(1905). In Newkirk v. Porter, 237 N.C. 115, 74 S.E.2d 235 (1953), it was
stated by way of dictum that a grantee who went into the physical possession
of a strip not covered in the deed would become an adverse possessor in his
own right and not a tenant at will of his grantor but tacking of the preceding
adverse possessions of the non-included strip nevertheless would not be al-
lowed. This dictum is in accord with the holding in Blackstock v. Cole, 51
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CARTWAYS
A property owner who has no reasonable access to his property
may file a petition for a cartway with the clerk3 if he can show that
the use to which he is putting or preparing to put his land complies
with G.S. § 136-69. This statute provides in part:
If any person... shall be engaged in the cultivation of any land
or the cutting and removing of any standing timber... or taking
action preparatory to the operation of any such enterprises, to
which there is leading no public road or other adequate means of
transportation affording necessary and proper means of ingress
thereto and egress therefrom, such person... may institute a
special proceeding as set out in the preceding section, and if it
shall be made to appear to the court necessary, reasonable and
just that such person shall have a private way to a public road
... over the lands of other persons, the court shall appoint a jury
of view .... 4
The fact that no public road leads to his land is not enough. If he
has an easement, a permissive use or a way of necessity over other
lands, he is not entitled to a cartway. Once the right has been de-
termined, the mechanics of locating and laying off the cartway is for
the jury of view.5
There have been two recent cases involving cartways. In Candler
v. Sluder,0 the evidence showed that the land of the petitioners was
at times leased to hunters, and that there were apple trees, grassland
and merchantable timber on the land. Prior to the withdrawal of a
permissive use over a road the land had been used for the grazing of
cattle. The Court said that the use to which the petitioners were
putting or preparing to put the land would have to strictly comply
with the statutory provision of G.S. § 136-69,7 and although hunting
was not one of them, the rule of strict construction would not limit
the uses to those specified in the statute if there were uses which
would meet statutory requirements. Holding that the petitioners were
entitled to a cartway, the Court stated that in its broad sense "en-
N.C. 560 (1859), the only North Carolina case in point prior to Jennings v.
White, supra.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-68 (1958).
'N.C. GEx. STAT. § 136-69 (1958).
Ibid.
p259 N.C. 62, 130 S.E.2d 1 (1963).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-69 (1958).
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gaged in the cultivation of land"' would mean the use of the land for
raising crops and could include apples or cattle.
In Weatherington v. Smith9 the petitioners' land did not abutt
on a road but it was a shorter distance to a neighborhood road than
to a public road. The Court said that the actual location of the cart-
way is for the jury of view, that the Court will determine if it is
reasonable and just, but that it is not required that the cartway be
laid off to a neighborhood road which is not a public road within
the meaning of G.S. § 136-67.'0
A way of necessity as a matter of right and the finding of a right
to a cartway differ materially. When title to an entire tract of land
has been in a grantor or testator and a part of it has been conveyed
or devised so as to separate it from a public road, there arises by
implication in favor of the grantee or devisee, a way of necessity
across the other tract to the highway.:" No compensation is re-
quired.12 The owner of the servient estate may select the location
of a way of necessity provided his selection is reasonable with due
consideration of the convenience and rights of the owner of the
dominent estate. 3 It is a temporary right existing only as long as
there is a necessity for it.'4 On the other hand, there is no matter of
right to establish a cartway. It is a statutory proceedingl4a and if
such is found to be necessary, reasonable and just, payment of corn-
8 259 N.C. at 65, 130 S.E.2d at 4.
p259 N.C. 493, 131 S.E.2d 33 (1963).
" N.C. GEI. STAT. § 136-67 (1958), provides in part: "All those portions
of the public road system of the State which have not been taken over and
placed under maintenance or which have been abandoned by the State High-
way Commission, but which remain open and in general use as a necessary
means of ingress to and egress from the dwelling house of one or more
families, ... and all other roads and streets ... outside of the boundaries of
any incorporated city or town in the State which serve a public use and
as a means of ingress or egress for one or more families.., are hereby de-
clared to be neighborhood public roads...."
'Pritchard v. Scott, 254 N.C. 277, 118 S.E.2d 890 (1961); Smith v.
Moore, 254 N.C. 186, 118 S.E.2d 436 (1961); Carver v. Leatherwood, 230
N.C. 96, 52 S.E.2d 1 (1949); 1 MoRDEcAI's LA w LECTUREs 466 (2d ed.
1916); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 793 (3d ed. 1939).
" Pritchard v. Scott, 254 N.C. 277, 118 S.E.2d 890 (1961).
" Pritchard v. Scott, 254 N.C. 277, 282, 283, 118 S.E.2d 890, 895 (1961).
Professor Mordecai said, "It is the duty and right of the vendor to select the
route; but, if he fails to point it out, the vendee may select; and after select-
ing it he must stick to it." 1 MORDECAI, op. cit. supra note 11, at 466.
"Pritchard v. Scott, 254 N.C. 277, 283, 118 S.E.2d 890, 895 (1961).
a N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-67 to -69 (1958).
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pensation must be made by the petitioner to the owner of the land
across whose land the cartway is laid out by a jury of view appointed
by the clerk, as in any condemnation proceeding.
DEEDS-MARRIED WOMEN-HUSBAND'S JOINDER
In Cruthis v. Steele, 5 a wife attempted to convey her real prop-
erty to her children. She was not joined in the deed by her hus-
band. 6 The Court held that since the wife was not joined by her
husband, the deed was void, and since there was no consideration
for this deed it could not be enforced as a valid contract to convey.'
7
DEEDS-REGISTRATION
A executed a timber deed to B. B signed and sealed a statement
on the back of the timber deed to the effect that he did "hereby trans-
fer this deed in its entirety ' mlla to C. A's deed to B was recorded
with B's endorsement thereon. In New Home Bldg. Supply Co. v.
Nations,'8 the Court held that the endorsement was sufficient as be-
tween the parties to pass title in that it was under seal, containing
operative words of conveyance and identified by reference the prop-
erty conveyed.' 9 Since the endorsement had not been acknowledged,
' 259 N.C. 701, 131 S.E.2d 344 (1963).
1 0N.C. CONST. art. X, § 6 has now been amended to eliminate the require-
ment of the joinder of the husband. N.C. SEss. LAWS 1963, ch. 1209, § 1.
This amendment was passed at the last general election held in January,
1964. N.C. SEss. LAws 1963, ch. 1209, § 4Y provides: "In the event that a
majority of the voters in such general election be in favor of the amendments
heretofore provided for, North Carolina G.S. 52-4 shall be repealed and said
repeal shall be effective on the date the Governor certifies the amendments
to the Secretary of State." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-4 (1950), was the statutory
requirement that the husband's joinder was necessary in his wife's deed of
her real property when conveying to persons other than her husband.
"Noted in 42 N.C.L. REv. 229 (1963).
"" New Home Bldg. Supply Co. v. Nations, 259 N.C. 681, 682, 131 S.E.2d
425, 426 (1963).
18 259 N.C. 681, 131 S.E.2d 425 (1963).
"o A deed must have a grantor, a grantee and a thing conveyed. Powell v.
Powell, 168 N.C. 561, 84 S.E. 860 (1915). It must be sealed. Ballard v.
Ballard, 230 N.C. 629, 55 S.E.2d 316 (1949). In Tunstall v. Cobb, 109 N.C.
316, 14 S.E. 28 (1891), and in Linker v. Long, 64 N.C. 296 (1870), similar
endorsements were used but a seal was not used in either case. It was held
in both cases that since a seal was not used, they could not be operative as
deeds but if supported by a valuable consideration could be enforced by
specific performance. In Thomason v. Bescher, 176 N.C. 622, 626, 97 S.E.
654, 655 (1918), the Court said that in equity causes the Court will usually
refuse aid except when there is a valuable consideration. In Cruthis v.
Steele, 259 N.C. 701, 131 S.E.2d 344 (1963), the Court held that a void deed
1964]
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the Court held that there had been no registration which would con-
stitute notice to B's creditors.2
It would seem to follow from this case that as the law now
stands, a grantor could take the instrument whereby he received title
to property, place an adequate endorsement on that deed, sign, seal
and acknowledge it, and the "deed" would not only be operative to
pass title as between the parties, but when properly registered, con-
stitute notice to third parties. 1
DEDICATION OF STREETS
In Owens v. Elliott22 a tract of land outside the city limits was
subdivided into lots and a street was laid off on the ground. A map
showing the lots and the street was recorded and lots were sold
with reference to the map. Plaintiffs purchased a lot outside the
subdivision and built a house facing the opened street. The de-
fendant closed the street. The Court held that the purchasers of a
lot located outside the boundaries of the subdivision acquired no
right to have the street kept open since the revocable offer to dedi-
cate had not been accepted by the proper public authorities.
The owners of property within a subdivision have a right to
have a street kept open as a matter of personal covenant between them
and the developer.23 However, it would seem to follow from this
decision that no rights are acquired by members of the public who
are outside the subdivision, 4 until such time as there has been an
could not be enforced as a contract to convey since there was no consideration
for the deed.
"0 McClure v. Crow, 196 N.C. 657, 146 S.E. 713 (1929).
"S N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-18 (Supp. 1963). The recording of a deed is
essential to its validity only as against creditors and purchasers for a val-
uable consideration. E.g., Ballard v. Ballard, 230 N.C. 629, 55 S.E.2d 316
(1949). No notice is binding upon them except registration of the deed.
Dula v. Parsons, 243 N.C. 32, 89 S.E.2d 797 (1955).
22 258 N.C. 314, 128 S.E.2d 583 (1962). For a complete discussion of all
aspects of this case see 41 N.C.L. REv. 875 (1963).
O wens v. Elliott, 257 N.C. 250, 125 S.E.2d 589 (1962). In Hughes v.
Clark, 134 N.C. 457, 46 S.E. 956 (1904), it was held that where the deeds
conveying lots referred to a map, the purchasers rights were not affected by
the acceptance or nonacceptance of the dedication.
2" In Bailliere v. Atlantic Shingle, Cooperage & Veneer Co., 150 N.C. 627,
637, 64 S.E. 754, 758 (1909), the Court said that our decisions were in
harmony with the uniform current of the authorities in holding that when lots
are sold with reference to a map in which streets are laid out, it constitutes
a dedication of the streets to the use of the purchaser and the public. In
Chesson v. Jordan, 224 N.C. 289, 291, 29 S.E.2d 906, 908 (1944), the modern
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acceptance of the street by the proper public authorities. As to those
persons who are outside the subdivision, it would be a mere offer
to dedicate, and until acceptance by the proper authorities, the owner
would have the power of revoking the dedication. According to
the decision in this case, this would be true even though such a mem-
ber of the public has acquired and improved adjoining lands in re-
liance upon the apparent dedication of the street.
25
EXECUTION-JUDICIAL SALES
In Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. Forbes,2 6 X, in reliance on
statements that the proceeds of an execution sale would be applied
in the discharge of prior liens and that he would receive an unen-
cumbered title, bid the market price for the property. On discover-
ing his mistake, he took an assignment of the judgment, withdrew
the execution and secured a refund of his deposit by order of the
Judge of the Superior Court. All of this was done before confirma-
tion of the sale by the clerk. 7 The Court held that before a sale
is confirmed a court of equity has the power to set aside a judicial
sale when the price bid is inadequate or excessive, since before con-
firmation neither the high bidder nor the judgment debtor acquire
any rights by virtue of the execution sale.
This does not mean a purchaser would be at liberty to withdraw
his bid2 nor that the doctrine of caveat emptor2 0 would not apply,
view is stated: "According to the current of decisions in this court there can
be in this State no public road or highway unless it be one either established
by public authorities in a proceeding regularly instituted before the proper
tribunal; or one generally used by the public and over which the public au-
thorities have asserted control for the period of twenty years or more; or one
dedicated to the public by the owner of the soil with the sanction of the
authorities and for the maintenance and operation of which they are re-
sponsible."
" Many dedications are sustained solely on the ground of estoppel in such
a case. 3 AMERICAN, op cit. supra note 2, § 12.133.
28258 N.C. 426, 128 S.E.2d 875 (1963). This case is discussed in CREDIT
TRANSACTIONS, Execution Sales, supra.
27 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-399.67 (1953), provides: "No sale of real property
may be consummated until the sale is confirmed by the clerk of the superior
court. No order of confirmation may be made until the time for submitting
an upset bid, pursuant to G.S. 1-339.65, has expired." The bargain is not
complete until the judicial sanction of the Court by confirmation. Miller v.
Feezor, 82 N.C. 192 (1880).
8 In the Matter of Yates, 59 N.C. 213 (1861).
" "While the doctrine of caveat emptor applies to purchasers at execu-
tion sales, it does not tie the hands of the court to prevent a manifest in-
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but only that until the time of the confirmation, the sale would be up
for scrutiny by the Court, both in the respect of the adequacy or ex-
cessiveness of the bid.30
FUTURE INTERESTS-R uLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
In Poindexter v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,"1 T left property
to the bank as trustee for her son for life, then to his issue, and if he
left no issue, then to testatrix's brothers and sisters then living.
The Court pointed out that if the word "issue" is used in its strict
technical sense it will violate the rule against perpetuities3 2 unless
something in the context or circumstances show the word "issue"
is used in a limited sense as meaning issue living at a date within the
rule.33 In this case the limitation over upon failure of issue was to
"my brothers'and sisters that is living and have led a sober and good
life in every way. 'saaa The Court concluded that the testatrix could
not have meant an indefinite succession of lineal descendants. Also,
a former will indicated that the ultimate disposition of the property
should be determined as the time of the death of the son. 4
The Court made no mention of G.S. § 41-4. This statute pro-
justice not due to the fault or neglect of the purchaser." Pittsburgh Plate
Glass Co. v. Forbes, 258 N.C. 426, 429, 128 S.E.2d 875, 878 (1963).
" In Harrell v. Blythe, 140 N.C. 415, 416, 53 S.E. 232 (1906), the Court
said by way of dictum: "[A] court certainly has the power to set aside a
sale made in pursuance of its authority, either for the relief of the owner of
the property if the price be inadequate, or for the relief of the purchaser if
from mistake or fraud he has been induced to bid too much for the same."
In First Carolina's Joint-Stock Land Bank v. Stewart, 208 N.C. 139, 179
S.E. 463 (1935), the Court held that a foreclosure could not be collaterally
attacked after confirmation of the sale, and that equitable defenses should
have been raised before confirmation by the clerk. In RORER, JUDICIAL SALES§ 1081, at 404 (2d ed. 1878), it is provided: "The court upon whose judgment
the execution issues has full power to set aside an execution sale whenever
the ends of justice and fair dealing require it, and to order a resale, or award
execution anew, at discretion."
31258 N.C. 371, 128 S.E.2d 867 (1963).
E ledge v. Parrish, 224 N.C. 397, 30 S.E.2d 314 (1944) ; Edmondson v.
Leigh, 189 N.C. 196, 126 S.E. 497 (1925); Albright v. Albright, 172 N.C.
351, 90 S.E. 303 (1916).
" In Turpin v. Jarrett, 226 N.C. 135, 136, 37 S.E.2d 124, 126 (1946), the
Court said that in order "to determine the effectiveness of the limitation over
the roll must be called as of the death of the first taker."
83a 258 N.C. at 374, 128 S.E.2d at 870.
"258 N.C. at 377, 128 S.E.2d at 872. Quaere: Was this proper since they
were following the common law rule which says that the contrary intention
must appear on the face of the will? This question need not have arisen if
G.S. § 41-4 had been applied.
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vides that a limitation over on death without issue in a deed or will
means without issue living at the death of the first taker, and, there-
fore, the limitation over is not within the rule against perpetuities
unless a contrary intention expressly and plainly appears in the face
of the deed or will creating it.5 The common law rule used by the
Court was that the word "issue" meant an indefinite failure of lineal
descendants, and, therefore, a limitation over to issue was void for
remoteness, unless a contrary intention appeared on the face of the
deed or will being construed.36 Application of G.S. § 41-4 would
have made such a finding unnecessary. The statute cured the defect
in the common law37 and established a new rule of construction."
If the Court had applied this statute it would have made the limita-
tion over read to the issue of the first taker living at the time of his
death, and, therefore, not void for remoteness, as a contrary inten-
tion did not expressly and plainly appear on the face of the will. Not
only would application of G.S. § 41-4 have eased the Court's task,
its application has been held mandatory although overlooked in some
cases.
89
The Court reiterated the change made in our law as to trusts and
the rule against perpetuities." It was formerly held by the
Court that in order for a trust for private purposes not to fall under
the rule against perpetuities, it must terminate within twenty-one
years and ten lunar months after a life or lives in being at the time
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41-4 (1950), provides: "Every contingent limitation
in any deed or will, made to depend upon the dying of any person without
heir or heirs of the body, or without issue or issues of the body, or without
children, or offspring, or descendant, or other relative, shall be held and
interpreted a limitation to take effect when such person dies not having such
heir, or issue, or child, or offspring, or descendant, or other relative (as the
case may be) living at the time of his death, or born to him within ten lunar
months thereafter, unless the intention of such limitation be otherwise, and
expressly and plainly declared in the face of the deed or will creating it ......
" Cabarrus Bank & Trust Co. v. Finlayson, 286 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1961).
7 Id. at 253.
:8 Id. at 255.
'Patterson v. McCormick, 177 N.C. 448, 99 S.E. 401 (1919), held that
this rule is obligatory on the courts and must be observed in all cases. The
rule has not been applied in some cases, e.g., Elledge v. Parrish, 224 N.C.
397, 30 S.E.2d 314 (1944); Edmondson v. Leigh, 189 N.C. 196, 126 S.E.
497 (1925). The Court said in Cabarrus Bank & Trust Co. v. Finlayson, 286
F.2d 251, 255 (4th Cir. 1961), that the most recent decision applying the rule
before the Cabarrus case was House v. House, 231 N.C. 218, 56 S.E.2d 695(1949).
'4 258 N.C. at 378, 128 S.E.2d at 873.
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
of the creation of the trust.4 The principle now is that as long as the
estates will vest in interest within the rule, the length of the trust
will be immaterial.42
PARTITION
In Allen v. Allen,43 commissioners appointed by the clerk4 3a made
an actual partition of a trust of land owned by the parties as tenants
in common, in pursuant to G.S. 46-10. 4' Their report was affirmed
by the clerk and an appeal was taken to the Superior Court where
the trial judge set aside the report and made a new division by alter-
ing the boundary lines.
The Court held that the judge could make only such order as
could be made by the clerk45 and since the clerk could not make the
" Mercer v. Mercer, 230 N.C. 101, 52 S.E.2d 229 (1949); American Trust
Co. v. Williamson, 228 N.C. 458, 46 S.E.2d 104 (1948) ; Springs v. Hopkins,
171 N.C. 486, 88 S.E. 774 (1916); GRAY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES
§201 (4th ed. 1942).
" Finch v. Honeycutt, 246 N.C. 91, 97 S.E.2d 478 (1957) ; McQueen v.
Branch Banking & Trust Co., 234 N.C. 737, 68 S.E.2d 831 (1952).
In the course of its opinion, the Court used the statement: "A vested
estate is transmittable, a contingent estate is not." 258 N.C. at 376-77, 128
S.E.2d at 872. It appears that this is rather broad statement which would
not be true in all cases. A contingent estate is devisable or transmissable
unless survivorship is a condition precedent to the vesting of the estate. In
Seawell v. Cheshire, 241 N.C. 629, 86 S.E.2d 256 (1955), the Court said that
where the estate is not dependent upon their surviving the first taker, the
contingent remaindermen take a transmissible estate, and upon the death of
the contingent remaindermen prior to the death of the first taker without
children then surviving, the estate goes to the heirs, next of kin and suc-
cessors of interest of the contingent remaindermen. Pearson, C.J., said in
Mastin v. Marlow, 65 N.C. 695, 703 (1871): "[A] contingent remainder
... is transmissible by descent... and.., it may be devised .... " In SMITH,
R.AL PROPERTY SURVEY 146 (1956), it is stated that both vested and con-
tingent remainders are descendible and devisable. A possibility of reverter,
power of termination, contingent remainder and an executory interest are
descendible and devisable. Id. at 153. "Of course, no interest is alienable ex-
cept by one identifiable and qualified to convey." Id. at 154. In MOYNIHIAN,
REAL PROPERTY § 23 at 137 (1962), it is said: "The courts agree that con-
tingent remainders are releasable, and they are devisable and descendible
subject to the contingency inhering in the interest."
" 258 N.C. 305, 128 S.E.2d 385 (1962).
... N.C. GEN. STAT. § 46-1 (1950), provides that a partition of lands held
by tenants in common shall be made by virtue of a special proceeding. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 46-7 (1950), provides: "The superior court shall appoint three
disinterested commissioners to divide and apportion such real estate...."
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §46-10 (1950), provides: "The commissioners...
must meet on the premises and partition the same among the tenants, accord-
ing to their respective rights and interests therein, by dividing the land into
equal shares in point of value as nearly as possible.. .."
" When a civil action or special proceeding instituted before the clerk is
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partition himself,46 the judge could not do so as it was within the sole
province of the commissioners. 7
SURFACE WATERS
P owned two lots at Nags Head. D built an elevated highway
between P's property and the sound which acted as a dam obstruct-
ing the flow of water which came over the dunes lines in times of
storms from going on into the sound. The water thus blocked by the
highway inundated P's property. The Court held in Midgett v.
North Carolina State Highway Comnnv11,48 that although no cases
could be found involving overflow waters from an ocean, sea or
gulf, despite an exhaustive search, the same principles which apply
to surface waters from inland streams should apply.
It is a well established principle of law in North Carolin 9 that
where tracts join each other, the lower tracts are burdened with an
easement to receive the surface waters flowing naturally from the
upper tracts, but the owner of an upper tract cannot divert the water
so as to cause it to flow onto lower land in a different manner or in
a different place from which it would naturally flow.50
sent to the superior court, the judge has the authority to consider and deter-
mine the matter as if originally before him. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-276 (1953).
Woody v. Barnett, 235 N.C. 73, 68 S.E.2d 810 (1952) ; Plemmons v. Cutshall,
230 N.C. 595, 55 S.E.2d 74 (1949).
" In the case of Langley v. Langley, 236 N.C. 184, 185, 72 S.E.2d 235,
236 (1952), the Court said: "While in a partition proceeding... the clerk
may (1) recommit the report for correction or further consideration, or
(2) vacate the report and direct a reappraisal by the same commissioners,
or (3) vacate the report, discharge the commissioners, and appoint new com-
missioners to view the premises and make partition thereof, he is without
authority to alter the report filed either by changing the division lines or by
enlarging or decreasing the owelty charge assessed by the commissioners."
(Emphasis added.)
"In Skinner v. Carter, 108 N.C. 106, 12 S.E. 908 (1891), the Court
pointed out that the commissioners were to make the divisions, but if in the
opinion of the clerk or the judge, the report was not fair or equitable, it could
be set aside with directions either that the commissioners make a re-allotment
or that other commissioners be appointed to do so.
'8 260 N.C. 241, 132 S.E.2d 599 (1963). This case is discussed in EMINENT
DOMAIN, supra.
" North Carolina follows the civil-law rule and has not recognized and
does not apply the common-enemy doctrine with reference to surface waters.
The common-enemy doctrine, in its strict application is that surface waters are
a common enemy and any landowner has an unqualified right by operations
on his own land to fend off surface waters as he sees fit without regard to
the consequences to other landowners. Midgett v. North Carolina State High-
way Comm'n, 260 N.C. 241, 245, 132 S.E.2d 599, 603-04 (1963).
" Chappell v. Winslow, 258 N.C. 617, 129 S.E.2d 101 (1963); Braswell
1964]
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The Court would seem to be correct in its reasoning that the
overflow of ocean waters would become surface waters when they
leave the main current in such a way as not to return. It would
necessarily follow then, as pointed out by the Court, that the plaintiff,
as the owner of an upper estate, would have an easement or servitude
in the lower tract for the drainage of this surface water, and would
be entitled to have it flow in its natural course and manner without
obstruction by the owner of a lower tract.?°
TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETY
G.S. §§ 35-14 to -17 provide a method of procedure for the
mortgage or sale of estates held by the entireties where one spouse
or both are mentally incompetent. If it becomes necessary or desirable
for property held by a husband and wife as tenants by the entirety
to be mortgaged or sold, the mentally competent spouse and/or the
guardian of the mentally incompetent spouse may file a petition with
the clerk of the superior court.51 The clerk is given by statute the
power to authorize the execution of a mortgage, deed of trust, deed
or other conveyance of such property if he finds the same is necessary
or to the best advantage of the parties, and not prejudicial to the
interest of the mentally incompetent spouseY2 Any instrument exe-
cuted under such authority would be valid to the same extent as if
both husband and wife were mentally capable of executing a con-
veyance." G.S. § 35-17 provides that "it shall be competent for the
court, in its discretion, to direct the application of funds arising from
a sale or mortgage of such property in such manner as may appear
necessary or expedient for the protection of the interest of the
mentally incompetent spouse."'54
In Perry v. Joy 55 petitioner instituted a special proceeding
against his incompetent wife's guardian for the purpose of having
the Court authorize a private sale of lands held by him and his wife
as tenants by the entirety. The petition alleged that the income
from the rental of the property was insufficient to provide for the
v. State Highway & Public Works Comm'n, 250 N.C. 508, 108 S.E.2d 912
(1959).
'o 260 N.C. at 247, 132 S.E.2d at 605.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §35-14 (1950).
' Ibid.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-16 (1950).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-17 (1950).
r 259 N.C. 306, 130 S.E.2d 654 (1963).
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expense of his wife's constant care and attention, and for the living
expenses of the petitioner. The Clerk of the Superior Court found
that the sale would be in the best interest of the incompetent and
directed that the proceeds of the sale be paid one-half to petitioner and
one-half to the guardian of the incompetent wife. The Supreme Court
on its own motion raised the question as to the proceeds of the sale
and held that the sale would not destroy or separate the interests
of the tenants by the entirety when one of the parties was incompetent,
but that the right of survivorship would be transferred to the fund
and the husband would hold the corpus as trustee for the survivor.
Tenancy by the entirety originated from the common law when
the husband and wife were considered but one person, and each is
deemed seised of the whole. 6 The proceeds derived from the sale
of land held as a tenancy by the entirety are personalty and belong
to the husband and wife as tenants in common rather than with the
right of survivorship.57 However, the Court said in Perry that this
would only apply when it was a voluntary sale by both parties.
Quaere: Would the test of "voluntariness" have any real relevance to
this situation wherein the sale can only be had by regular judicial
proceeding58 based upon a judicial finding that it is necessary or to
the best interest of the incompetent, so that the guardian in a trust
relationship of the highest character59 acts for someone who is un-
able to act for himself? If the land is sold in the best interest of the
incompetent, then it would seem to follow the Court could in its
discretion direct that the fund be used in the best interest of the in-
competent. The Court seems to be interpreting the legislative act6"
"Lanier v. Dawes, 255 N.C. 458, 121 S.E.2d 857 (1961); Carter v.
Continental Ins. Co., 242 N.C. 578, 89 S.E.2d 122 (1955); Davis v. Bass,
188 N.C. 200, 124 S.E. 566 (1924).
"Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947). Our Court has
repeatedly held that a tenancy by the entirety may exist only in land and not
in personal property of any kind. E.g., Bowling v. Bowling, 243 N.C. 515,
91 S.E.2d 176 (1956); Wilson v. Ervin, 227 N.C. 396, 42 S.E.2d 468 (1947);
Winchester-Simmons Co. v. Cutler, 194 N.C. 698, 140 S.E. 622 (1927). See
generally, Lee, Tenancy by the Entirety in North Carolina, 41 N.C.L. REv.
67 (1962).
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-14 to -17 (1950); Smith v. Moore, 178 N.C.
370, 100 S.E. 702 (1919).
"' Owens v. Hines, 227 N.C. 236, 41 S.E.2d 739 (1947); Adams v. Adams,
212 N.C. 337, 193 S.E. 661 (1937).
"°N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 35-14 to -18 (1950), provide a method of procedure
to be followed where one spouse or both are mentally incompetent and it be-
comes, necessary or desirable to mortgage or sell land held by them as tenants
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as being ineffective to go the full way and separate the fund from the
incidents of survivorship after a sale by judicial proceeding.
It appears that the only changes made by statute relative to the
incidents of survivorship are when one spouse murders the other,"'
when it cannot be determined which spouse died first, 2 and when
one of the tenants is presumed to be dead and so declared by statutory
provision.03 It may be that additional legislation is needed to spe-
cifically provide that a court could in its discretion abolish the rights
of survivorship in a fund derived from the sale of a tenancy by the
entirety if it was found to be in the best interest of the incompetent.
SALES
AUTOMOBILES-CETIFICATES OF TITLE
In Home Indem. Co. v. West Trade Motors, Inc.' a used car
dealer sold and delivered an automobile to one Bradshaw, who paid
for it with money borrowed the same day from Smart Finance Co.
The dealer executed an assignment on the reverse side of the title
certificate, and Bradshaw executed a purchaser's application for a
new certificate of title. By agreement with Bradshaw the dealer
delivered these two instruments to Smart Finance Co., which had
possession of them at all times hereinafter mentioned. More than
a month later Bradshaw, while operating the automobile, was in a
collision with one Crockett, who asserts that at the time of the col-
lision title to the automobile was still in the dealer and that there-
fore the dealer's insurance carrier is liable to him. The Court held
that there was no such liability.
The Court noted that under G.S. § 20-73 the burden is on the
transferee of a motor vehicle to present the title certificate and make
application for a new certificate to the Department of Motor Ve-
hicles within twenty days, and that under G.S. § 20-742 when, as in
by the entirety. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 35-17 (1950), provides that the court
may direct the application of the funds "in such manner as may appear
necessary or expedient for the protection of the interest of the mentally
incompetent spouse."
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31A-5 (Supp. 1963).02N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-161.3 (1950).
83N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-197.1 (Supp. 1963).
1258 N.C. 647, 129 S.E.2d 248 (1962). This case is discussed in IN-
SuJANCE, Automobile Liabzity Insurance, supra.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. 20-74 (Supp. 1963), makes it the duty of the purchaser
to see that the application for a transfer of title is sent in to the department.
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the instant case, the certificate of title is delivered to a lien holder,
it is still the duty of the purchaser to see that the certificate is
forwarded to the Department. The Court held that these provisions
do not prevent title from passing so far as the dealer reselling to a
purchaser is concerned. He had complied with the statute by giving
the duly endorsed title certificate and Bradshaw's application for
a new certificate to Smart Finance Co. There is nothing in the
statute, according to the Court, which suggests that the dealer
should be penalized and held liable because of the failure of Brad-
shaw, the buyer, to perform his statutory duty.
WARRANTY
The Court has recently considered a significant case involving
warranty in the sale of goods.' In Murray v. Bensen Aircraft
Corp.,5 plaintiff, a resident of California, purchased an aircraft
known as a "gyro-glider" from the defendant-manufacturer, a North
Carolina corporation. Plaintiff was injured when the aircraft failed
to function properly. This action for damages was instituted al-
leging negligence in the manufacture and design of the machine,
and breach of warranty. The defendant demurred to the com-
plaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer as to the action for
breach of warranty, but overruled it as to the action for negligence.
The Court affirmed.
Warranty implies a contractual relation between the party
making it and the beneficiary of it, and absent privity of contract
there can be no recovery for a breach thereof,6 unless the warrantor
addressed the warranty to the ultimate consumer or user.7 A
The Court in Community Credit Co. v. Norwood, 257 N.C. 87, 90, 125
S.E.2d 369, 371 (1962), stated: "The vesting of title ii deferred until the
purchaser has the old certificate endorsed to him and makes application for
a new certificate." In the instant case, the Court distinguished Norwood
on the ground that it did not involve rights as between the vendor and vendee
of a vehicle.
'A second case involving warranty, heard last term, was Perfecting
Serv. Co. v. Product Develop. & Sales Co., 259 N.C. 400, 131 S.E.2d 9
(1963), which is discussed under CREDIT TRANSACTIONS, Warranty-Guar-
ranty, supra. There are numerous notes in earlier issues of the North Caro-
lina Law Review on the subject of warranty. Among the more recent ones
are 39 N.C.L. Rnv. 299 (1961); 39 N.C.L. REv. 86 (1960); and 37 N.C.L.
REv. 205 (1959).
259 N.C. 638, 131 S.E.2d 367 (1963). This case is discussed in CIvn.
PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES), Demurrer-Dismissal or Amendment,
supra.
o Thomason v. Ballard & Ballard Co., 208 N.C. 1, 179 S.E. 30 (1935).
Simpson v. American Oil Co., 217 N.C. 542, 8 S.E.2d 813 (1940).
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stranger to the contract of warranty may sue the manufacturer
only on a theory of negligence.'
The plaintiff in the principal case failed to allege where, when
and from whom he purchased the gyro-glider. He therefore did
not allege contractual privity giving rise to a cause of action in his
favor on the warranty. But he may maintain the suit on a theory
of negligence.
TAXATION
APPORTIONMENT OF TAX BURDEN
In Cornwell v. Huffman,1 the Court was presented with the
problem of whether to apportion the estate and inheritance taxes
among the properties creating the tax liability. In 1937, Mrs.
Cornwell and her mother, Mrs. Huffman, conveyed some stocks
and a 5,000 dollar note in trust. The property so transferred was
owned one-third by Mrs. Huffman and two-thirds by Mrs. Cornwell.
At the time of the conveyance, the properties had a value of 190,000
dollars. The trust agreement provided for a 6,000 dollar annual
distribution to Mrs. Huffman from the trust income, and after that
distribution, 1,000 dollars of income was to be paid annually to
Mrs. Cornwell. If the securities yielded more than 7,000 dollars
annually, the next 2,000 dollars was to be divided equally between
Mrs. Cornwell and Mrs. Huffman. Any yield in excess of 9,000
dollars was to be invested and added to the principal so as to guar-
antee Mrs. Huffman an annual income of 6,000 dollars for her
life. The principal was not subject to change during the life of Mrs.
Huffman, but the income provisions could be modified by unanimous
agreement of the grantors and trustees. The trust was to terminate
on the death of Mrs. Huffman, and if Mrs. Cornwell was living at
that time, she was to become sole owner of the trust property. How-
ever, if Mrs. Cornwell died before Mrs. Huffman, the trust property
was to be paid to the children of Mrs. Cornwell per capita on the
death of Mrs. Huffman.
Mrs. Cornwell died testate before her mother, Mrs. Huffman,
and left a probate estate of 790,000 dollars. The date of death value
' Caudle v. F. M. Bohannon Tobacco Co., 220 N.C. 105, 16 S.E.2d 680
(1941); Enloe v. Charlotte Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 208 N.C. 305, 180 S.E.
582 (1935). These rules are in accord with the weight of American
authority. See Annot., 75 A.L.R. 2d 39 (1961).
1258 N.C. 363, 128 S.E.2d 798 (1963).
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of the trust property to be included in her estate for tax purposes was
over 2,000,000 dollars. Thus, the probate estate would be exhausted
if it was used to pay the taxes.
When Mrs. Cornwell's will was executed, it was uncertain who
would survive-Mrs. Cornwell or her mother, Mrs. Huffman-so
the testatrix attempted in the will to provide for carrying of the
tax burden in either case. The will stipulated that in the event Mrs.
Cornwell survived her mother, and the trust properties became hers
to pass under the will, then the taxes were to be paid out of the
residuary estate; on the other hand, if the mother, Mrs. Huffman,
survived Mrs. Cornwell, and the trust property was never subject
to Mrs. Cornwell's disposition, the taxes,
which are levied upon the property passing under this will
shall be paid out of my residuary estate as if the property pass-
ing under this will constituted my entire estate for the purpose of
such taxes, and that all the remainder of such taxes shall be paid
out of the principal of the said trust which does not pass under
this will.
2
The Court held that an apportionment of the taxes as directed
by the will was proper. Earlier North Carolina cases' to the effect
the residuary estate is liable for taxes without contribution were
distinguished because in the principal case there was an express
provision in the will directing an apportionment.
ESTATE TAX
In First Nat'l Bank v. Melvin,4 the widow dissented from her
husband's will. The will provided that all estate and inheritance
taxes were to be paid out of the residuary estate. It was held that
the widow's one-half share of the net estate was to be estimated be-
fore any tax deductions. The Court relied on G.S. § 30-3 (a)
which provides:
Upon dissent... the surviving spouse.., shall take the same
share of the deceased spouse's real and personal property as if
the deceased had died intestate; provided, that if the deceased
2258 N.C. at 366, 128 S.E.2d at 798.
2 Craig v. Craig, 232 N.C. 729, 62 S.E.2d 336 (1950); Buffaloe v. Barnes,
226 N.C. 313, 38 S.E.2d 222 (1946). In Craig, the Court first used the
statement, "no contrary testamentary provision appear[ing] in the will"
which the Court in the principal case relied on as the distinguishing factor.
232 N.C. at 730, 62 S.E.2d at 336 (1950).
'259 N.C. 255, 130 S.E.2d 387 (1963). This case is discussed in WILLS
AND ADMINIsTRATION, Dissent-Effect on Administration, infra.
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spouse is not survived by a child or children, or any lineal de-
scendants of a deceased child or children, or by a parent, the
surviving spouse shall receive only one half of the deceased
spouse's net estate... which one half shall be estimated and de-
termined before any federal estate tax is deducted or paid and
shall be free and clear of such tax.6
The above statute was passed apparently to overrule the effect of
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Gree 6 on this point-the Green
case holding that where a widow dissented from the will, her one-
half interest was to be computed after payment of the federal estate
tax. In Green, as in the principal case, the widow's share was, by
intestacy, one-half of the net estate. However, the statute's express
terms would not apply in a case in which the surviving spouse's share
was something other than one-half, as would be the case if the
testator was survived by two or more children. 7
It is suggested that there is no good reason for this statute not
to apply in all cases in which a spouse dissents from the will of a
deceased spouse, notwithstanding the fact that the dissenting spouse's
share is something other than one-half of the net estate. Thus, an
amendment to the present statute would seem to be proper in order
to cover such cases.
SALES TAx
In Sale v. Johnson,8 taxpayer brought suit to recover a sales tax
paid under protest. Petitioner was in the business of manufacture
and sale of chicken coops to farmers and others in the poultry
business. He alleged that the coops were used for packaging, de-
livery, and shipment of poultry by his customers. Taxpayer claimed
that these sales were exempt from the sales tax by virtue of G.S. §
105-164.13 (37) which exempts:
Sales of wrapping paper, labels ... coops and barrels.., sold
to manufacturers and retailers, when such materials are used
for packaging, shipment or delivery of tangible personal property
which is sold either at wholesale or retail or when such articles
constitute a part of the sale of such tangible personal property
and are delivered with it to the customer.9
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 30-3 (a) (Supp. 1963).
6236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.2d 879 (1953). See also 31 N.C.L. Rv. 491
(1953).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (2) (Supp. 1963).
8258 N.C. 749, 129 S.E.2d 465 (1963).
' N.C. GEN. § 105-164.13 (37) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
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The lower court held for the taxpayer, and on appeal the Court
reversed. Plaintiff contended that he need comply with only one
of the provisions in the statute in order to qualify for the exemption,
and that he came within it as the coops were "materials... used for
packaging, shipment or delivery of tangible personal property which
is either sold at wholesale or retail .... "
The Commissioner, on the other hand, contended that the last
requirement that exemption would be granted "when such articles
constitute a part of the sale of such tangible personal property and
are delivered with it to the customer" was controlling, and that the
petitioner did not allege facts sufficient to bring him within this
requirement and that, therefore, the petitioner did not qualify for
the exemption.
The Court found that the provision was ambiguous, and then
construed the two provisions to read as though joined by and instead
of or, thus requiring taxpayer to meet two tests instead of only one
of two alternatives. In support of its construction of the statute,
the Court relied heavily upon the rule of construction that exemp-
tions from taxation are never presumed and are to be strictly con-
strued,"° the legislative intent behind the statute,'" and the Com-
missioner's regulations.'"
VALUATION
In In Re Property of Pine Raleigh Corp.,3 petitioner's property
was appraised for tax purposes at over 600,000 dollars. However,
this property was the subject of a long term lease from petitioner to
a third party beginning January 1, 1952 and ending August 30,
1981, the annual rental being five and one-half per cent of the
lessee's gross sales. In the last eight years, the highest rent yield
from the property was 44,196 dollars. Petitioner requested that the
appraised value of the property be reduced to 400,000 dollars, taking
into consideration the long term lease.
Bragg Investment Co. v. Cumberland County, 245 N.C. 492, 96 S.E.2d
3411(1957). See I PAUL AND MERTINS § 3.30 (1934).
"258 N.C. at 757, 129 S.E.2d at 470.
The Court quoted from the Sales and Use Tax Regulations to the
effect that: "Items of tangible personal property ... are not subject to the
Sales or Use Tax . . . such itenis include containers for products sold,
wrapping twine and similar items which actually accompany delivery of the
tangible personal property sold." 258 N.C. at 756, 129 S.E.2d at 470.(Emphasis added.)18258 N.C. 398, 128 S.E.2d 855 (1963).
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The State Board affirmed the appraisal saying that it "did
carefully consider all pertinent facts and data in the above appeal." 4
During the course of the hearing, petitioner called the appraiser
employed by the county to appraise the property, and he testified that
at the time of the appraisal he did not know of the lease on the
property and the actual rentals being received by the petitioner, but
that "capitalization was taken into consideration in this particular
only on a comparable basis with other property in the vicinity."' 5
The Court construed G.S. § 105-295, the statute that instructs
assessors to consider income as a factor affecting value,', to mean
that income that could be obtained from a proper and efficient use
of the land. The Court pointed out that any other holding would
penalize the competent and diligent and reward the incompetent or
indolent.' The Court then stated: "If it appears that the income
actually received is less than the fair earning capacity of the prop-
erty, the earning capacity should be substituted as a factor rather
than the actual earnings. The fact-finding board can properly con-
sider both."'" This statement seems to sanction the elimination
altogether of the actual rent income as a factor in valuation. Ob-
viously, actual rental was given no weight since the original as-
sessment was affirmed, that assessment admittedly made without
consideration of income from the lease. This resulted in the equiva-
lent of not considering it at all in this particular case, and since it
clearly affects the value of the premises, seems to violate the terms
of G.S. § 105-295 requiring the assessor to consider all "factors
which may affect its value."
At another point, however, the Court made the statement, "If
petitioner's assertion is correct, the trial court should have allowed
its motion to remand.., and consider income as one of the elements
of value."'
The Court went on to hold that since petitioner had his witness
before the State Board testifying as to rental income, the Board in
reality had considered income as a factor. However, some of the
language used by the Court sheds doubt on whether this factor must
be considered at all.
1 258 N.C. at 400, 128 S.E.2d at 857.
Id. at 402, 128 S.E.2d at 858.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-295 (Supp. 1963).
17 258 N.C. at. 403, 128 S.E.2d at 859.
1 Ibid.
258 N.C. at 401, 128 S.E.2d at 857.
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It is submitted that even if the principal case requires at least
consideration of actual income as a factor, income is entitled to
much more weight than it was given. Rents produced by a long term
lease would surely have a drastic effect on the value of land in the
eyes of a prospective purchaser. Further, a literal construction of
the instant case would allow little consideration to be given to rents
from a long term lease made for a reasonable fixed rental at the
time, and then followed by a period of inflation. Surely, here the
decreased value of the land could hardly be attributed to the im-
providence of the lessor. In the principal case, the rent was a
percentage of the lessee's gross sales. This presents the very real
question of whether the low rents were a product of the lessor's
improvidence, as intimated by the Court, or of the unsuccessful
lessee.
TORTS
NEGLIGENCE
Characterization of the Action
Sometimes it is difficult to determine whether a particular
action sounds in tort or contract. The general rule in the United
States is that there will be liability in tort for misperformance of a
contract whenever there would be liability for gratuitous perform-
ance without the contract.' When an action is brought in such
cases, two difficult questions arise: (1) Has plaintiff in fact brought
the action in tort or in contract? Usually this is determined by the
pleadings. (2) If inconsistent rules of law apply to the two actions,
will he be permitted to elect as to which theory he will use, and
thus take advantage of the more favorable rule, or will the court
make the election for him ?'
In the past, North Carolina has usually allowed the party to
make the election.3 In Peele v. Hartsell,4 however, the Court made
the election for him. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant damaged
their house trailer while attempting to move it pursuant to a con-
'See PROSSER, TORTS § 81 (2d ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
Where only nonperformance is alleged, however, the remedy will usually be
limited to the action on the contract. Ibid.
'See generally PROSSER, SELECTED Topics ON THE LAW OF TORTS 407-15
(1954).
See, e.g., Causey v. Davis, 185 N.C. 155, 116 S.E. 401 (1923). See
generally 1 MCINTosH, N.C. PRACTicE & PROCEDURE § 1135 (2d ed. 1956).
'258 N.C. 680, 129 S.E.2d 97 (1963).
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tract; the complaint clearly indicated that the action was brought
on the theory that defendant had breached the contract. However,
in reversing a judgment of nonsuit entered at the close of plaintiffs'
evidence, the Court declared that "plaintiffs have misconstrued the
nature of the cause of action which they have stated. It is not in
contract but in tort."5 Declaring that this defect is immaterial in
view of the North Carolina rule that the relief to which plaintiffs
are entitled is determined by the evidence and not by the conclusions
of the pleader, the Court proceeded to hold that plaintiffs' evidence
was sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of whether defendant
had failed to exercise the common law duty to use due care to
protect the trailer.
This case may indicate that, in the future, the Court will tend
to look more closely at the essence of the claim rather than the theory
chosen by the plaintiff. Although in the principal case the plaintiff
is not prejudiced by the Court's finding that the breach of the con-
tract was not the gravamen of the action, such a refusal to permit an
election can have drastic procedural and substantive effects. For
example, if the action is held to be one on the contract, the plaintiff's
contributory negligence will not bar the action but will merely be
considered on the issue of damages.'
In a later case, Interstate Textile Equip. Co. v. SwinmMer,7 the
Court did not question plaintiff's election to sue in tort rather than
on the contract. Plaintiff, a dealer in textile machinery, contracted
with defendants, an insurance broker and his agency; the terms
of the contract required defendants to provide continuous insurance
coverage on plaintiff's machinery. Plaintiff sued on a theory of
negligence for damages caused by defendant's failure to have
insurance in effect when the machinery was destroyed by fire.
In affirming a judgment for plaintiff, the Court rejected defend-
ants' contention that certain instructions to the jury had imposed
an absolute contractual standard of conduct instead of the standard
of ordinary care, in effect converting a tort action into one for
breach of contract. In the major and final portion of his charge, the
trial court made no mention of ordinary care, but charged that one
Id. at 684, 129 S.E.2d at 99.
'See Elam v. Smithdale Realty & Ins. Co., 182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632
(1921), which held that plaintiff was entitled to sue an insurance agent for
breach of contract for failure to obtain the coverage requested and so avoid
the bar of contributory negligence.
1259 N.C. 69, 130 S.E.2d 6 (1963).
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element of actionable negligence was "the failure to perform the
duty which the defendants owed the plaintiff by the agreement .... "8
The Court held that, in view of the fact that a previous portion of
the charge had applied the ordinary care standard, no prejudicial
error was committed.
To support its holding, the Court cited Elam v. Smithdeal Realty
& Ins. Co.,. a case similar on its facts but pleaded and tried under
the breach of contract theory. In Elan the Court stated the rule
that, for breaches of duty involved in the contract of agency, the
principal may sue either for breach of contract for faithfulness or
in tort for a breach of duty imposed by the contract.10 However,
the Court there noted that tort liability of the insurance agent
arose because the law imposed upon him, "the duty, in the exercise
of reasonable care, to perform the duty he has assumed .... ."- It
could be plausibly argued that the Elam case supports defendants'
position that it was prejudicial in this tort action to leave the jury
with the uncorrected impression that the defendants might be found
guilty of negligence merely for failing to comply with the con-
tractual obligation to keep the insurance in force, without regard
to whether they exercised reasonable care in the circumstances.
Last Clear Chance
Under the doctrine of last clear chance, defendant may be held
liable in a negligence action despite plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence if, immediately prior to the harm, he had the superior op-
portunity, or last clear chance, to avoid it.'2 In North Carolina the
doctrine is based on the theory that defendant's negligent failure to
avoid the accident intervenes between plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence and the injury and thus becomes the direct and proximate
cause.' 8 But the real basis has been said to be the courts' dissatis-
8Id. at 73, 130 S.E.2d at 9.
182 N.C. 599, 109 S.E. 632 (1921).10Id. at 604, 109 S.E. at 634.
Id. at 602, 109 S.E. at 633 (Emphasis added.)
12 See generally PROSSER § 52.
"McMillan v. Home, 259 N.C. 159, 130 S.E.2d 52 (1963). The proxi-
mate cause rationale has been criticized by the text writers as not being in
accord with current ideas of proximate cause. It has been noted that in
an action by an innocent third party, the same act which is here called
contributory negligence would be regarded as a proximate cause of the
injury even when the last clear chance doctrine is in play. See 2 HARPER
& JAMES, ToRTs § 22.12 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMEs].
North Carolina cases applying the doctrine are discussed in 33 N.C.L. Rnv.
301 (1955); 16 N.C.L. Rv. 50 (1937); 5 N.C.L. REv. 58 (1926).
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faction with the defense of contributory negligence.' 4
Problems have arisen in the North Carolina cases involving the
doctrine, probably due to some imprecisely stated qualifications to
the rule. For example, the Court has stated in numerous cases that
the doctrine does not apply if plaintiff is guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law.' 5 However, these cases still inquire
into the issue of whether the defendant in fact had the last clear
chance. 6 It has been suggested by a federal court applying North
Carolina law that the real meaning of this statement is merely that
contributory negligence as a matter of law will bar recovery unless
defendant had the last clear chance.' 7
Another misleading qualification of the rule that has been an-
nounced by the Court is that the doctrine does not apply if the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff continues until the moment
of impact.' 8 Language to this effect was used in McMillan v.
Home, 9 in an action for damages allegedly caused by defendant's
negligent operation of her automobile, causing it to run over plain-
tiff, a pedestrian. On defendant's appeal from an adverse judgment,
the Court held that it was error to submit the issue of last clear
chance to the jury and remanded for entry of judgment denying
recovery because of the finding that plaintiff was contributorily
negligent. The basis of the holding is that the evidence indicated
that defendant did not see plaintiff in his position of peril and could
not have discovered him in the exercise of ordinary care in time to
have avoided the injury.
This is a correct result since the doctrine is not applicable unless
defendant had in fact a clear chance to avoid the injury. However,
the Court supports its holding with the statement that plaintiff's
contributory negligence continued until the moment of impact. If
such a limitation were actually imposed upon the doctrine, it would
greatly reduce its effectiveness, since the plaintiff's contributory
negligence is a continuing element in many, if not most, of the
cases in which the doctrine is applied. This fact was recognized
1 See PROSSER § 52.
See, e.g., Sherlin v. Southern Ry., 214 N.C. 222, 198 S.E. 640 (1938).
See generally 33 N.C.L. REv. 138 (1954).
18 See, e.g., Sherlin v. Southern Ry., supra note 15.
1 Cagle v. Norfolk So. Ry., 242 F.2d 405 (4th Cir. 1957).
18 See, e.g., Aydlett v. Keim, 232 N.C. 367, 61 S.E.2d 109 (1950); Ingram
v. Smoky Mountain Stages, Inc., 225 N.C. 444, 35 S.E.2d 337 (1945).
But cf. Redmon v. Southern Ry., 195 N.C. 764, 143 S.E. 829 (1928).
1 259 N.C. 159, 130 S.E.2d 52 (1963).
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in a prior case2" which held that it was proper to submit the last
clear chance issue to the jury even though the plaintiff's negligence
may have continued until the accident.
Apparently the "continuing negligence" exception to the doc-
trine is not an exception at all, but means merely that there must be
a sufficient interval between the time plaintiff's peril was or should
have been discovered and the moment of the accident, during which
time defendant did in fact have the last clear chance to avoid it."'
It would be desirable for the Court to discontinue using this lan-
guage, since it adds nothing but confusion to an already confusing
subject.
Scott v. Darden2= is an unusual case in that defendant, rather
than plaintiff, attempted to rely upon the last clear chance doctrine.
Plaintiff alleged that his driver was proceeding along a dominant
highway when he collided with defendant's truck, which allegedly
slowed but failed to stop at a stop sign before entering the main
road directly in front of plaintiff's vehicle. Defendant pleaded the
contributory negligence of plaintiff's driver, and further pleaded
that if defendant were negligent, plaintiff's recovery was barred be-
cause plaintiff's driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision.
In reversing a judgment of involuntary nonsuit entered at the close
of plaintiff's evidence, the Court held that plaintiff had not proved
himself out of court on the issue of contributory negligence. The
Court further held that plaintiff's evidence did not show as a matter
of law that his driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision
so as to hold plaintiff and his driver solely responsible for the col-
lision, and bar any recovery by plaintiff here.
The clear implication in this decision is that, given a proper
factual situation, the defendant as well as the plaintiff should be able
to use the last clear chance doctrine.23 This misconceives the nature
and purpose of the doctrine, which is a device to promote, rather than
hinder recovery. The reason for the confusion is probably that
20 Newbern v. Leary, 215 N.C. 134, 1 S.E.2d 384 (1939).
21 See Cagle v. Norfolk So. Ry., 242 F.2d 405 (4th Cir. 1957).
22259 N.C. 167, 130 S.E.2d 42 (1963).
2
'A small minority of courts ostensibly apply the doctrine to both plain-
tiff and defendant. E.g., Coble v. Georgia Motor Express, 62 Ga. App. 566,
8 S.E.2d 724 (1940); Heitman v. Davis, 127 Fla. 1, 172 So. 705 (1937).
It has been observed, however, that a close analysis of these decisions
reveals that the courts are merely allowing the defendant to invoke the
contributory negligence doctrine under another name. See Annot., 32
A.L.R.2d 543 (1953).
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the Court bases the doctrine on the theory of proximate cause, rather
than the policy of barring the defense of contributory negligence
when defendant has the superior opportunity to avoid the injury.
The use of the last clear chance doctrine by defendant clearly adds
nothing to the defense of contributory negligence, and the language
of this case suggesting the possibility of such use should be promptly
disavowed by the Court.
Release of One Joint Tortfeasor
North Carolina follows the general rule that a release of one
joint tortfeasor releases all the joint wrongdoers and is a bar to
a suit against any of them for the same injury;24 this is based upon
the theory that the injured party is entitled to but one satisfaction
and the release operates to extinguish the cause of action.25
By giving a covenant not to sue, rather than a release, however,
plaintiff may avoid the effect of having his cause of action against
the joint wrongdoers extinguished.2u In Simpson v. Plyler plain-
tiff executed a covenant not to sue in favor of one tortfeasor, pur-
suant to which a consent judgment was entered which recited the
covenant and decreed that the cause of action against the covenantee
should be terminated upon the payment of the agreed amount.
Satisfaction of the judgment was duly entered. Even though both
the consent judgment and the satisfaction thereof stipulated that
plaintiff's cause of action against the other tortfeasor was reserved,
plaintiff's action against the other tortfeasor was dismissed upon the
trial court's finding that the agreement, consent judgment, and
satisfaction operated to release defendant.
On appeal, the Court affirmed and held that, regardless of
whether the agreement was a release or a covenant not to sue, the
entry and satisfaction of the consent judgment barred and extin-
2 McFarland v. News & Observer Publishing Co., 260 N.C. 397, 132
S.E.2d 752 (1963).
" This rule has been roundly criticized by the text writers as being
based upon outmoded concepts of common law procedure. See, e.g., PROSSER
§ 46. The rule has been abolished in a few jurisdictions on the ground that
otherwise a deserving plaintiff may be barred by such a release even though
he has received for it far less than adequate compensation. See Breen v.
Peck, 28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958).
" Slade v. Sherrod, 175 N.C. 346, 95 S.E. 557 (1918).
27258 N.C. 390, 128 S.E.2d 843 (1963), 42 N.C.L. REv. 429 (1964).
This case is discussed in CIVIL PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIES),
Releases, supra and TRIAL PRACTICE, Judgments-Consent Judgment as
Waiver of Claim Against Joint Tortfeasor, infra.
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guished the cause of action. The Court further held that the inten-
tion of the parties, as expressed in the stipulations in the judgment
and satisfaction, does not govern in the face of the judgment termi-
nating the cause of action.2"
Standard of Care-Negligence of Physician
In Stone v. Proctor,2" plaintiff sued defendant psychiatrist for
negligently failing to discover that the first of a series of electro-
shock therapy treatments administered to plaintiff by defendant had
produced a fracture of plaintiff's vertebrae, although defendant had
been put on notice of the injury by plaintiff's complaints of severe
pain. At trial, the court refused to admit in evidence a section of the
Standards for Electroshock Treatment, approved by the American
Psychiatric Association, requiring an X-ray examination to de-
termine whether a patient complaining of pain after such treatment
had suffered accidental damage. Defendant's testimony concerning
the applicability of these standards to the local area was also ex-
cluded. On plaintiff's appeal from a judgment of involuntary
nonsuit, defendant urged that nonsuit was proper because plaintiff
had failed to call a specialist in psychiatry to testify as to the rele-
vant standard of care.3" The Court reversed, holding that plaintiff
should have been allowed to introduce the standards, since defendant
had acknowledged their authenticity and their applicability to the
local area. The Court held, without admitting the soundness of de-
fendant's contention that only the evidence of a fellow specialist is
sufficient to make out a case, that it overlooked the fact that the stand-
ards set by the American Psychiatric Association, with which de-
fendant was familiar and which he could have observed, specifically
required an X-ray examination under the circumstances of the case.
The evidence offered, in connection with that improperly excluded,
was held sufficient to go to the jury.
"
8Accord, Eberle v. Sinclair Prairie Oil Co., 120 F.2d 746 (10th Cir.
1941).
2 59 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963). This case is also discussed in
EVIDENCE, Evidence of Voluntarily Adopted Safety Code, supra.
"3 The Court set out the general rule in North Carolina as to a physi-
cian's civil liability as laid down in Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88
S.E.2d 762 (1955): "A physician... must meet these requirements: (1)
He must possess the degree of professional learning, skill and ability which
others similarly situated ordinarily possess; (2) he must exercise reasonable
care and diligence in the application of his knowledge and skill to the
patient's case; and (3) he must use his best judgment in the treatment and
care of his patient." Id. at 521, 88 S.E.2d at 765.
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Although the result reached in this case is undoubtedly sound,
the rationale underlying the decision is not entirely clear. The gen-
erally established rule in North Carolina is that expert testimony is
ordinarily required to establish the standard of care in such actions,
because appropriate medical procedures are usually outside the range
of common knowledge and experience. 1 Yet the Court apparently
regards this case as holding that the voluntary adoption by defendant
of safety standards established by experts in his field as the guide
to be followed for the protection of the public is at least some
evidence that a reasonably prudent person would adhere to their
requirements. 32 The Court could have prevented possible confusion
in this area had it based its holding expressly upon the theory that
defendant himself supplied the expert testimony required by the
North Carolina rule by testifying in effect that the procedure set out
in the standards was in accordance with approved medical practice.8
Many courts have held that the standard of care for physicians may
be so established."
Standard of Care-Violation of Administrative Safety Code
North Carolina has followed the general rule that a violation
of an administrative safety code, adopted and given the force and
"' See Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium & Asheville Agricultural School,
234 N.C. 222, 67 S.E.2d 57 (1951). Once such a standard is established,
departure therefrom may usually be shown by a non-expert witness. Ibid.
82 At least this is suggested by the citation of Stone to support the
holding in Wilson v. Lowe's Asheboro Hardware, Inc., 259 N.C. 660, 131
S.E.2d 501 (1963), that a violation by a manufacturer of a voluntarily
adopted industrial safety code is some evidence of negligence.
8 It is not clear whether North Carolina qualifies the standard of care
with respect to the locality of practice. In an early case, the Court held
that a dentist was not to be judged solely by what was approved practice in
the same neighborhood. McCracken v. Smathers, 122 N.C. 799, 29 S.E.
354 (1898). Later cases have held that the relevant standard of care is
what is in accord with "approved medical practice." See, e.g., Jackson v.
Mountain Sanitarium & Asheville Agricultural School, 234 N.C. 222, 67
S.E.2d 57 (1951). But see Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N.C. 259, 72 S.E.2d
589 (1952), where the Court suggested that the expert witness should be
asked whether the treatment was in conformity with approved medical prac-
tice in the same locality. Although the facts as stated in the principal case
do not show unequivocally that the standards in question were actually fol-
lowed in the area, the record indicates that defendant admitted that they were
followed as a general practice among specialists in North Carolina at the
time. Record, p. 103, Stone v. Proctor, 259 N.C. 633, 131 N.C. 297 (1963).
Thus the facts in Stone would seem to make out a case even under the
"local practice" rule.
" E.g., Lashley v. Koerber, 26 Cal. 2d 83, 156 P.2d 441 (1945) (failure to
make X-rays); Snyder v. Pantaleo, 143 Conn. 290, 122 A.2d 21 (1956).
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effect of law by the legislature, is negligence per se."' In several
cases the Court has applied the rule to hold that a violation of the
National Electric Code, incorporated into the North Carolina Build-
ing Code and expressly adopted by the legislature, is negligence per
se.36 In one such case, 7 this was regarded as merely an application
of the general rule in North Carolina that, when a statute imposes
upon a person a specific duty for the protection of others, a violation
of such statute constitutes negligence per se. Although violation of
the Building Code is a misdemeanor 8s the previous cases did not
regard this fact as determinative of whether the per se rule was
applicable; the critical finding was that the administrative code had
been given the effect of law, not that its violation was a criminal
offense.39
In Swaney v. Peden Steel Co.,4 ° however, the Court seems to
regard the provision of a criminal penalty as essential to the ap-
plicability of the rule. Plaintiff, an employee of a construction
contractor, was ordered by his employer to ride upon a steel truss as
it was being hoisted into place by a crane, and was injured when the
truss collapsed. Plaintiff brought this action against defendant
manufacturer for negligence in the design and fabrication of the
truss. In appealing an adverse judgment, defendant urged that the
trial court erred in refusing to grant its motions for judgment of
compulsory nonsuit. The Court found no error, holding that the evi-
dence was sufficient to go to the jury on the issue of defendant's neg-
ligence, and that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law in riding the load in violation of the American
Standard Code for Building Construction and certain regulations
issued by the North Carolina Department of Labor. Since the Amer-
ican Standard Code had not been adopted as law by the legislature,
the Court held that its violation could not be considered contributory
negligence per se.4 ' Although the Department of Labor regulations
" See, e.g., Jenkins v. Leftwich Elec. Co., 254 N.C. 553, 119 S.E.2d
767 (1961); Drum v. Bisaner, 252 N.C. 305, 113 S.E.2d 560 (1960);
Lutz Industries, Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d 333(1955).
"' Cases cited note 35 supra.
" Lutz Industries, Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 88 S.E.2d
333 (1955).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-138 (1958).
"' See, e.g., Drum v. Bisaner, 252 N.C. 305, 113 S.E.2d 560 (1960).
" 259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963). This case is discussed in Evi-
DENCE, Evidence of Voluntarily Adopted Safety Codes n.44, supra.
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had been adopted as law by G.S. § 95-11, the Court held that the
violation of one of its provisions designed to protect employees from
dangerous methods of work may not be asserted by a tortfeasor as
contributory negligence of the employee so as to relieve itself of
liability for negligently injuring the employee. Instead of stating
this result as an exception to the general rule, however, the Court at-
tempted to reconstruct the rule to fit the facts of this case. The Court
concluded that the Department of Labor regulations had not been
given the same force of law as the Building Code, since the violation
of the Building Code was made a misdemeanor, and "therefore" neg-
ligence per se, while the regulations were made enforceable only by a
civil action instituted by the Attorney General.4" Under the new rule,
the necessity of a criminal penalty is stressed: "When noncom-
pliance with an administrative regulation is criminal, the rule that
in the trial of a civil action the violation of a criminal statute, unless
otherwise provided, is negligence per se, is applicable."48
Although this emphasis upon the criminal nature of the offense
seems unwarranted, in that it leads to artificial distinctions between
essentially similar legislative standards of care, the result in the
instant case is sound. It recognizes the strong economic pressure
often placed upon employees to violate safety rules when directed
to do so by their employers. In holding that the legislature had not
intended to establish a standard of care by which to judge an em-
ployee in his action against a third party tortfeasor, the Court indi-
cates its unwillingness to apply the strict per se rule in the cir-
cumstances of the instant case. Since the Court apparently approved
the submission of the regulations to the jury as evidence tending to
establish contributory negligence, it has in effect created another
exception to the per se rule analogous to the treatment of plaintiffs
charged with contributory negligence in failing to walk on the left
" See Wilson v. Lowe's Asheboro Hardware, Inc. 259 N.C. 660, 131
S.E.2d 501 (1963).
" See N.C. GFN. STAT. § 95-13 (1958).
43 259 N.C. at 542, 131 S.E.2d at 609. The cases cited for this con-
struction of the rule are not persuasive. One, Jenkins v. Leftwich Elec. Co.,
254 N.C. 553, 119 S.E.2d 767 (1961), merely mentioned the criminal penalty
in the process of finding that the Electric Code had the force of law. The
other, Hinson v. Dawson, 241 N.C. 714, 86 S.E.2d 585 (1955), contained
a statement that, in applying the per se rule to a motor vehicle statute, "the
statute must be construed as a criminal statute." Id. at 719, 86 S.E.2d
at 589. It seems from the context, however, that the Court in Hinson meant
only that such a criminal statute must be strictly construed in determining
whether or not it was in fact violated.
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side of the highway as required by statute.44 In both cases the
Court treats the violation by plaintiff of a standard of conduct re-
quired by the legislature as merely evidence of negligence. 4' This
results in both instances in weakening the defense of contributory
negligence and furthering the modern policy toward compensating
accident victims and distributing accident losses.
It is unfortunate that the Court found it necessary to justify
its holding by redefining the per se rule to exclude from its operation
the violation of administrative regulations which have the force
of law but which impose no criminal penalty.40 In a case where a
plaintiff is injured as a result of the violation of these regulations,
he should be entitled to the same benefit of the per se rule as if he
had been injured by the violation of the Electrical Code. While
it is true that some courts have ruled that proof of deviation from
administrative regulations is only evidence of negligence,' the
better view would seem to be that breach of either an administrative
safety measure or a criminal statute is negligence per se, unless
special circumstances justify departure from the standard. In the
absence of an attack on the soundness of the administrative safety
code or a showing of justifiable violation, the jurors should not
be allowed to substitute their own concept of due care for the
judgment of the presumably expert and unbiased administrator.4"
The principal case should be regarded by the Court as merely an
exception to the general rule laid down in the Electrical Code cases.
" The exception to the per se rule in the case of pedestrians is discussed
under Standard of Care-Violation of Statute, infra.
"' For a discussion of the possible trend in the courts toward the appli-
cation of a double standard by regarding the violation of statute by de-
fendants as negligence per se but violation by plaintiffs as merely evidence
of negligence, see 2 HARPER & JAMES § 22.10.
"O The real basis of the per se rule would seem to be not in the fact
that the legislature has imposed a criminal penalty, but in the fact that the
standard of conduct is regarded as the proper one by the legislature. This
point is made by justice Traynor in Clinkscales v. Carver, 22 Cal. 2d 72,
136 P.2d 777 (1943): "When a legislative body has generalized a standard
from the experience of the community and prohibits conduct that is likely
to cause harm, the court accepts the formulated standards and applies them
... except where they would serve to impose liability without fault." Id.
at 75, 136 P.2d at 778.
" E.g., Ursprung v. Winter Garden Co., 183 App. Div. 718, 169 N.Y.
Supp. 738 (1st Dep't 1918); Weimer v. Westmoreland Water Co., 127 Pa.
Super. 201, 193 Atl. 665 (1937).
. This position on the proper use of such codes is taken in Morris, The
Role of Administrative Safety Measures in Negligence Actions, 28 TEXAs
L. REv. 143 (1949).
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Standard of Care-Violation of Statute
The general rule in North Carolina is that the violation of a
statute or ordinance which imposes upon a person a specific duty
for the protection of others constitutes negligence per se.49 The
basis of this rule, according to the Court, is that the statute pre-
scribes the standard of care and that the standard fixed by the legis-
lature is absolute ;"O thus, proving breach of the statute proves negli-
gence. Though this is the majority rule, a substantial number of
jurisdictions have held that such a violation is merely evidence of
negligence to be weighed by the jury;"' even among the courts
applying the per se rule there seems to be a trend away from its
strict application, perhaps in order to promote compensation of
injured plaintiffs who would otherwise be barred by their own
contributory negligence as a matter of law.52
Although ordinarily the per se rule is quite simple in its opera-
tion, occasionally the wording of the statute affects its application
in civil cases. For example, some statutes fix no absolute standard
of care but merely codify the common law standard.53 An example
is a statute requiring drivers to use "due care" to avoid hitting
pedestrians.54 In other cases, the statute specifies that the fact of
violation of the statutory standard shall not be held in a civil action
to be negligence per se, but shall merely be one of the facts in the
case to be considered with the other facts and circumstances by the
jury in determining the negligence issue.' 5
In Boykin v. Bissette56 both types of statutes were involved.
In reversing a judgment of compulsory nonsuit, the Court noted that
'
5 Reynolds v. Murph, 241 N.C. 60, 84 S.E.2d 273 (1954).50Aldridge v. Hasty, 240 N.C. 353, 82 S.E.2d 331 (1954).
5 See generally 2 HAm1Ei & JAMES § 17.6.
'2 Id. § 22.10.
The common law standard of care is that standard of care which a
reasonably prudent man would exercise under like circumstances. Ingram
v. Libes, 250 N.C. 65, 107 S.E.2d 920 (1959). In the absence of statute, a
motorist must exercise the degree of care an ordinarily prudent person would
exercise under similar circumstances. E.g., Badders v. Lassiter, 240 N.C.
413, 82 S.E.2d 357 (1954); Henderson v. Henderson, 239 N.C. 487, 80
S.E.2d 383 (1954).
' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-174(e) (1953). In Gathings v. Sehorn, 255
N.C. 503, 121 S.E.2d 873 (1961), the Court recognized that this statute
merely codified the common law standard.
" See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-149(b) (Supp. 1963) (failure to give
audible warning before passing); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141(e) (Supp.
1963) (outrunning headlights).58260 N.C. 295, 132 S.E.2d 616 (1963).
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there was evidence that defendant had been guilty of reckless driv-
ing in violation of G.S. § 20-140(b) and of passing without giving
audible warning in violation of G.S. § 20-149 (b), as well as common
law negligence. The Court properly recognizes that the "audible
warning" statute provides that its violation shall be merely a fact to
be considered on the issue of negligence. The Court seems to over-
look the true function of the per se rule, however, when it states
that the reckless driving statute, which prohibits the operation of
a motor vehicle "without due caution and circumspection and at
a speed or in a manner so as to endanger or be likely to endanger
any person or property,"' establishes an "absolute standard
of care," the violation of which is negligence per se.58 Actually,
such a statute clearly calls for the exercise of the jury's function
to determine whether due care has been used; it is merely a codifica-
tion of the common law standard of care, and it is misleading to
hold that it constitutes any sort of absolute standard.52
Even where the statute purports to create an absolute standard
of care, the Court may find that the strict application of the per
se rule in a civil case would be unjust. In Stephens v. Southern Oil
Co.60 plaintiff alleged that her injuries resulted from a collision
caused in part by defendant's operation of its vehicle without ade-
quate brakes, in violation of G.S. § 20-124."1 Defendant pleaded as
a defense that the brake failure was unusual and unexpected, and
offered evidence tending to show that the brakes had been over-
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-140(b) (Supp. 1963).4 "The Court has so held many times. E.g., Dunlap v. Lee, 257 N.C.
447, 126 S.E.2d 62 (1962); Stegall v. Sledge, 247 N.C. 718, 102 S.E.2d
115 (1958). The Court has also applied the per se rule to violations of
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-152(a) (Supp. 1963), which provides that the driver
of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is
"reasonable and proper." See, e.g., Fox v. Hollar, 257 N.C. 65, 125 S.E.2d
334 (1962); Smith v. Rawlins, 253 N.C. 67, 116 S.E.2d 184 (1960).
' Even though the statute seemed to create an absolute standard, the
Court in Williams v. Tucker, 259 N.C. 214, 130 S.E.2d 306 (1963), held
that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-1 54(a) (1953), requiring a driver making a
left turn first to ascertain whether the move can be made in safety, was
violated only if the driver failed to exercise due care under the circumstances.
0259 N.C. 456, 131 S.E.2d 39 (1963).61N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-124 (Supp. 1963), provides, in relevant part,
that "every motor vehicle.., shall be equipped with brakes adequate to con-
trol the movement of and to stop such vehicle.. and such brakes shall be
maintained in good working order and shall conform to regulations provided
in this section." In an earlier case, the violation of this statute was held to
be negligence per se. Tysinger v. Coble Dairy Products, 225 N.C. 717, 36
S.E.2d 246 (1945).
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hauled quite recently and had operated properly up until the time
of the collision. The Court reversed a judgment for plaintiff, on
the ground that the trial court erred in charging that the violation
of this statute constituted negligence per se, without instructing the
jury what would excuse the operation of a vehicle with defective
brakes. Even though the statute in this case is mandatory in its
language, the Court held that if brakes fail to operate because of
some latent defect, not discoverable by due care, the operator is
not liable in a civil suit, notwithstanding the violation of the statute.
The Court stated that the true rule62 in such cases is that violation
of the statutory standard constitutes negligence, but that upon de-
fendant's offering substantial proof of a legal excuse for the
violation, it becomes a jury question as to whether the defendant
was negligent. A legal excuse may be shown by proof that an
occurrence wholly without defendant's fault made compliance with
the statute impossible at the moment complained of, and that proper
care on his part would not have avoided the occurrence. Clearly
such a result is proper if liability for motor vehicle accidents is to
be based upon fault."3
In view of the principles outlined above, however, the concluding
language of the opinion is somewhat confusing. The Court stated
that an unexplained failure of the brakes "warranted a finding"
of negligence but that defendant's evidence was sufficient to negative
the charge of negligence with respect to the brakes. Whether de-
fendant's evidence was sufficient to overcome the showing made by
plaintiff was held to be a jury question. This indicates that the Court
considers proof of a violation of the statute merely evidence of
negligence which is sufficient to make out a prima facie case, but
which may be overcome by proof of a proper excuse. If so, the
Court's statement is inconsistent with its rule that a violation of
the statute is negligence per se. However, confusion could be elim-
inated by adhering to the per se rule and requiring a binding in-
struction in the absence of sufficient evidence to justify a finding
of excusable violations.64 Where such evidence is presented, the
" This rule is quoted with approval from Wilson v. Shumate, 296 S.W.2d
72 (Mo. 1956).
" See generally Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence
Actions, 49 CoLuM. L. REv. 21 (1949).
" A similar result is reached in the minority of jurisdictions that profess
to follow neither the per se rule nor the evidence of negligence rule; these
courts hold that the violation creates a presumption of negligence, which
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jury should be instructed that, if they believe it, they must determine
whether or not defendant was negligent under the circumstances.
The clearest example in North Carolina of the trend toward
relaxing the per se rule when the plaintiff's contributory negligence
is at issue is the treatment given by the Court of the violation by
a plaintiff of G.S. § 20-174(d), making it unlawful to walk along
the traveled portion of a highway other than on the extreme left-
hand side thereof. Despite the fact that this statute purports to
create an absolute standard of care, and contains no provision that
its violation is not to be considered negligence per se, the Court
has held that a violation constitutes merely "evidence of negligence
along with the other evidence"6 5 in determining whether plaintiff
pedestrian was guilty of contributory negligence.
In Simpson v. Wood 6 the Court affirmed a judgment for de-
fendant based on a jury finding that plaintiff pedestrian was guilty
of contributory negligence. Plaintiff assigned as error an instruction
to the effect that if the jury found that plaintiff was walking on the
right paved portion of the highway, "it would be a negligent act
on his part.... . 6  The Court construed the statute as meaning that
it was unlawful to walk along the right-hand shoulder of the high-
way, and held that plaintiff's evidence that he was walking on this
shoulder showed a violation of the statute, which was evidence of
contributory negligence. The instructions were held not prejudicial,
but favorable to plaintiff, since they indicated to the jury that walk-
ing on the shoulder was not a violation. However, the Court over-
looks the fact that the charge, in making a violation of the statute
a "negligent act," in effect applies the per se rule rather than the
"evidence of negligence" rule approved in the case. Since such a
charge leaves much less to the discretion of the jury, the chances of
the plaintiff's being found guilty of contributory negligence are
greater, and the possibility of compensation being awarded is
lessened.
may be rebutted by a showing of an adequate excuse but calls for a binding
instruction if no evidence of such excuse is presented. See, e.g., Landry v.
Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141 AtI. 593 (1928). The same result is reached in
most courts applying the per se rule, since they have recognized instances in
which a violation of statute is excusable. See PROSSER § 34.
" Simpson v. Wood, 260 N.C. 157, 161, 132 S.E.2d 369, 372 (1963).
Accord, Simpson v. Curry, 237 N.C. 260, 74 S.E.2d 649 (1953).
00 260 N.C. 157, 132 S.E.2d 369 (1963) (Bobbitt, J., dissenting without
opinion).
" Id. at 160, 132 S.E.2d at 371.
1964]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Standard of Care-Voluntary Adoption of Industry Safety Codes
North Carolina has adopted the strict rule that advisory safety
codes which have not been given the force of law by the legislature
are not admissible to establish negligence. 8 However, an exception
to this rule was laid down in Wilson v. Lowe's Asheboro Hardware,
Inc."9 In this case, a purchaser of a ladder made by defendant manu-
facturer and sold by defendant hardware store sued the vendor for
breach of an alleged warranty of fitness and the manufacturer for
negligence. After taking a voluntary nonsuit as to the vendor,
plaintiff recovered judgment against the manufacturer. At the
trial, plaintiff introduced evidence tending to show that the manu-
facturer had failed to comply with the provisions of the American
Standard Safety Code for Portable Wood Ladders, a voluntary
code sponsored by several industry and insurance groups. Both
plaintiff and defendant acknowledged the general acceptance of
the code and defendant admitted on appeal that the code was "the
standard to which defendant must adhere at the peril of being guilty
of negligence for not so doing."'70 Defendant insisted that it had
complied with the code. The Court, while stating the general rule
to be that a manufacturer must operate with the degree of care which
a reasonably prudent person would use in similar circumstances,
held that evidence tending to prove violation of the code was suffi-
cient to take the issue of defendant's negligence to the jury. It
based this holding on the ground that "the voluntary adoption of a
safety code as the guide to be followed for protection of the public
is at least some evidence that a reasonably prudent person would
adhere to the requirements of the code."'71
"
8E.g., Swaney v. Peden Steel Co., 259 N.C. 531, 131 S.E.2d 601 (1963)
(dictum); Sloan v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 248 N.C. 125, 102 S.E.2d
822 (1958). Apparently Sloan based the rule on the theory that the intro-
duction of the collective judgment of parties not before the court violates
the hearsay rule. Although the Court regards this as the majority view,
what limited authority there exists seems to hold such evidence admissible, at
least for limited purposes. See 20 Am. JuR. Evidence § 966 n.8 (1939,
Cum. Supp. 1963).
'9259 N.C. 660, 131 S.E.2d 501 (1963). This case is also discussed
under Ev-hEcc., Evidence of Voluntarily Adopted Safety Code, supra.
"0 Brief for Appellant, p. 23, Wilson v. Lowe's Asheboro Hardware, Inc.,
259 N.C. 660, 131 S.E.2d 501 (1963).71259 N.C. at 666, 131 S.E.2d at 505. The Court cites Stone v. Proctor,
259 N.C. 633, 131 S.E.2d 297 (1963) in support of its holding. However,
the Stone case could be regarded as holding only that a medical expert (who
may be defendant himself) may establish the standard of care in a mal-
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It is unclear why the voluntary adoption of an industry safety
code should enable plaintiff to get to the jury upon proof of its
violation, whereas the same code is not even admissible if not so
adopted. Perhaps if defendant had objected to the admission of
the code and had not admitted on appeal that violation of the code
was negligence per se, the Court would have adhered to the ex-
clusionary rule; certainly these factors tend to weaken the holding.
It would be unfortunate, however, if the Court does not apply the
rule asserted here to situations in which the defendant subscribes to
the code in his operations, but objects to its admission as evidence
of a standard of care.
In any case, since the voluntary code is merely "some evidence"
of the proper standard of care, defendant should be protected by
proper instructions to the jury. An excellent charge given in an
analogous situation was recently quoted in a New York decision. 2
The New York court, in holding that a safety rule promulgated by
defendant railroad was admissible against it in a negligence action,
approved a charge to the effect that defendant was to be held to
the standard of reasonable care, in connection with which the jury
might consider the safety rule as a "standard that the railroad sets
itself for its employees"; that a violation of the rule is not negligence
per se; that whether or not a violation would be negligent depends
upon whether or not they find that it sets a standard which reason-
able prudence required; and that if it set a higher standard, then
plaintiff is to receive no benefit from its adoption by defendants. 3
Statute of Limitations
In Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.74 plaintiff
brought an action charging the defendants with negligence in selling
it a truck with a latently defective carburetor, which caused a fire
damaging the truck. The fire had occurred less than three years
before the filing of the action, but more than three years had elapsed
between the date of the sale and the institution of the action. De-
fendants pleaded the statute of limitations, and the Court held that
the statute had run. 5
practice suit by testifying that safety rules established by a professional
association are applicable under the circumstances.
"' Danbois v. New York Cent. R.R., 12 N.Y.2d 234, 189 N.E.2d 468
(1963).(,Id. at 237, 189 N.E.2d at 469-70.
*' 258 N.C. 323, 128 S.E.2d 413 (1962).
The Court held that the period prescribed for the commencement of the
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The decision is rested on the general rule that the statute begins
to run from the occurrence of an act or omission which causes injury
giving rise to an action for nominal damages, even though the
substantial or actual damage is not discovered or does not occur
until later.76 The Court held that the delivery to plaintiff of a truck
equipped with a defective and dangerous carburetor, the existence of
which defendants knew or should have known, and the failure of
defendants to warn plaintiff thereof, was an injury to plaintiff and
an invasion of his rights, which then gave rise to an action for
nominal damages at least.7
Although the Court had previously held that the statute of
limitations in a negligence action begins to run from the time of
the wrongful act or omission, and not from the time injury oc-
curred,7 8 it expressly declined to decide whether it would follow the
rule in future cases where there is no injury to plaintiff or invasion
of his rights at the time of the defendant's negligent act. Thus the
instant case may herald a trend away from the unnecessarily tech-
nical interpretation of a right of action adopted in the earlier cases.
It cannot be determined from this case, however, whether the Court
will consider the mere invasion of a technical right, without actual
damages, sufficient to give rise to a cause of action for nominal
damages and thus start the running of the statute of limitations.
According to the better view, proof of damages is an essential element
in a cause of action for negligence, and nominal damages to vindi-
action, whether considered an action for breach of warranty or one for negli-
gence, was three years. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-15, 1-46, 1-52(1), 1-52(4)(1953).
7' See, e.g., Baie v. Rook, 223 Iowa 845, 273 N.W. 902 (1937); Johnson
v. Beattie, 88 Vt. 512, 93 Atl. 250 (1915). See generally 34 Am. JUR.
Limitation of Actions §§ 115, 160 (1941).
" The Court relied upon Shearin v. Lloyd, 246 N.C. 363, 98 S.E.2d
508 (1957), which held that an action for malpractice against a physician
accrued at the time he negligently left a foreign object in plaintiff's body
following an operation, and not when the injurious consequences were or
should have been discovered. In the principal case, the Court held that the
decision in Shearin was based on the ground that there was a sufficient
injury at the time of the negligent act to give rise to an action for nominal
damages at least.
" E.g., Hooper v. Carr Lumber Co., 215 N.C. 308, 1 S.E.2d 818 (1939);
State ex rel. Bank of Spruce Pine v. McKinney, 209 N.C. 668, 184 S.E.
506 (1936) ; State ex rel. Daniel v. Grizzard, 117 N.C. 105, 23 S.E. 93 (1895).
See also Powers v. Planters Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 219 N.C. 254, 13
S.E.2d 431 (1941), where it was held that the statute ran from the time
defendant negligently leased plaintiff a house infected with tuberculosis
germs, not when the injury was discovered. The Powers case is noted and
the harsh North Carolina rule criticized in 19 N.C.L. REv. 599 (1941).
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cate a technical right cannot be recovered where no loss has oc-
curred.O
ABSOLUTE LIABILITY
Recovery for Concussion Damage Caused by Blasting
In Guilford Realty & Ins. Co. v. Blythe Bros. Co.,80 the Court
held that one conducting blasting operations which produce con-
cussions and vibrations damaging plaintiff's property is absolutely
liable, irrespective of negligence."- Plaintiffs alleged that their
property had been damaged by concussion from the ultrahazardous
blasting operations conducted by defendant contractors in the con-
struction of a sewer line for the City of High Point; no negligence
in carrying out the blasting was alleged. The Court held that the
complaint stated a good cause of action and rejected the minority
rule that consequential damages for concussion cannot be recovered
where the blasting was conducted at a lawful time and place and
in the exercise of due care."2 Thus North Carolina has joined the
growing majority83 of states which impose absolute liability for
damages caused by blasting operations.
"' See, e.g, Northern Pac. R.R. v. Lewis, 162 U.S. 366 (1896); Sullivan
v. Old Colony St. Ry., 200 Mass. 303, 86 N.E. 511 (1908). See PROSSER §
35. According to this view, the statute of limitations does not begin to
run on a negligence action until damage has occurred. White v. Schnoebelen,
91 N.H. 273, 18 A.2d 185 (1941). The White case held, contra to the
principal case, that the cause of action for negligently installing a lightning
rod that caused plaintiff's property to be damaged by fire accrued at the
time of the fire and not at the time of the negligent act.
60260 N.C. 69, 131 S.E.2d 900 (1963). This case is discussed under
EMINENT DOMAIN, supra and MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, Municipal In-
nmunity, supra.
" For a discussion and analysis of the North Carolina cases involving
liability for blasting, see 40 N.C.L. Rav. 640 (1962).
2 In upholding the judgment sustaining plaintiff's motion to strike the
asserted defense that defendant was not liable because it was carefully using
the explosives in accordance with a contract with the City and for necessary
governmental purposes, the Court held that defendant could not thus bring
itself within the immunity of the City, since the City was not immune
under the circumstances. See the discussion of this point under MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS, Municipal Immunity, supra. The Court deemed it improper
upon the "meager" factual allegations in defendant's pleading, to decide
whether it would follow the rule that a contractor acting on behalf of a
principal with eminent domain power cannot be held personally liable in the
absence of negligence for damage done by him in connection with a proposed
public improvement. The authorities are divided as to the applicability of the
rule. See generally 19 MINN. L. REv. 129 (1934).
" See, e.g., Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849) ("trespass" by rocks
and debris); Federoff v. Harrison Const. Co., 362 Pa. 181, 66 A.2d 817
19641
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It is not clear from the opinion whether the holding is based
upon the theory that absolute liability results because of the trespass
by debris or vibrations, or the policy decision that since blasting
operations are ultrahazardous, they must be made to pay their
own way.84 As a practical matter, however, there would seem to be
little difference between the two theories, and both lead to the un-
questionably sound result reached in this case.
OWNERS AND OCCUPIERS OF LAND
Duty to Invitees
The owner or proprietor of a business establishment, while
not an insurer of the safety of his invitees, is under a duty to exer-
cise ordinary care to keep the portion of his premises designed for
their use in a reasonablysafe condition.85 But the duty to warn of
unsafe conditions is limited to those of which the proprietor had
notice, express or implied, and the failure to allege or prove that an
unsafe condition had existed long enough to give him at least
constructive notice thereof, is fatal."'
In Norris v. Belk's Department Store7 the Court, in affirming
a nonsuit entered at the close of plaintiff's evidence, held that evi-
dence tending to show that plaintiff slipped and fell when she stepped
on a cylindrical stick from a candy sucker concealed by a piece of
tissue paper, without a showing of how long the stick had been
there, was insufficient to be submitted to the jury on the issue of
the proprietor's negligence. The Court held further that, in view
of the fact that there was no evidence that the goods sold in the
store were likely to be dangerous if dropped on the floor, or that the
floors were slippery, it was unforeseeable that injury would result
(1949) (damage caused by concussion only). See generally Annot., 20
A.L.R.2d 1372 (1951), which cites twenty cases in accord with the principal
case to the effect that recovery may be had for concussion damage without
proof of negligence.
"The Court cites with approval a recent South Carolina case, Wallace
v. A. H. Guion & Co., 237 S.C. 349, 117 S.E.2d 359 (1960), based upon
absolute liability for ultrahazardous activity; however, it also discusses the
unwarranted distinction asserted by some courts between a trespass by
debris thrown on plaintiff's premises and an invasion of his land by
concussion and vibrations.
"Waters v. Harris, 250 N.C. 701, 110 S.E.2d 283 (1959); Sledge v.
Wagoner, 250 N.C. 559, 109 S.E.2d 180 (1959).
"' Revis v. Orr, 234 N.C. 158, 66 S.E.2d 652 (1951).
'1259 N.C. 350, 130 S.E.2d 537 (1963).
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from what appeared to be merely a piece of paper lying flat on the
floor.88
In Raper v. McCrory-McLellan Corp.'9 plaintiff sued to recover
for her injuries sustained when she fell as a result of stepping in
vomit on the landing of a staircase in defendant's store. The Court
reversed a judgment of involuntary nonsuit, holding that it was a
jury question whether the vomit had remained there long enough
to the knowledge of defendant's supervisor for her in the exercise
of due care to have removed it, or to have given proper warning of
its presence to plaintiff. The Court noted that it is "hornbook law"
that in considering a motion for judgment of involuntary nonsuit
plaintiff must be given the benefit of every fact and of every reason-
able inference of fact arising from the evidence and that all conflicts
therein must be resolved in his favor."0 Nevertheless, in two recent
cases involving similar questions, the Court does not appear to be
applying the rule liberally.
In Berger v. Cornwell9 a nonsuit was sustained on the ground
that the evidence of plaintiff invitee showed that she was contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law. The evidence tended to show
that plaintiff slipped on a patch of ice in defendant's parking lot
while returning from defendant's animal hospital to her taxi. The
patches of ice in the vicinity of the taxi were difficult to see. De-
fendant had not sanded these patches or given any warning of their
presence. Nevertheless, the Court held that plaintiff's contributory
negligence was established by the fact that part of the lot was free
from ice and that plaintiff could have seen the ice-free areas and
walked there. This seems clearly wrong in principle; a plaintiff
should not be barred because he fails to choose a safe path across
defendant's premises if there is no reason to believe that the path
taken is unsafe.92
The Court took a somewhat similar approach in construing the
evidence in Harrison v. Williams.9 3 Plaintiff, an invitee, alleged
"R Accord, Smith v. American Stores Co., 156 Pa. Super. 375, 40 A.2d
696 (1945).259 N.C. 199, 130 S.E.2d 281 (1963).
80Id at 204, 130 S.E.2d at 284.
9'260 N.C. 198, 132 S.E.2d 317 (1963) (per curiam).
9' Perhaps the Court was influenced by the fact that plaintiff failed to
look down as she walked. However, this should not be material if her
evidence is taken as true that the ice was difficult to see; if plaintiff would
not have seen the ice in the exercise of due care if she had looked, her
failure to look would not then be an actual cause of her fall.
"260 N.C. 392, 132 S.E.2d 869 (1963).
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that she was injured in a fall caused by the negligent failure of
defendant to provide adequate lighting over a step-down between
floor levels. In affirming a judgment of nonsuit, the Court held that
plaintiff's evidence was too vague and indefinite to go to the jury. 4
However, plaintiff testified that the area was dimly lighted and
that there was no overhead or floor light in the area where she fell.
The Court made much of the fact that while the plaintiff testified
that "it was dark in there," she also testified on cross-examination
that "it was not light enough.., to see... [the step] automati-
cally... ."" The Court stated that the word "dark" was a relative
term, and suggested that it could not be too dark if plaintiff could
have seen the step by the exercise of due care, even if not "auto-
matically." ' The suggestion that if plaintiff had used due care
she could have seen the step, even though she testified that it was
too dark to see adequately, indicates that the Court is not really
following its often-announced rule that all conflicts in plaintiff's
evidence must be resolved in his favor in considering a motion for
nonsuit.1
7
Obvious Dangers
The proprietor is not under a duty to warn an invitee of a condi-
tion which is obvious 8 or of which the invitee has equal or superior
knowledge.99 These exceptions to the general rule were illustrated
in two recent cases. In Coleman v. Colonial Stores, Inc. 00 the
Court applied the obvious danger rule in affirming a judgment of
nonsuit. Plaintiff's evidence tended to show that after purchasing
groceries at defendant's store, he approached the glass exit door
" The Court suggested that plaintiff should have presented floor plans,
diagrams, photographs, etc. Id. at 396, 132 S.E.2d at 872.
Id. at 396-97, 132 S.E.2d at 872. Compare the recent case of Reason v.
Singer Sewing Mach. Co., 259 N.C. 264, 130 S.E.2d 397 (1963), in which
the plaintiff's case depended upon proof that oil squirted on her by defendant's
machine was "hot"; the Court affirmed a judgment of compulsory nonsuit
on the ground that plaintiff testified that the oil was "warm." It would
seem that if "dark" is a relative term enabling the Court to construe it
against plaintiff, then "warm" is sufficiently relative to enable the Court to
construe it for plaintiff.
260 N.C. at 397, 132 S.E.2d at 872.
See, e.g., Myers v. Southern Pub. Util. Co., 208 N.C. 293, 180 S.E.
694 (1935).
"E.g., Garner v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 250 N.C. 151, 108 S.E.2d
461 (1959).
.'Harris v. Nachamson Dept. Stores Co., 247 N.C. 195, 100 S.E.2d
323 1957).10 259 N.C. 241, 130 S.E.2d 338 (1963) (per curiam).
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while carrying two sacks of groceries; these bags were carried
higher than his shoulders and partially obstructed his vision. When
the door opened automatically to the left, he passed through, spoke
to someone outside, and turned right, tripping over a metal screen
extending from the wall to the ground. The Court held that the
evidence failed to establish any duty of defendant to warn of a
condition "obvious to any ordinarily intelligent person" and that it
plainly indicated that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence.
It would seem that in this case the Court adopted an unduly
strict approach to the problem of obvious dangers. Modern authori-
ties tend to hold that the fact that a condition is obvious does not
always remove all unreasonable danger where the plaintiff would
not in fact expect to find it where it is, or is likely to have his at-
tention distracted as he approaches it, or for some other reason
is not likely to see it.'"" Several cases10 2 have applied this doctrine,
and in a previous North Carolina case,10 3 the Court at least con-
sidered such evidence on the issue of defendant storekeeper's negli-
gence in failing to warn of an obvious condition at the exit. In
finding no such duty, the Court stated that:
In the instant case, the weather was dear, the entryway was
not crowded, only a few persons were passing on the sidewalk,
and the plaintiff was not carrying bundles of merchandise. In
the absence of some unusual condition, the mere fact that the
entryway and sidewalk sloped, and that there was a drop-off of
varying height at the sidewalk, did not constitute negligence. 04
The Court in future cases should give serious consideration to
the theory that a proprietor should be under a duty to warn of a
condition that may injure his invitees, if he can reasonably foresee
"'See Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 675 (1952). See generally 2 HARPER &
JAMES § 27.13; Keeton, Personal Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious
Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. Rnv. 629 (1952).
102 See, e.g., Nicolls v. Scranton Club, 208 F.2d 874. (3d Cir. 1954)(plaintiff's attention diverted and vision obstructed by luggage he carried) ;
Walker v. County of Randolph, 251 N.C. 805, 112 S.E.2d 551 (1959)(plaintiff's attention diverted by bulletin board); Seng v. American Stores
Co., 384 Pa. 338, 121 A.2d 123 (1956) (plaintiff left store with arms piled
high with bundles).
'03 Garner v. Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 250 N.C. 151, 108 S.E.2d 461(1959).
11d. at 159, 108 S.E.2d at 467. (Emphasis added.) See Grady v. J. C.
Penney Co., 260 N.C. 745, 133 S.E.2d 678 (1963) (recognizing the "diverted
attention" doctrine).
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that, though ordinarily obvious, the invitee may be injured by it
under conditions likely to exist. If this rule had been applied in
the instant case, it would have been for the jury to decide if de-
fendant should have reasonably foreseen that heavily laden cus-
tomers would be likely to trip over the screen, even though it would
be obvious to one not so burdened.
In Henry v. White'0 5 the invitee had an equal or superior
knowledge of the hazard, and the Court affirmed a judgment of
involuntary nonsuit entered in an action to recover damages for
the wrongful death of the invitee. Plaintiff's evidence was held to
establish that decedent, an independent contractor who came onto
the premises to repair refrigeration machinery (which he had
originally installed), was killed when caught by an exposed belt in
the machinery. The Court held that, since decedent knew the
hazards of the machine as well as or better than defendant, de-
fendant was under no duty to warn of any defects in the machinery.
This seems clearly correct.106 The same result could also have been
reached on the theory that decedent had assumed the risk.10 7
TRIAL PRACTICE
PROCESS-WAIVER OF IMMUNITY
Under G.S. § 15-79 a non-resident, who is brought into North
Carolina on a criminal charge by or after waiver of extradition, is
not subject to the service of personal process in civil actions arising
out of the same facts as the criminal charge until he has been con-
victed, or, if acquitted, until he has had a reasonable opportunity
to return to his home state.
In Reverie Lingerie, Inc. v. McCain four non-resident indi-
viduals were being sued for tortiously damaging plaintiff's plant.
Criminal proceedings were also pending in this state against those
individuals based upon the same alleged acts of tortious destruction.
Three of the individuals had been arrested outside of North Carolina
10. 259 N.C. 282, 130 S.E.2d 412 (1963).
100 See Harris v. Nachamson Dept. Stores Co., 247 N.C. 195, 100 S.E.2d
323 (1957) (no duty to warn where invitee has equal or superior knowledge
of danger).
10' See generally PROSSER § 55.
1258 N.C. 353, 128 S.E.2d 835 (1963). This case is discussed in AGENCY
AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Agency, supra; LABOR LAW, Vicarious
Liability for Local's Misconduct, supra.
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and had waived extradition to this state. The fourth had voluntarily
appeared in this state a month before the criminal term at which the
cases were to be tried and had posted bond for his appearance in the
criminal case. On September 27, 1960, while all four defendants
were in the Superior Court of Orange County defending the crim-
inal charges against them, they were served with civil arrest process
in the above entitled case. The order for civil arrest had fixed the
bail at 10,000 dollars. On the same day the civil arrest process was
served, the trial judge signed an order, which had been consented
to by the four defendants and the plaintiff, reducing the amount of
bail fixed in the order from 10,000 to 7,500 dollars. It does not
appear on whose motion this reduction was made. The Supreme
Court as to this says,
Probably what happened was this: Counsel for the plaintiff and
counsel for the defendants agreed privately to present an order
to the court consenting to the reduction of the bail bonds. The
court signed the order which had been consented to in writing by
each of the four defendants and by counsel of record for the
plaintiff.2
On October 17, 1960, all the individual defendants moved to
quash the service of process in the civil suit on the ground of im-
munity. The trial court denied the motions and on appeal the
Supreme Court affirmed. The Court recognized the immunity pro-
vided by G.S. § 15-79 but declared that the action of the defendants,
in consenting to the reduction of the amount of bail called for in
the civil arrest order, constituted a general appearance and thus
waived immunity. As to the defendant who had posted a bond for
his appearance, the Court declared he had no immunity whatsoever.
Justice Bobbitt dissented as to the three defendants who had waived
extradition without stating his reasons.
The action of the Court, in so far as the defendant who had
posted bond for his appearance is concerned, is in line with prior
case law.' No precedent in point, however, is cited by the Court
for its action in construing the consent order reducing the amount
of bail as a waiver of immunity. The Court relies on general ex-
pressions contained in decided cases that if a defendant makes an
appearance for any purpose other than to attack the jurisdiction of
21d. at 362, 128 S.E.2d at 842.
'E.g., White v. Ordille, 229 N.C. 490, 50 S.E.2d 499 (1948); Hare v.
Hare, 228 N.C. 740, 46 S.E.2d 840 (1948).
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the Court, his appearance is general. Although the Court concedes
it does not know whether a motion for reducing the amount of bail
fixed in the arrest order was made by defendants or made by the
trial court ex mero motu, it does appear that the written consent
of each defendant was on the order reducing the bail. Hence the
Court says,
When the consent order authorizing the reduction of bail ... was
signed, these defendants invoked the power of the court in their
behalf and for their benefit which, in our opinion, constituted a
general appearance and waived any defect in connection with
the service of process. 4
While this reasoning of the Court would support its conclusion
as to the three defendants who had waived extradition and consented
to reduction of the bail called for, one may wonder if the action of the
Court is in keeping with the purpose of the statute affording the im-
munity in instances of this kind. Suppose the trial judge had said of
his own accord,
"Methinks the amount of bail fixed in this order for civil arrest
is too high. I will reduce it if you defendants have no objection."
Defendants then reply, "We do not object, your Honor, you
have our consent to make the reduction."
Could it truly be said that the defendants in such case waived
the immunity from service of civil process? The lesson of the case
is clear. A defendant faced with the service of civil process in a
situation such as confronted the three defendants who had waived
extradition should do nothing more than move to quash the service
because of the immunity provided for in G.S. § 15-79.
JUDGMENT-CONSENT JUDGMENT AS WAIVER
OF CLAIM AGAINST JOINT TORTFEASOR
In Simpson v. Plyler5 plaintiff was injured while a passenger in
Crenshaw's car which collided with a truck operated by the Charlotte
Florist Supply Company. Crenshaw died in the collision and plain-
tiff sued Crenshaw's administratrix and the Florist Supply Company
as joint tortfeasors. After issues had been joined and the case
transferred to the civil docket, plaintiff executed a covenant not to
sue and to hold harmless the administratrix. The agreement recited
that the plaintiff "desires to settle and adjust any claim which he...
'258 N.C. at 362, 128 S.E.2d at 842.
°258 N.C. 390, 128 S.E.2d 843 (1963).
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might have against ... administratrix... by reason of said injuries
.. and further to execute a consent judgment as to... administra-
trix... so as to avoid any suit or other legal action." 6
The agreement also stated a consent judgment was to be entered
in the present action in so far as the administratrix was concerned
and that it was understood that the agreement was only a "covenant
not to sue and is not a release of any claim or cause of action" against
the corporate defendant and "all rights, causes of action and remedies
against... [corporate defendant] are expressly'reserved."'
The agreement went still further and stated that the sum paid
as consideration was neither paid nor accepted as a satisfaction of
the injuries sustained. In due course, a judgment was entered in
the cause in the amount of the consideration for the agreement and
consented to by the plaintiff and administratrix. The judgment
recited the execution of the covenant not to sue. On the same date a
satisfaction of judgment was entered in which it was stated that the
judgment against the administratrix had been paid and satisfied in
full. This instrument also purported to reserve plaintiff's cause of
action against the corporate defendant.
There can be no doubt that what the parties intended was clearly
and readily discernible. But what they intended was not to be what
they were informed by the Court they had done! After the filing of
the aforesaid satisfaction of judgment, the corporate defendant
moved for a dismissal of the action against it on the ground that
the satisfaction of the consent judgment operated as a release of a
joint torifeasor and hence released the other joint tortfeasor.
The Court recognized the rule that a covenant not to sue does-
not operate as a release of a joint torifeasor but, in this case, despite
the clear intention of the parties, the Court held that the satisfaction
of the consent judgment entered against one joint torifeasor oper-
ated as a release of the other joint tortfeasor and hence, contrary to
the intent of the parties, the plaintiff had lost any right to proceed
against the corporate defendant. The Court expressly stated, "It
is our view that intention does not govern in the face of the judg-
ment terminating the cause of action.... The court is without au-
thority, after extinguishment of the cause of action as to one joint
tortfeasor, to retain and reserve it as to another."
8
6 Id. at 392, 128 S.E.2d at 844.
"Ibid. (Emphasis added.)8258 N.C. at 398, 128 S.E.2d at 849. This case is discussed in CIVIL
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It is unfortunate that, in the face of a growing trend which gives
to a release of one joint tortfeasor the effect of a covenant not to sue,
the Court in this instance of a clearly declared intent of the paroies
saw fit to disregard that intent and to give to a covenant not to sue
which had been molded into a consent judgment thereafter satisfied,
the effect of a release of one joint tortfeasor as at common law.9
DEFAULT JUDGMENTS-EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
It is well settled law in North Carolina that when husband and
wife are jointly sued and the husband assures the wife that he will
attend to the litigation, his failure to do so is not chargeable to the
wife and a default judgment against her will be vacated.10
In Jones v. Statesville Ice & Fuel Co." the husband alone was
sued. After service on him he left the suit papers with his wife who
assured him she would see that they were given the necessary at-
tention. On the wife's failure to do so, default judgment was entered.
The trial court, on the husband's motion, refused to vacate the judg-
ment charging the negligence of the wife to her husband. On appeal
the Court held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion and
that cases giving the wife relief where the spouses are jointly sued
are not pertinent.
One may well ask what the ruling of the Court would be if the
husband and wife had been jointly sued and the husband had relied
on the wife's assurance that she would attend to the suit. The Court
did not imply that the husband in such case would be granted relief.
Rather, it said, "We find no case in which it has been held that a
husband, when served with process in a civil action, may rely on his
wife to assume the responsibility of filing answer and defending
the suit."' It looks very much as if, when both spouses are jointly
sued, that what is sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the
gander!
PROCEDURE (PLEADING AND PARTIE ), Releases, supra; TORTS, Negligence,
supra.
'See McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1943) ; Breen v. Peck,
28 N.J. 351, 146 A.2d 665 (1958); 40 N.C.L. REv. 89-90 (1961).
"E.g., Abernethy v. Nichols, 249 N.C. 70, 105 S.E.2d 211 (1958);
Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Turner, 202 N.C. 162, 162 S.E. 221 (1932).
11259 N.C. 206, 130 S.E.2d 324 (1963).
1 2Id. at 210, 130 S.E.2d at 327.
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TRUSTS
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE
In Godwin v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.,' husband and wife
entered into an inter vivos trust agreement without compliance with
G.S. § 52-12 requiring a private examination of the wife. Simul-
taneously, husband and wife executed reciprocal wills giving the
property of each respectively to the trustee to be disposed of as
provided in the trust agreement. The court, assuming but not de-
ciding that the trust agreement was void as an inter vivos agreement
for failure to comply with G.S. § 52-12, held the dispositions of the
trust to be validly incorporated in the will of each party. This case
is fully discussed in a Note appearing in the Review.'
MODIFICATION OF INVESTMENT PROVISIONS
The trust indenture establishing the Duke Endowment restricts
the trustees in their investment of surplus funds to the stocks and
bonds of Duke Power Co. and its subsidiaries, and federal, state,
and municipal bonds. In Cocke v. Duke University,' the trustees
sought to modify these investment restrictions so as to permit in-
vestment in other corporate securities on grounds that: (1) Sound
investment policy dictated greater diversification than allowed by
the indenture; and (2) Inflation had rendered investment in
government bonds economically unsound. There was no evidence
that the trust corpus was in danger of immediate depletion or that
refusal to grant the relief sought would frustrate the purposes of the
trust. In fact, there was evidence that the corpus had increased
substantially through the years and that present investments were
yielding an adequate return. Applying New Jersey law, the Court
refused to modify the restrictions, holding that the mere possibility
of corpus shrinkage due to inflation or a desire to produce more
income than investment in governmentals would yield are not
sufficient grounds to overrule the express directions of settlor with
respect to investment of trust funds. This case is fully discussed in
a Note appearing in the Review.4
-259 N.C. 520, 131 S.E.2d 456 (1963).
242 N.C.L. REv. 493 (1964).
-260 N.C. 1, 131 S.E.2d 909 (1963).
'42 N.C.L. REv. 486 (1964).
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PROPER VENUE FOR ACTION AGAINST TESTAMENTARY TRUSTEE
In Lichtenfels v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank,' testatrix's will,
probated in Buncombe county, appointed her executors to serve also
as testamentary trustees. Defendant, a national banking association
with offices in Mecklenburg county, was subsequently appointed
substitute trustee by order of the Clerk of Buncombe County Superi-
or Court. Plaintiffs, beneficiaries of the trust, instituted an action
for an accounting in Buncombe county. Defendant moved to have
the action removed to Mecklenburg county as a matter of right.0
The superior court judge ordered the cause removed to Mecklen-
burg. The Court reversed.
G.S. § 1-78 declares the proper venue for actions against execu-
tors and administrators to be the county in which they qualify.
Notwithstanding the statute's express limitation to executors and
administrators, the Court interpreted this statute "to encompass all
fiduciaries, irrespective of technical titles, who act by reason of
court appointment and are by law required to account to the court
appointing them."7 Construing this statute in pari materia with
G.S. § 28-53 requiring testamentary trustees to account to the court
in which the will was probated, it was held that Buncombe county
was the proper venue for the action in this case.8
PURCHASE MONEY RESULTING TRUST-DEGREE OF
PROOF REQUIRED
In Vinson v. Smith," plaintiff sought to establish a purchase
money resulting trust' ° in her favor, alleging that she furnished the
'260 N.C. 146, 132 S.E.2d 360 (1963).
8 Defendant relied on a federal statute granting permission to sue
national banks in the county in which they are located as grounds for its
motion to have the cause removed to Mecklenburg. The Court held that this
statute did not affect the jurisdiction of state courts but was merely enacted
for the convenience of national banks and could be waived. 260 N.C. at 150,
132 S.E.2d at 363, citing First Nat'l Bank of Charlotte v. Morgan, 132
U.S. 141 (1889). Defendant's acceptance of fiduciary duties with knowledge
that the law required it to account to the court appointing it was, in effect,
deemed to be a waiver of this privilege.
7260 N.C. at 149, 132 S.E.2d at 363.
'The Court had previously held G.S. § 1-78 to be applicable to actions
against guardians. Cloman v. Stanton, 78 N.C. 235 (1878).
'259 N.C. 95, 130 S.E.2d 45 (1963).10 When the purchase price of property is furnished by one person and
title is taken in the name of another, to whom the person furnishing the
purchase money owes no obligation of support, a presumption arises that
the person in whose name title is taken holds the property as trustee for the
person furnishing the purchase money. Hoffman v. Mozely, 247 N.C. 121,
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purchase money for property, title to which was taken in the name
of defendant, her half-sister. At the trial conflicting evidence was
presented as to who actually furnished the purchase money. In sub-
mitting this issue to the jury, the trial judge instructed that the
plaintiff must carry the burden of proving this fact "by the evidence
and by its greater weight."' 1  On appeal from a verdict for the
plaintiff, the Court held this instruction to be error.
A person seeking to establish a purchase money resulting trust
in his favor must carry the burden of proof by a degree of evidence
greater than the ordinary preponderance required in most civil
actions.' Such a degree of evidence is variously referred to as
"clear, strong, and convincing' 1 3 and "clear, strong, cogent, and con-
vincing."' 4 Though it is recognized that such evidence is greater
in intensity than a "mere" preponderance, its precise limits are in-
capable of definition. It has been said that the jury must be con-
vinced beyond equivocation 5 or beyond a reasonable doubt.' It is
clear that the words "clear, strong, and convincing" are employed in
their usual sense and intended to mean what they are generally under-
stood to mean, and thus it is proper for the trial judge to instruct the
jury as to the dictionary definition of the words." However, it is
error for the trial judge to- define this degree of proof by way of
comparing it with the meaning ascribed to carrying the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence.'
8
100 S.E.2d 243 (1957). See generally Edwards & Van Hecke, Purchase
Money Resulting Trusts in North Carolina, 9 N.C.L. REv. 177 (1931).
"259 N.C. at 99, 130 S.E.2d at 48.
12Ibid. This has long been the rule in North Carolina, Summers v.
Moore, 113 N.C. 394, 18 S.E. 712 (1893), and accords with the majority
view throughout the country. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 348 Mo. 1041,
156 S.W.2d 610 (1941). See generally Annot., 23 A.L.R. 1500 (1923);
BOGERT, TRusTs § 74 (Hornbook series 1952) ; 89 C.J.S. Trusts § 137 (1955).
Though this stronger degree of proof is required to establish the fact
that the plaintiff furnished the purchase money, the amount of purchase
money furnished may be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. Paul
v. Neece, 244 N.C. 565, 94 S.E.2d 596 (1956).
"Vinson v. Smith, 259 N.C. 95, 99, 130 S.E.2d 45, 48 (1963).
1, Shue v. Shue, 241 N.C. 65, 67, 84 S.E.2d 302, 303 (1954).
See Summers v. Moore, 113 N.C. 394, 18 S.E. 712 (1893).
1 Clark v. Clark, 398 Ill. 592, 76 N.E.2d 446 (1948).
McCorkle v. Beatty, 226 N.C. 338, 38 S.E.2d 102 (1946).
McCorlde v. Beatty, 225 N.C. 178, 33 S.E.2d 753 (1945).
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TRUSTEE'S POWER OF SALE-
NECESSITY OF ALLEGATIONS IN ACTION
Absent an express or implied power of sale, the trustee has no
authority to sell trust property, and any sale made without such
power is invalid.' In Johnson v. Johnson,20 plaintiff sought to en-
force a trustee's agreement to sell an interest of the trust in a part-
nership. The Court held that a demurrer to the complaint for failure
to state a cause of action against the trustee was properly sustained,
since the complaint failed to disclose that the parties had ever
reached a final agreement as to the sale. In the course of the opinion,
the court stated: "Further, there is nothing in all of plaintiff's
pleadings to indicate that [the trustee] ... had any power to sell the
trust property held by her in the partnership."21
The implication from this statement is that a complaint otherwise
alleging a firm agreement of sale between a vendee and a trustee-
vendor would nevertheless fail to state a cause of action for specific
performance against the trustee, absent an allegation that the trustee
has the power to sell. It is not clear whether the Johnson case act-
ually stands for this proposition, since the court's statement seems to
be added merely in support of their decision which is apparently
based on other grounds. No cases dealing precisely with this point
have been found.22 It is arguable that a complaint which alleges a
trustee's agreement to sell without alleging a power in the trustee
to effectuate the sale fails to set out a valid, enforceable contract
against the trustee and would, therefore, be demurrable 3 On the
other hand, it is arguable that lack of capacity to enter into the con-
tract in the first instance or inability to execute its terms is matter
1 Morris v. Morris, 246 N.C. 314, 98 S.E.2d 298 (1957); Maxwell v.
Barringer, 110 N.C. 76, 14 S.E. 516 (1892); cf. Robinson v. Ingram,
126 N.C. 327, 35 S.E. 612 (1900).
20259 N.C. 430, 130 S.E.2d 876 (1963). This case is discussed in CIVIL
PROCEDURE, (PLEADING AND PARTiEs), Demurrer-Dismissal or Amendment,
supra.11d. at 439, 130 S.E.2d at 883.
22The Court cites Maxwell v. Barringer 110 N.C. 76, 14 S.E. 516
(1892), and 54 Am. JUR. Trusts § 433 (1945), in support of its statement.
Both authorities support the general proposition that a trustee must have the
power of sale to effectively dispose of trust property, but neither authority
deals with the power of sale as related to the pleadings in an action to
enforce the trustee's contract of sale.
"
3Thus, in Webber v. Spencer, 148 Neb. 481, 27 N.W.2d 824 (1947),
it was held that a guardian having no power to sell his ward's property
could not make a valid contract to sell the property, and that such a contract
could not be specifically enforced.
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of defense to be raised by the answer rather than anticipated in
the complaint.24 In any event, in view of the court's statement, it
behooves the vendee's attorney, in actions to enforce the trustee's
contract of sale, to allege facts in the complaint sufficient to indicate
a power of sale in the trustee.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
ADOPTED CHILDREN
In Thomas v. Thomas1 there was an action to construe a will
executed in 1926 in which the testator devised property to his son
for life, remainder in fee to the children of the son living at his
death, and if there were no such children, then to the brothers
and sisters of the son in fee simple. At the time of the death
of the testator the son had no children but later adopted a child
who was living at the death of the son. The Court held that the
child adopted after the death of the testator could not take. This
decision is in accord with the majority view which holds that where
there is a testamentary provision for the children of a named person,
an adopted child is presumed not to be included unless there is
language in the will, or there are other attendant circumstances
present at the time of the making of the will, which make it clear
that the adopted child was intended to be included.2
In adopting the majority view the Court applied the law in
effect in North Carolina in 1926, the time of the execution of the
will. This decision was based on the settled rule that the intent of
the testator is to be ascertained from a consideration of the language
he used in the light of the circumstances existing at the time the
will was made? Since at that time, there was nothing in our statutes
of descent and distribution or our adoption laws, or in the will itself
to indicate that an adopted child would or could be the ultimate taker,
it followed that the child should be precluded.4
' See Rachou v. McQuitty, 125 Mont. 1, 229 P.2d 965 (1951). See
generally CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 97 (Hornbook series 1947).
258 N.C. 590, 129 S.E.2d 239 (1963).
2Id. at 592, 129 S.E.2d at 240. The Court cited Smyth v. McKissick,
222 N.C. 644, 24 S.E.2d 621 (1943), on this point and numerous cases from
other jurisdictions. See Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 12 (1962).
258 N.C. at 594, 129 S.E.2d at 241.
'258 N.C. at 594, 129 S.E.2d at 242. The Court pointed out that a
distinction between devises and inheritances with respect to an adopted
child is still made in most jurisdictions and made the comment that, if there
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There were two dissenting judges who thought the child should
take. They cited G.S. § 48-23, enacted in 1955, and argued that the
testator selected the date of the death of his son as the time for the
remainder to go to the child and on such date the law of North
Carolina embodied in G.S. § 48-23, was that the adopted child was
the son's child for all purposes. The dissent discredited the majority's
argument that the testator did not know the law of adoption might
ultimately be changed to give an adopted child full family status, it
being their opinion that neither did he know to the contrary. On the
lack of uniformity in the attitude of the courts toward adopted chil-
dren, the dissent commented that "some are inclined to take them
by the hand; others by the seat of the pants."5
CONSTRUCTION
In Yount v. Yount' there was a proceeding under the Declaratory
Judgment Acta to secure the interpretation of a will and codicil.
In the will the names of the two executors were typed below the
signature of the testator and opposite the signature of the witnesses,
thereby raising the question of whether the executors were effectively
appointed. The Court held that when the clerk of the superior court
probated the will he adjudicated that these words were a part of the
will and that this adjudication was binding on the Court and the
parties until vacated on appeal from the clerk or declared void in a
direct proceeding.7 Apparently the Court felt that the clerk was on
sound ground, for in a dictum it ventured further and pointed out
that North Carolina statutes have never required a testator to sub-
scribe his signature to a will.' It was also noted that the signatures
of the witnesses were subscribed and that no provisions relating to
disposition or administration were written below these signatures.
In the codicil the testator again designated two executors but
were a question of inheritance here, G.S. § 48-23 would control, and the
adopted child would not be precluded. Although at the time action was
commenced in this case G.S. § 48-23, as construed, applied only to inherit-
ances, a 1963 amendment to the statute specifically states that the word
"child" or its plural form in a deed, grant, will or other written instrument is
to be held to include adopted children whether the written instrument is
executed before or after the entry of the order of adoption and whether the
instrument was executed before or after the enactment of this section.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-23(3) (Supp. 1963).
r258 N.C. at 598, 129 S.E.2d at 244.
258 N.C. 236, 128 S.E.2d 613 (1962).
aN.C. Gen Stat. §§ 1-253 to -267 (1953).
Id. at 238, 128 S.E.2d at 616.8Id. at 239, 128 S.E.2d at 616.
[Vol. 42
NORTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
only one of them was the same as in the will, thus raising the ques-
tion of whether this designation in the codicil revoked that in the
will or whether all three should serve as executors. The Court noted
that cases construing appointments, 9f other or additional executors
than those named in the will are few. Two English cases were cited
where both those named in the will and in the codicil were held to be
co-executorsY But the Court did not deem these cases to be per-
suasive and held that the testator by his codicil revoked the appoint-
ments in his will, this decision being based on the ground that he
meant to substitute completely those named in the codicil for those
in the will.1"
It is a rule of construction that for a codicil to revoke any part
of a will, its provisions must be so inconsistent with those of the
will as to exclude any' other legitimate inference than that the testator
had changed his intentions.:" However rules of construction must
bend to the testator's intention, and here the Court read the instru-
ments as evidencing an intent on the part of the testator to revoke
the appointment in the will and to substitute the appointment made
in the codicil. On this issue there was a strong dissent premised on
the fact that the rule of construction together with the two English
cases should control; and therefore, all three should be executors.'2
In Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Dodson1' there was another
proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act for the construction
of a will and codicil. The testatrix left to'her sisters, A and B, the
income from her estate, made up largely of corporate stock, for
life and on the death or marriage of either, the survivor was to get
the whole of the income, not exceeding twelve hundred dollars per
year. Upon the death or marriage of the survivor of A and B, C
and D were to receive a specified number of shares of the corporate
stock, which produced part of the life income received by A and B.
One of the issues before the Court was whether the legatees of
In the Goods of John Howard, L.R. 1 P. & D. 636 (1869) ; Evans v.
Evans, 17 Sim. 86, 60 Eng. Rep. 1060 (1849). In the Goods of Daniel Lowe,
3 S. & T. 478, 164 Eng. Rep. 1361 (1864), was also cited by the Court. In
that case the wife was named "sole executrix" in a codicil, and this was held
to be tantamount to a revocation of the appointment in the will because it
implied an intention that no other person should be associated with her in
the office of executrix.
10 258 N.C. at 240, 128 S.E.2d at 617.
" Armstrong v. Armstrong, 235 N.C. 733, 71 S.E.2d 119 (1952).
12258 N.C. at 243, 128 S.E.2d at 619.
260 N.C. 22, 131 S.E.2d 875 (1963).
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the stock were specific or demonstrative. In deciding that they were
specific, the Court cited and approved the following general state-
ments concerning the two types of legacies:
If the thing bequeathed is... undividuated so that it is dis-
tinguishable from all others of the same kind, it is a "specific
legacy"'14.... A demonstrative legacy is a bequest of money or
other fungible goods, payable out of ... a particular fund in
such a way as not to amount to a gift of the corpus of the fund
... and so described as to be indistinguishable from other things
of the same ind.'5
The Court was then confronted with the question of how to
treat the stock dividends, stock splits and cash dividends derived
from the corporate stock, both during the lives of A and B and
during the life of the survivor. As to the stock dividends and stock
splits the matter was settled by following the rule almost universally
recognized by the courts that legacies carry with them all accretions
of dividends, and the like, that accrue after the death of the testator
but before the actual satisfaction of the specific legacies.,
The cash dividends from the stock, however, demanded a dif-
ferent treatment, and the problem was complicated by the unusual
wording of the bequest to A and B, who were to receive the income
for life or until marriage, the survivor to receive the whole of the in-
come, not exceeding twelve hundred dollars per year. The problem
was resolved as follows:
(1) During the Lives of A and B. The life interest of the income
from the testator's estate, which A and B were to receive, mani-
fested an intent on the part of the testator that the specific legacies
not carry with them cash dividends during the lifetime of A and B.17
(2) After the Death of One of the Life Tenants. Although the
Court was unable to find any cases from any jurisdiction construing
a will using the same language as the one here, it was held that the
gift to the survivor of A and B of the whole of the income, but not
14 Id. at 34, 131 S.E.2d at 883, quoting from Heyer v. Bullock, 210 N.C.
321, 328, 186 S.E.2d 356, 360 (1936).
* 260 N.C. at 34, 131 S.E.2d at 883, quoting from Shepard v. Bryan,
195 N.C. 822, 828, 143 S.E. 835, 838 (1928).
16260 N.C. at 36, 131 S.E.2d at 884, citing Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1129(1938), and a number of North Carolina cases that have followed this rule.
" The "universal rule" that was followed in determining how to dispose
of the stock dividends and stock splits is subject to an exception where there
is a contrary intent evidenced in the will. This exception was invoked here
with respect to the cash dividends. 260 N.C. at 37, 131 S.E.2d at 885.
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exceeding twelve hundred dollars per year, entitled the survivor to
a maximum of twelve hundred dollars per year and no more.',
The Court noted that it was impossible to reconcile the language
"whole of said income" with "not exceeding twelve hundred dollars
per year," but cited a great number of cases from other jurisdictions
in support of its conclusion. This meant that after the death of one
of the life tenants, the specific legacies of the stock carried with
them all cash dividends that were not required to make up the
twelve hundred dollars per year that was to go to the survivor.
DISSENT-EFFECT ON ADMINISTRATION
In First Union Nat'l Bank v. Melvin.' the widow of a childless
testator dissented from the will, under which she received less than
one half of his net estate.20 Action was brought to determine the
effect of the dissent upon the distribution and administration of the
estate.
One of the issues before the Court was whether a widow who has
dissented from her husband's will takes her year's allowance in
addition to, or as part of, her statutory share of his estate.2 The
Court held that after her dissent the widow was no longer a bene-
ficiary of the will, and therefore, under G.S. § 30-15 she was en-
titled to her year's allowance in addition to her statutory intestate
share of the estate.
Another key question to be determined was whether, where a
18260 N.C. at 40, 131 S.E.2d at 887.
19259 N.C. 255, 130 S.E.2d 387 (1963). This case is discussed in
TAXATION, Estate Tax, supra.2 Under the provisions of N.C. GEN STAT. § 30-3 (a) (Supp. 1963),
as a dissenting widow of a deceased husband who was not survived by any
lineal descendants or parent, she was entitled to one half of the net estate
as defined in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-2(3) (Supp. 1963).21259 N.C. at 260, 130 S.E.2d at 392. The Court pointed out that G.S.
§ 30-15, rewritten in 1961, for the first time in North Carolina allowed a
year's allowance in the case of testacy, but it is in that case to be charged
against the share of the surviving spouse.
Also discussed was Dudley v. Staton, 257 N.C. 572, 126 S.E.2d 590
(1962), which held that a husband could not dissent from his wife's will.
The Court's language to the effect that he can have no year's allowance if
his wife disinherits him because he cannot dissent would seem to be no
longer valid in the light of the recent constitutional amendment which
enables the legislature to equalize the property rights of husband and wife.
The law which enacted the amendment that was subsequently ratified by a
general election says in pertinent part: "From and after date of certification
of the amendment... wherever the word "spouse" appears in the General
Statutes with reference to testate or intestate succession, it shall apply
alike to both husband and wife." N.C. Sess. Laws 1963, ch. 1209, § 4.1.
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widow dissents, the residuary estate is first liable for her share or
whether it is to be taken pro rata from the shares of all the named
beneficiaries. The Court noted that prior to July 1960, the effective
date of G.S. § 30-3(c), North Carolina was in accord with the
majority view that when a widow's dissent makes it necessary for
other beneficiaries to contribute to her statutory share, the residuary
estate is first liable.22 However, now under G.S. § 30-3 (c) the
share of the estate in excess of that devised or bequeathed her which
must be set aside for her is not to be taken from the residuary estate,
but is to be taken pro rata from the shares of all the beneficiaries,
unless the will otherwise provides.23 Here, since the will did not
provide otherwise, the statutory method of pro rata contribution
by other beneficiaries had to be employed.
Finally it was held that upon the filing of her dissent the widow
became vested with title to her statutory share of the real property,
a one half undivided interest, and therefore, was entitled to one half
of the income therefrom from the date of the death of the testator.
2 4
ELECTION
In North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Barbee25 the testator named
his wife executrix of his will, left her a life estate in all of his property,
both real and personal, and purported to devise to his children three
lots which he had held as tenant by the entirety with his wife. The
Court held that the wife's offer of the will for probate and her
qualification as executrix did not constitute an election to take only
under the will or to waive her claim as survivor to the entireties
properties, which the will purported to devise to the children.
The Court noted the majority rule is that merely qualifying as
executor or administrator c.t.a. is not sufficient, standing alone, to
constitute an election to take under the will. 26 North Carolina follows
this rule, unless the executor is by the terms of the will required to
make an election. The Court cited a long line of North Carolina
22259 N.C. at 261, 129 S.E.2d at 393. See generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.2d
291 (1954).23259 N.C. at 261, 129 S.E.2d at 393.
2259 N.C. at 264, 129 S.E.2d at 394. See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 1253
(1956) and Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1129 (1938).2 260 N.C. 106, 131 S.E.2d 666 (1963).
2 08 Id. at 108, 131 S.E.2d at 669. See Annot., 166 A.L.R. 316 (1947).
"' For an earlier holding contra to the instant case, see Mendenhall v.
Mendenhall, 53 N.C. 287 (1860), where the act of qualifying as executrix
and the undertaking to carry out provisions of the will were considered to
constitute an irrevocable election to abide by the terms of the will.
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cases on the point that where, in a purported disposal of a bene-
ficiary's property to third parties, the testator has mistaken it to be
his, the law will not imply an election." This, coupled with the pre-
sumption that a testator means only to dispose of that which is his
own, effectively prevented a construction that would give rise to the
finding that the widow had made an election.
EVIDENCE-POSSIBILITY or ISSUE EXTINCT
In Hicks v. Hicks29 an action was brought to determine the
ownership of government bonds and cash which represented the
proceeds from the sale of land which had been devised to the plain-
tiff for life, and then to her children. The plaintiff's son, her only
child, had died leaving a wife as the sole beneficiary under his will.
The son's wife transferred all her right, title and interest in the
bonds and cash to the plaintiff.
In affirming the lower court's decision that the plaintiff was the
absolute owner of the bonds and cash, the Supreme Court held that
medical testimony that the plaintiff was seventy-three years old and
that her ovaries had been surgically removed was sufficient to rebut
the legal presumption that possibility of issue is not extinct until
death and to establish that she was incapable of bearing children.30
EXECUTORS AND ADmINISTRATORS
In Spivey v. Godfrey, 1 the plaintiff was one of the next of kin
of a deceased intestate. The defendants held in trust a fund of money
which was to be ratably divided among all of the next of kin of the
intestate. The plaintiff had received less than one half of his share
and sued for the balance due.
In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiff's action
the Supreme Court followed the general rule that the administrator,
and not the creditors or next of kin, is the proper party to bring an
action to collect a debt due the estate or to recover specific personal
property. 2 The Court noted that there are execptions to this gen-
28260 N.C. at 111, 131 S.E.2d at 671. See Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 736
(1958), where the North Carolina cases and those from other jurisdictions
are discussed.2- 259 N.C. 387, 130 S.E.2d 666 (1963).
so The Court followed and quoted at length from United States v.
Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1934). The possibility of issue extinct
is the topic of annotations in Annot., 67 A.L.R. 538 (1930) and Annot.,
146 A.L.R. 794 (1943).8258 N.C. 676, 129 S.E.2d 253 (1963).82 Id. at 677, 129 S.E.2d at 254.
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eral rule. If the administrator has refused to bring the action to col-
lect the assets; if there is collusion between a debtor and a personal
representative; or, if there is some other peculiar circumstance
that warrants it, the creditors or next of kin may bring the action
which the personal representative should have brought.83  There
was nothing alleged in this case to bring it within one of the stated
exceptions.
PROBATE
In lt re Will of Marks8 4 two writings of the same testator were
admitted to probate in the same county-one dated January 1961
and probated in March 1961, the other dated February 1961 and
probated in April 1961. The latter was probated by means of an
exemplified copy of a South Carolina probate proceeding. The
clerk, after a hearing, ordered the transcript of the South Carolina
proceeding stricken from the record.85
On appeal from an affirmance of the clerk's order, the Court
noted that there is a division of authority on whether it is necessary
to caveat a writing previously admitted to probate in order to
establish a later writing as a will. North Carolina adheres to the
rule that the proper way to challenge the validity of a probate in
common form is by caveat. 8 Thus it was held here that the South
Carolina proceeding could not be probated in North Carolina until
the judgment establishing the January writing as the testator's will
had been set aside, and to do so it was necessary to caveat the
previously probated will.
3 3 Id. at 677-78, 129 S.E.2d at 254-55.
",259 N.C. 326, 130 S.E.2d 673 (1963).
35 Id. at 328, 130 S.E.2d at 675. On the possibility of both a North Caro-
lina court and a South Carolina court each finding that the testator was
domiciled in its jurisdiction, the Court said that this was a question of fact
of which different courts may reach different conclusions without invading
constitutional rights and cited Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343
(1942).
36 259 N.C. at 331, 130 S.E.2d at 667. Accord Holt v. Holt 232 N.C.
497, 61 S.E.2d 448 (1950); In re Will of Puett, 229 N.C. 8, 47 S.E.2d 488
(1948).
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